linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot()
@ 2024-11-24 12:46 Sasha Levin
  2024-11-24 12:46 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 2/5] perf/x86/amd: Warn only on new bits set Sasha Levin
  2024-11-24 13:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Oleg Nesterov
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2024-11-24 12:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra, Sasha Levin, mhiramat, mingo, acme,
	namhyung, linux-trace-kernel, linux-perf-users

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit c7b4133c48445dde789ed30b19ccb0448c7593f7 ]

1. Clear utask->xol_vaddr unconditionally, even if this addr is not valid,
   xol_free_insn_slot() should never return with utask->xol_vaddr != NULL.

2. Add a comment to explain why do we need to validate slot_addr.

3. Simplify the validation above. We can simply check offset < PAGE_SIZE,
   unsigned underflows are fine, it should work if slot_addr < area->vaddr.

4. Kill the unnecessary "slot_nr >= UINSNS_PER_PAGE" check, slot_nr must
   be valid if offset < PAGE_SIZE.

The next patches will cleanup this function even more.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240929144235.GA9471@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/events/uprobes.c | 21 +++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 4b52cb2ae6d62..cc605df73d72f 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -1683,8 +1683,8 @@ static unsigned long xol_get_insn_slot(struct uprobe *uprobe)
 static void xol_free_insn_slot(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct xol_area *area;
-	unsigned long vma_end;
 	unsigned long slot_addr;
+	unsigned long offset;
 
 	if (!tsk->mm || !tsk->mm->uprobes_state.xol_area || !tsk->utask)
 		return;
@@ -1693,24 +1693,21 @@ static void xol_free_insn_slot(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	if (unlikely(!slot_addr))
 		return;
 
+	tsk->utask->xol_vaddr = 0;
 	area = tsk->mm->uprobes_state.xol_area;
-	vma_end = area->vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
-	if (area->vaddr <= slot_addr && slot_addr < vma_end) {
-		unsigned long offset;
-		int slot_nr;
-
-		offset = slot_addr - area->vaddr;
-		slot_nr = offset / UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES;
-		if (slot_nr >= UINSNS_PER_PAGE)
-			return;
+	offset = slot_addr - area->vaddr;
+	/*
+	 * slot_addr must fit into [area->vaddr, area->vaddr + PAGE_SIZE).
+	 * This check can only fail if the "[uprobes]" vma was mremap'ed.
+	 */
+	if (offset < PAGE_SIZE) {
+		int slot_nr = offset / UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES;
 
 		clear_bit(slot_nr, area->bitmap);
 		atomic_dec(&area->slot_count);
 		smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* pairs with prepare_to_wait() */
 		if (waitqueue_active(&area->wq))
 			wake_up(&area->wq);
-
-		tsk->utask->xol_vaddr = 0;
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 2/5] perf/x86/amd: Warn only on new bits set
  2024-11-24 12:46 [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Sasha Levin
@ 2024-11-24 12:46 ` Sasha Levin
  2024-11-24 13:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Oleg Nesterov
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2024-11-24 12:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, stable
  Cc: Breno Leitao, Paul E . McKenney, Peter Zijlstra, Sandipan Das,
	Sasha Levin, mingo, acme, namhyung, tglx, bp, dave.hansen, x86,
	linux-perf-users

From: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>

[ Upstream commit de20037e1b3c2f2ca97b8c12b8c7bca8abd509a7 ]

Warning at every leaking bits can cause a flood of message, triggering
various stall-warning mechanisms to fire, including CSD locks, which
makes the machine to be unusable.

Track the bits that are being leaked, and only warn when a new bit is
set.

That said, this patch will help with the following issues:

1) It will tell us which bits are being set, so, it is easy to
   communicate it back to vendor, and to do a root-cause analyzes.

2) It avoid the machine to be unusable, because, worst case
   scenario, the user gets less than 60 WARNs (one per unhandled bit).

Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241001141020.2620361-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
index 920e3a640cadd..b4a1a2576510e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
@@ -943,11 +943,12 @@ static int amd_pmu_v2_snapshot_branch_stack(struct perf_branch_entry *entries, u
 static int amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events);
+	static atomic64_t status_warned = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
+	u64 reserved, status, mask, new_bits, prev_bits;
 	struct perf_sample_data data;
 	struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
 	struct perf_event *event;
 	int handled = 0, idx;
-	u64 reserved, status, mask;
 	bool pmu_enabled;
 
 	/*
@@ -1012,7 +1013,12 @@ static int amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	 * the corresponding PMCs are expected to be inactive according to the
 	 * active_mask
 	 */
-	WARN_ON(status > 0);
+	if (status > 0) {
+		prev_bits = atomic64_fetch_or(status, &status_warned);
+		// A new bit was set for the very first time.
+		new_bits = status & ~prev_bits;
+		WARN(new_bits, "New overflows for inactive PMCs: %llx\n", new_bits);
+	}
 
 	/* Clear overflow and freeze bits */
 	amd_pmu_ack_global_status(~status);
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot()
  2024-11-24 12:46 [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Sasha Levin
  2024-11-24 12:46 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 2/5] perf/x86/amd: Warn only on new bits set Sasha Levin
@ 2024-11-24 13:13 ` Oleg Nesterov
  2024-11-24 14:15   ` Sasha Levin
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2024-11-24 13:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sasha Levin
  Cc: linux-kernel, stable, Peter Zijlstra, mhiramat, mingo, acme,
	namhyung, linux-trace-kernel, linux-perf-users

Hi Sasha,

but why do you think it makes sense to backport these "uprobes" cleanups?

Oleg.

On 11/24, Sasha Levin wrote:
>
> From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit c7b4133c48445dde789ed30b19ccb0448c7593f7 ]
>
> 1. Clear utask->xol_vaddr unconditionally, even if this addr is not valid,
>    xol_free_insn_slot() should never return with utask->xol_vaddr != NULL.
>
> 2. Add a comment to explain why do we need to validate slot_addr.
>
> 3. Simplify the validation above. We can simply check offset < PAGE_SIZE,
>    unsigned underflows are fine, it should work if slot_addr < area->vaddr.
>
> 4. Kill the unnecessary "slot_nr >= UINSNS_PER_PAGE" check, slot_nr must
>    be valid if offset < PAGE_SIZE.
>
> The next patches will cleanup this function even more.
>
> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240929144235.GA9471@redhat.com
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> ---
>  kernel/events/uprobes.c | 21 +++++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> index 4b52cb2ae6d62..cc605df73d72f 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> @@ -1683,8 +1683,8 @@ static unsigned long xol_get_insn_slot(struct uprobe *uprobe)
>  static void xol_free_insn_slot(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  {
>  	struct xol_area *area;
> -	unsigned long vma_end;
>  	unsigned long slot_addr;
> +	unsigned long offset;
>
>  	if (!tsk->mm || !tsk->mm->uprobes_state.xol_area || !tsk->utask)
>  		return;
> @@ -1693,24 +1693,21 @@ static void xol_free_insn_slot(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	if (unlikely(!slot_addr))
>  		return;
>
> +	tsk->utask->xol_vaddr = 0;
>  	area = tsk->mm->uprobes_state.xol_area;
> -	vma_end = area->vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
> -	if (area->vaddr <= slot_addr && slot_addr < vma_end) {
> -		unsigned long offset;
> -		int slot_nr;
> -
> -		offset = slot_addr - area->vaddr;
> -		slot_nr = offset / UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES;
> -		if (slot_nr >= UINSNS_PER_PAGE)
> -			return;
> +	offset = slot_addr - area->vaddr;
> +	/*
> +	 * slot_addr must fit into [area->vaddr, area->vaddr + PAGE_SIZE).
> +	 * This check can only fail if the "[uprobes]" vma was mremap'ed.
> +	 */
> +	if (offset < PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		int slot_nr = offset / UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES;
>
>  		clear_bit(slot_nr, area->bitmap);
>  		atomic_dec(&area->slot_count);
>  		smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* pairs with prepare_to_wait() */
>  		if (waitqueue_active(&area->wq))
>  			wake_up(&area->wq);
> -
> -		tsk->utask->xol_vaddr = 0;
>  	}
>  }
>
> --
> 2.43.0
>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot()
  2024-11-24 13:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Oleg Nesterov
@ 2024-11-24 14:15   ` Sasha Levin
  2024-11-24 14:36     ` Oleg Nesterov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2024-11-24 14:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Oleg Nesterov
  Cc: linux-kernel, stable, Peter Zijlstra, mhiramat, mingo, acme,
	namhyung, linux-trace-kernel, linux-perf-users

On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 02:13:57PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>Hi Sasha,
>
>but why do you think it makes sense to backport these "uprobes" cleanups?

If it doesn't, I'm happy to drop them. This commit was selected mostly
because of:

>> 1. Clear utask->xol_vaddr unconditionally, even if this addr is not valid,
>>    xol_free_insn_slot() should never return with utask->xol_vaddr != NULL.

Which sounded to me like more than a cleanup.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot()
  2024-11-24 14:15   ` Sasha Levin
@ 2024-11-24 14:36     ` Oleg Nesterov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2024-11-24 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sasha Levin
  Cc: linux-kernel, stable, Peter Zijlstra, mhiramat, mingo, acme,
	namhyung, linux-trace-kernel, linux-perf-users

On 11/24, Sasha Levin wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 02:13:57PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> >Hi Sasha,
> >
> >but why do you think it makes sense to backport these "uprobes" cleanups?
>
> If it doesn't, I'm happy to drop them. This commit was selected mostly
> because of:

I'd suggest to drop.

> >>1. Clear utask->xol_vaddr unconditionally, even if this addr is not valid,
> >>   xol_free_insn_slot() should never return with utask->xol_vaddr != NULL.
>
> Which sounded to me like more than a cleanup.

Sorry for confusion. This patch doesn't make much sense without the next
changes.

Oleg.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2024-11-24 14:37 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-11-24 12:46 [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Sasha Levin
2024-11-24 12:46 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 2/5] perf/x86/amd: Warn only on new bits set Sasha Levin
2024-11-24 13:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/5] uprobes: sanitiize xol_free_insn_slot() Oleg Nesterov
2024-11-24 14:15   ` Sasha Levin
2024-11-24 14:36     ` Oleg Nesterov

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).