[PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Henry Zhang]

KCSAN reported a data race where perf_event_set_bpf_handler() writes
event->prog while __perf_event_overflow() reads it concurrently from
interrupt context:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __perf_event_overflow / __perf_event_set_bpf_prog

write to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by task 13065 on cpu 0:
 perf_event_set_bpf_handler kernel/events/core.c:10352 [inline]
 __perf_event_set_bpf_prog+0x418/0x470 kernel/events/core.c:11303
...

read to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
 __perf_event_overflow+0x252/0x920 kernel/events/core.c:10410
...

Annotate event->prog access with WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE.

Reported-by: syzbot+2a077cb788749964cf68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2a077cb788749964cf68
Signed-off-by: Henry Zhang <zeri@umich.edu>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
 		return -EPROTO;
 	}
 
-	event->prog = prog;
+	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
 	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
 	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
 		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
 
-	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
+	struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
+
+	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
 	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
 		goto out;
 
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Qing Wang]

On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 10:36, Henry Zhang <henryzhangjcle@gmail.com> wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
>  		return -EPROTO;
>  	}
>  
> -	event->prog = prog;
> +	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
>  	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
>  	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
>  		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
>  
> -	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> +	struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> +
> +	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
>  	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
>  		goto out;

Looking at this code, I guess there may be an serious issue: a potential
use-after-free (UAF) risk when accessing event->prog in __perf_event_overflow.

CPU 0 (interrupt context)               CPU 1 (process context)
read event->prog
                                        perf_event_free_bpf_handler()
                                            put(prog)
                                                free(prog)
access memory pointed to by prog

This scenario need to be more analysis.

--
Qing

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Qing Wang]

On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 16:37, Qing Wang <wangqing7171@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 10:36, Henry Zhang <henryzhangjcle@gmail.com> wrote:
> > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> >  		return -EPROTO;
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	event->prog = prog;
> > +	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> >  	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> > @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> >  	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> >  		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
> >  
> > -	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > +	struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> > +
> > +	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> >  	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> >  		goto out;
> 
> Looking at this code, I guess there may be an serious issue: a potential
> use-after-free (UAF) risk when accessing event->prog in __perf_event_overflow.
> 
> CPU 0 (interrupt context)               CPU 1 (process context)
> read event->prog
>                                         perf_event_free_bpf_handler()
>                                             put(prog)
>                                                 free(prog)
> access memory pointed to by prog
> 
> This scenario need to be more analysis.
> 
> --
> Qing

This is my idea for solving the problem of data competition and potential UAF.

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a0fa488bce84..3abf3689157d 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -10291,7 +10291,12 @@ static inline bool sample_is_allowed(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *r
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+/*
+ * Execute the attached BPF program. Caller must ensure prog is non-NULL
+ * and of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT under RCU protection.
+ */
 static int bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event,
+				struct bpf_prog *prog,
 				struct perf_sample_data *data,
 				struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
@@ -10299,22 +10304,17 @@ static int bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event,
 		.data = data,
 		.event = event,
 	};
-	struct bpf_prog *prog;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	ctx.regs = perf_arch_bpf_user_pt_regs(regs);
 	if (unlikely(__this_cpu_inc_return(bpf_prog_active) != 1))
 		goto out;
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
-	if (prog) {
-		perf_prepare_sample(data, event, regs);
-		ret = bpf_prog_run(prog, &ctx);
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	perf_prepare_sample(data, event, regs);
+	ret = bpf_prog_run(prog, &ctx);
+
 out:
 	__this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
 		return -EPROTO;
 	}
 
-	event->prog = prog;
+	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
 	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -10361,13 +10361,14 @@ static inline void perf_event_free_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (!prog)
 		return;
 
-	event->prog = NULL;
+	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, NULL);
 	bpf_prog_put(prog);
 }
 #else
 static inline int bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event,
-				       struct perf_sample_data *data,
-				       struct pt_regs *regs)
+				struct bpf_prog *prog,
+				struct perf_sample_data *data,
+				struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -10407,9 +10408,19 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
 	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
 		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
 
-	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
-	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
+	/*
+	 * For BPF-based overflow handling. If a BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT
+	 * program is attached, execute it and skip default overflow handling.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	struct bpf_prog *prog = rcu_dereference(event->prog);
+
+	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
+	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, prog, data, regs)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		goto out;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	/*
 	 * XXX event_limit might not quite work as expected on inherited

What do you think about this solution? Looking forward to your review.
--
Qing

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Henry Zhang]

Thanks, this looks good.

--
Henry

On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 5:36 AM Qing Wang <wangqing7171@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 16:37, Qing Wang <wangqing7171@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 10:36, Henry Zhang <henryzhangjcle@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> > >             return -EPROTO;
> > >     }
> > >
> > > -   event->prog = prog;
> > > +   WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> > >     event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
> > >     return 0;
> > >  }
> > > @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> > >     if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> > >             perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
> > >
> > > -   if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > > +   struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> > > +
> > > +   if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > >         !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> > >             goto out;
> >
> > Looking at this code, I guess there may be an serious issue: a potential
> > use-after-free (UAF) risk when accessing event->prog in __perf_event_overflow.
> >
> > CPU 0 (interrupt context)               CPU 1 (process context)
> > read event->prog
> >                                         perf_event_free_bpf_handler()
> >                                             put(prog)
> >                                                 free(prog)
> > access memory pointed to by prog
> >
> > This scenario need to be more analysis.
> >
> > --
> > Qing
>
> This is my idea for solving the problem of data competition and potential UAF.
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index a0fa488bce84..3abf3689157d 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -10291,7 +10291,12 @@ static inline bool sample_is_allowed(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *r
>  }
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> +/*
> + * Execute the attached BPF program. Caller must ensure prog is non-NULL
> + * and of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT under RCU protection.
> + */
>  static int bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> +                               struct bpf_prog *prog,
>                                 struct perf_sample_data *data,
>                                 struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
> @@ -10299,22 +10304,17 @@ static int bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event,
>                 .data = data,
>                 .event = event,
>         };
> -       struct bpf_prog *prog;
>         int ret = 0;
>
>         ctx.regs = perf_arch_bpf_user_pt_regs(regs);
>         if (unlikely(__this_cpu_inc_return(bpf_prog_active) != 1))
>                 goto out;
> -       rcu_read_lock();
> -       prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> -       if (prog) {
> -               perf_prepare_sample(data, event, regs);
> -               ret = bpf_prog_run(prog, &ctx);
> -       }
> -       rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +       perf_prepare_sample(data, event, regs);
> +       ret = bpf_prog_run(prog, &ctx);
> +
>  out:
>         __this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active);
> -
>         return ret;
>  }
>
> @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
>                 return -EPROTO;
>         }
>
> -       event->prog = prog;
> +       WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
>         event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
>         return 0;
>  }
> @@ -10361,13 +10361,14 @@ static inline void perf_event_free_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event)
>         if (!prog)
>                 return;
>
> -       event->prog = NULL;
> +       WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, NULL);
>         bpf_prog_put(prog);
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline int bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> -                                      struct perf_sample_data *data,
> -                                      struct pt_regs *regs)
> +                               struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +                               struct perf_sample_data *data,
> +                               struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
>         return 1;
>  }
> @@ -10407,9 +10408,19 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
>         if (event->attr.aux_pause)
>                 perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
>
> -       if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> -           !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> +       /*
> +        * For BPF-based overflow handling. If a BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT
> +        * program is attached, execute it and skip default overflow handling.
> +        */
> +       rcu_read_lock();
> +       struct bpf_prog *prog = rcu_dereference(event->prog);
> +
> +       if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> +           !bpf_overflow_handler(event, prog, data, regs)) {
> +               rcu_read_unlock();
>                 goto out;
> +       }
> +       rcu_read_unlock();
>
>         /*
>          * XXX event_limit might not quite work as expected on inherited
>
> What do you think about this solution? Looking forward to your review.
> --
> Qing

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Qing Wang]

On Wed, 28 Jan 2026 at 05:29, Henry Zhang <zeri@umich.edu> wrote:
> Thanks, this looks good.

Thanks for your review. Let's wait for maintainer's reply.

--
Qing

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Qing Wang]

On Wed, 28 Jan 2026 at 05:29, Henry Zhang <zeri@umich.edu> wrote:
> Thanks, this looks good.

I thought my patch is incorrect after review.

1. The RCU protects 'prog->aux' but not 'prog', so 'rcu_dereference(event->prog)'
is incorrect.
2. The UAF issue of 'prog' may not exist. It's needed further anlysis.

Let's forget my patch.

The data race is correctly fixed by your patch but there is still a little
suggestion:

The 'event->prog = NULL' in perf_event_free_bpf_handler is needed WRITE_ONCE.

--
Best regards,
Qing

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Peter Zijlstra]

On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 04:37:19PM +0800, Qing Wang wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 10:36, Henry Zhang <henryzhangjcle@gmail.com> wrote:
> > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> >  		return -EPROTO;
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	event->prog = prog;
> > +	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> >  	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> > @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> >  	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> >  		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
> >  
> > -	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > +	struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> > +
> > +	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> >  	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> >  		goto out;
> 
> Looking at this code, I guess there may be an serious issue: a potential
> use-after-free (UAF) risk when accessing event->prog in __perf_event_overflow.
> 
> CPU 0 (interrupt context)               CPU 1 (process context)
> read event->prog
>                                         perf_event_free_bpf_handler()
>                                             put(prog)
>                                                 free(prog)
> access memory pointed to by prog
> 
> This scenario need to be more analysis.

This can only happen if the event can overlap with removal, which it
typically cannot -- but I'll have to audit the software events.

Specifically, events happen in IRQ/NMI context, and event removal
involves an IPI to that very CPU, which by necessity will then have to
wait for event completion.

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Peter Zijlstra]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 09:36:18PM -0500, Henry Zhang wrote:
> KCSAN reported a data race where perf_event_set_bpf_handler() writes
> event->prog while __perf_event_overflow() reads it concurrently from
> interrupt context:
> 
> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __perf_event_overflow / __perf_event_set_bpf_prog
> 
> write to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by task 13065 on cpu 0:
>  perf_event_set_bpf_handler kernel/events/core.c:10352 [inline]
>  __perf_event_set_bpf_prog+0x418/0x470 kernel/events/core.c:11303
> ...
> 
> read to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
>  __perf_event_overflow+0x252/0x920 kernel/events/core.c:10410
> ...
> 
> Annotate event->prog access with WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE.
> 
> Reported-by: syzbot+2a077cb788749964cf68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2a077cb788749964cf68
> Signed-off-by: Henry Zhang <zeri@umich.edu>
> ---
>  kernel/events/core.c | 6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
>  		return -EPROTO;
>  	}
>  
> -	event->prog = prog;
> +	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
>  	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;

What about that cookie thing? The consumer seems to be a bpf function
(bpf_get_attach_cookie_pe) which can equally run concurrently, no?

Also, there seems to be a coherency issue here, if prog runs, it expects
cookie to be present and all that.

Would that not suggest something like:

	WRITE_ONCE(event->bpf_cookie, bpf_cookie);
	smp_store_release(&event->prog, prog);

>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
>  	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
>  		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
>  
> -	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> +	struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);

smp_load_acquire(&event->prog);

> +
> +	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
>  	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
>  		goto out;
>  

Hmm?

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Henry Zhang]

On Fri, Jan 30, 2026 at 5:23 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 09:36:18PM -0500, Henry Zhang wrote:
> > KCSAN reported a data race where perf_event_set_bpf_handler() writes
> > event->prog while __perf_event_overflow() reads it concurrently from
> > interrupt context:
> >
> > BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __perf_event_overflow / __perf_event_set_bpf_prog
> >
> > write to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by task 13065 on cpu 0:
> >  perf_event_set_bpf_handler kernel/events/core.c:10352 [inline]
> >  __perf_event_set_bpf_prog+0x418/0x470 kernel/events/core.c:11303
> > ...
> >
> > read to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
> >  __perf_event_overflow+0x252/0x920 kernel/events/core.c:10410
> > ...
> >
> > Annotate event->prog access with WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE.
> >
> > Reported-by: syzbot+2a077cb788749964cf68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2a077cb788749964cf68
> > Signed-off-by: Henry Zhang <zeri@umich.edu>
> > ---
> >  kernel/events/core.c | 6 ++++--
> >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> >               return -EPROTO;
> >       }
> >
> > -     event->prog = prog;
> > +     WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> >       event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
>
> What about that cookie thing? The consumer seems to be a bpf function
> (bpf_get_attach_cookie_pe) which can equally run concurrently, no?
>
> Also, there seems to be a coherency issue here, if prog runs, it expects
> cookie to be present and all that.
>
> Would that not suggest something like:
>
>         WRITE_ONCE(event->bpf_cookie, bpf_cookie);
>         smp_store_release(&event->prog, prog);
>
> >       return 0;
> >  }
> > @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> >       if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> >               perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
> >
> > -     if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > +     struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
>
> smp_load_acquire(&event->prog);
>
> > +
> > +     if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> >           !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> >               goto out;
> >
>
> Hmm?

Thanks for the feedback. I'll send a v2 later in the day.

--
Henry

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Andrii Nakryiko]

On Fri, Jan 30, 2026 at 2:23 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 09:36:18PM -0500, Henry Zhang wrote:
> > KCSAN reported a data race where perf_event_set_bpf_handler() writes
> > event->prog while __perf_event_overflow() reads it concurrently from
> > interrupt context:
> >
> > BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __perf_event_overflow / __perf_event_set_bpf_prog
> >
> > write to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by task 13065 on cpu 0:
> >  perf_event_set_bpf_handler kernel/events/core.c:10352 [inline]
> >  __perf_event_set_bpf_prog+0x418/0x470 kernel/events/core.c:11303
> > ...
> >
> > read to 0xffff88811b219168 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
> >  __perf_event_overflow+0x252/0x920 kernel/events/core.c:10410
> > ...
> >
> > Annotate event->prog access with WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE.
> >
> > Reported-by: syzbot+2a077cb788749964cf68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2a077cb788749964cf68
> > Signed-off-by: Henry Zhang <zeri@umich.edu>
> > ---
> >  kernel/events/core.c | 6 ++++--
> >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> >               return -EPROTO;
> >       }
> >
> > -     event->prog = prog;
> > +     WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> >       event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
>
> What about that cookie thing? The consumer seems to be a bpf function
> (bpf_get_attach_cookie_pe) which can equally run concurrently, no?
>
> Also, there seems to be a coherency issue here, if prog runs, it expects
> cookie to be present and all that.
>
> Would that not suggest something like:
>
>         WRITE_ONCE(event->bpf_cookie, bpf_cookie);
>         smp_store_release(&event->prog, prog);

yeah, once we set event->prog, we can theoretically have that BPF
program triggered before we set event->bpf_cookie.

But this setup thing is one-time and can be expensive...

>
> >       return 0;
> >  }
> > @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> >       if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> >               perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
> >
> > -     if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > +     struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
>
> smp_load_acquire(&event->prog);

while this is very frequent. So shouldn't we try to avoid unnecessary
overhead here? Maybe just use more expensive memory barriers in
perf_event_set_bpf_handler() to ensure that bpf_cookie will always be
set before event->prog can be seen by any CPU?

>
> > +
> > +     if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> >           !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> >               goto out;
> >
>
> Hmm?

Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()

[Peter Zijlstra]

On Fri, Jan 30, 2026 at 11:07:33AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 04:37:19PM +0800, Qing Wang wrote:
> > On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 10:36, Henry Zhang <henryzhangjcle@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> > >  		return -EPROTO;
> > >  	}
> > >  
> > > -	event->prog = prog;
> > > +	WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> > >  	event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
> > >  	return 0;
> > >  }
> > > @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> > >  	if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> > >  		perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
> > >  
> > > -	if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > > +	struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> > > +
> > > +	if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> > >  	    !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> > >  		goto out;
> > 
> > Looking at this code, I guess there may be an serious issue: a potential
> > use-after-free (UAF) risk when accessing event->prog in __perf_event_overflow.
> > 
> > CPU 0 (interrupt context)               CPU 1 (process context)
> > read event->prog
> >                                         perf_event_free_bpf_handler()
> >                                             put(prog)
> >                                                 free(prog)
> > access memory pointed to by prog
> > 
> > This scenario need to be more analysis.
> 
> This can only happen if the event can overlap with removal, which it
> typically cannot -- but I'll have to audit the software events.
> 
> Specifically, events happen in IRQ/NMI context, and event removal
> involves an IPI to that very CPU, which by necessity will then have to
> wait for event completion.

---
Subject: perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race

Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all
possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running
it with only preemption disabled.

This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go
and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like
the BPF program.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 22a0f405585b..1f5699b339ec 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -10777,6 +10777,13 @@ int perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
 			struct perf_sample_data *data,
 			struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Entry point from hardware PMI, interrupts should be disabled here.
+	 * This serializes us against perf_event_remove_from_context() in
+	 * things like perf_event_release_kernel().
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
 	return __perf_event_overflow(event, 1, data, regs);
 }
 
@@ -10853,6 +10860,19 @@ static void perf_swevent_event(struct perf_event *event, u64 nr,
 {
 	struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
 
+	/*
+	 * This is:
+	 *   - software		preempt
+	 *   - tracepoint	preempt
+	 *   -   tp_target_task	irq (ctx->lock)
+	 *   - uprobes		preempt/irq
+	 *   - kprobes		preempt/irq
+	 *   - hw_breakpoint	irq
+	 *
+	 * Any of these are sufficient to hold off RCU and thus ensure @event
+	 * exists.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
 	local64_add(nr, &event->count);
 
 	if (!regs)
@@ -10861,6 +10881,16 @@ static void perf_swevent_event(struct perf_event *event, u64 nr,
 	if (!is_sampling_event(event))
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * Serialize against event_function_call() IPIs like normal overflow
+	 * event handling. Specifically, must not allow
+	 * perf_event_release_kernel() -> perf_remove_from_context() to make
+	 * progress and 'release' the event from under us.
+	 */
+	guard(irqsave)();
+	if (event->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
+		return;
+
 	if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD) && !event->attr.freq) {
 		data->period = nr;
 		return perf_swevent_overflow(event, 1, data, regs);
@@ -11359,6 +11389,11 @@ void perf_tp_event(u16 event_type, u64 count, void *record, int entry_size,
 	struct perf_sample_data data;
 	struct perf_event *event;
 
+	/*
+	 * Per being a tracepoint, this runs with preemption disabled.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
+
 	struct perf_raw_record raw = {
 		.frag = {
 			.size = entry_size,
@@ -11691,6 +11726,11 @@ void perf_bp_event(struct perf_event *bp, void *data)
 	struct perf_sample_data sample;
 	struct pt_regs *regs = data;
 
+	/*
+	 * Exception context, will have interrupts disabled.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
 	perf_sample_data_init(&sample, bp->attr.bp_addr, 0);
 
 	if (!bp->hw.state && !perf_exclude_event(bp, regs))
@@ -12155,7 +12195,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart perf_swevent_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
 
 	if (regs && !perf_exclude_event(event, regs)) {
 		if (!(event->attr.exclude_idle && is_idle_task(current)))
-			if (__perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
+			if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs))
 				ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART;
 	}