public inbox for linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Anubhav Shelat <ashelat@redhat.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
	Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Anubhav Shelat <ashelat@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] perf: enable unprivileged syscall tracing with perf trace
Date: Wed,  8 Apr 2026 08:39:47 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260408123947.23779-2-ashelat@redhat.com> (raw)

Allow unprivileged users to trace their own processes' syscalls using
perf trace, similar to strace without the intrusive overhead of ptrace().

Currently, perf trace requires CAP_PERFMON or paranoid level ≤ 1 even
though the kernel has existing infrastructure (TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY)
specifically designed to mark syscall tracepoints as safe for
unprivileged access. To fix this:

1. Loosen the condition in perf_event_open() which requires priviliges
for all events with exclude_kernel=0. This allows perf_event_open() to
bypass the paranoid check for task-attached tracepoint events.

2. Make the format and id tracefs files world-readable only for tracepoints
   with TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY, allowing unprivileged users to see
syscall tracepoint ids without exposing sensitive information.

Example usage after this change:
  $ perf trace ls          # works as unprivileged user
  $ perf trace             # system-wide, still requires privileges
  $ perf trace -p 1234     # requires ptrace permission on pid 1234

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4.5
Signed-off-by: Anubhav Shelat <ashelat@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/events/core.c        | 2 +-
 kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 8 ++++++--
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 89b40e439717..71d99ea4bea4 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -13833,7 +13833,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
+	if (!attr.exclude_kernel && !(attr.type == PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT && pid != -1)) {
 		err = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (err)
 			return err;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
index 249d1cba72c0..6250b2529376 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
@@ -3051,7 +3051,9 @@ static int event_callback(const char *name, umode_t *mode, void **data,
 	struct trace_event_call *call = file->event_call;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "format") == 0) {
-		*mode = TRACE_MODE_READ;
+		*mode = (call->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY) ?
+			(TRACE_MODE_READ | 0004) :
+			TRACE_MODE_READ;
 		*fops = &ftrace_event_format_fops;
 		return 1;
 	}
@@ -3087,7 +3089,9 @@ static int event_callback(const char *name, umode_t *mode, void **data,
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
 	if (call->event.type && call->class->reg &&
 	    strcmp(name, "id") == 0) {
-		*mode = TRACE_MODE_READ;
+		*mode = (call->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY) ?
+		(TRACE_MODE_READ | 0004) :
+		TRACE_MODE_READ;
 		*data = (void *)(long)call->event.type;
 		*fops = &ftrace_event_id_fops;
 		return 1;
-- 
2.53.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-04-08 12:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-08 12:39 Anubhav Shelat [this message]
2026-04-08 13:06 ` [PATCH] perf: enable unprivileged syscall tracing with perf trace sashiko-bot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260408123947.23779-2-ashelat@redhat.com \
    --to=ashelat@redhat.com \
    --cc=acme@kernel.org \
    --cc=adrian.hunter@intel.com \
    --cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=irogers@google.com \
    --cc=james.clark@linaro.org \
    --cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=namhyung@kernel.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox