From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Anubhav Shelat" <ashelat@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] perf: enable unprivileged syscall tracing with perf trace
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 14:05:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260410140530.4F754C19421@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260410133529.21947-1-ashelat@redhat.com>
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [High] The kaddr_leak mask in perf_event_open() fails to block PERF_SAMPLE_IP and PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, allowing unprivileged users to bypass KASLR and leak kernel register state.
--
commit d9060ee10098244bcdd4bf26d128fe8ae6f9f578
Author: Anubhav Shelat <ashelat@redhat.com>
perf: enable unprivileged syscall tracing with perf trace
This patch allows unprivileged users to trace their own processes' syscalls
using perf trace by relaxing the perf_allow_kernel() check for task-attached
tracepoint events. It attempts to prevent KASLR bypasses by blocking sample
types that expose kernel addresses.
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index 6d1f8bad7e1c5..07d67d95af96f 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -13833,9 +13833,25 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> return err;
>
> if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
> - err = perf_allow_kernel();
> - if (err)
> - return err;
> + bool tp_bypass = false;
> +
> + if (attr.type == PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT && pid != -1) {
> + /*
> + * Block sample types that expose kernel addresses to
> + * prevent KASLR bypass
> + */
> + u64 kaddr_leak = PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN |
> + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK |
> + PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR;
Does this kaddr_leak mask need to include PERF_SAMPLE_IP and
PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR?
If an unprivileged user requests a task-attached tracepoint event with
exclude_kernel=0 and specifies PERF_SAMPLE_IP or PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR,
tp_bypass will evaluate to true and the perf_allow_kernel() check will be
skipped.
When the tracepoint fires in kernel mode, won't the user receive samples
containing the kernel instruction pointer and full CPU register state,
allowing a KASLR bypass?
> +
> + tp_bypass = !(attr.sample_type & kaddr_leak);
> + }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260410133529.21947-1-ashelat@redhat.com?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-10 14:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-10 13:35 [PATCH v2] perf: enable unprivileged syscall tracing with perf trace Anubhav Shelat
2026-04-10 14:05 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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