From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Dapeng Mi" <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v2 9/9] perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2026 05:24:10 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260609052411.1CCD61F00893@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260609050222.2458129-10-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] The patch breaks `perf record -g` for unprivileged users with existing `perf` binaries.
--
commit ac223ffdf5e79c1aa96a91deecdff94004bbe30f
Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested
This commit updates perf_event_open to verify kernel access permissions
when kernel callchains are requested, even if exclude_kernel is set.
This is intended to prevent unprivileged capture of kernel callchains.
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -13904,7 +13904,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
> + if (!attr.exclude_kernel ||
> + ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) &&
> + !attr.exclude_callchain_kernel)) {
> err = perf_allow_kernel();
[Severity: Critical]
Does this change break perf record -g for unprivileged users using
existing perf binaries?
When an unprivileged user runs perf record -g, the initial syscall
request fails with -EACCES. The perf tool's existing fallback logic
retries by setting exclude_kernel = 1, but it leaves
exclude_callchain_kernel = 0.
Because this new check enforces the privilege requirement for callchains
even when exclude_kernel is set, the retried syscall will fail a second
time with -EACCES.
Looking at the perf tool's fallback handler:
tools/perf/util/evsel.c:evsel__fallback() {
...
} else if (err == EACCES && !evsel->core.attr.exclude_kernel &&
(paranoid = perf_event_paranoid()) > 1) {
...
}
Since exclude_kernel was set to 1 during the first fallback, the tool
cannot handle the second -EACCES failure. Will this cause the tool to
abort entirely with a permission denied error rather than falling back
to user-only callchains?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609050222.2458129-1-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com?part=9
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-09 5:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-09 5:02 [Patch v2 0/9] perf/x86: Miscellaneous PMU bug fixes Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 1/9] perf/x86/intel: Remove anythread_deprecated bit from perf_capabilities Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 2/9] perf/x86: Introduce is_x86_pmu() helper Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 3/9] perf/x86: Update cap_user_rdpmc base on rdpmc user disable state Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 4/9] perf/x86/intel: Fallback to sw branch type decoding if no hw decoding Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 5/9] perf/x86/intel: Drop LBR entries whose privilege level mismatches br_sel Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 6/9] perf/x86/intel: Validate return value of intel_pmu_init_hybrid() Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 7/9] perf/x86/intel: Drop fixed-counter PEBS constraints for baseline PEBS Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 8/9] perf/core: Fix kernel register info leak via hardware skid Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:02 ` [Patch v2 9/9] perf/core: Check kernel access when kernel callchains are requested Dapeng Mi
2026-06-09 5:24 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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