From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Dapeng Mi" <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 3/8] perf/x86: Guard intel_pmu_cpu_dead() against invalid hybrid PMU casts
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 09:31:11 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260717093111.A5A0F1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260717080342.1879573-4-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] Setting `cpuc->pmu = NULL` on initialization failure triggers a user-triggerable `WARN_ON_ONCE` in `x86_get_pmu()`.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Unchecked MSR writes in NMI handler cause a #GP fault on asymmetric PMU configurations.
--
--- Patch [3]: [Patch v3 3/8] perf/x86: Guard intel_pmu_cpu_dead() against invalid hybrid PMU casts ---
commit 2ef12c59a0f0eb0a83a45dd11cf187ca55beecdf
Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
perf/x86: Guard intel_pmu_cpu_dead() against invalid hybrid PMU casts
Fix invalid container conversions in failure paths by clearing cpuc->pmu to
NULL when check_hw_exists() fails, and validating cpuc->pmu in
intel_pmu_cpu_dead(). A new helper x86_get_static_pmu() is added.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> index b39c6ce0efb5c..a991fc4f1575f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> @@ -6329,8 +6329,10 @@ static bool init_hybrid_pmu(int cpu)
>
> intel_pmu_check_hybrid_pmus(pmu);
>
> - if (!check_hw_exists(&pmu->pmu, pmu->cntr_mask, pmu->fixed_cntr_mask))
> + if (!check_hw_exists(&pmu->pmu, pmu->cntr_mask, pmu->fixed_cntr_mask)) {
> + cpuc->pmu = NULL;
[Severity: High]
Does setting cpuc->pmu to NULL here trigger a warning in x86_get_pmu()?
If check_hw_exists() fails (e.g., due to a hypervisor restricting PMU MSRs),
we now set cpuc->pmu to NULL but leave the CPU in the possible_cpus mask.
If a user later opens a perf event utilizing Architectural LBRs (like perf
record -b), x86_reserve_hardware() calls reserve_lbr_buffers() which
iterates over all possible CPUs:
arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c:reserve_lbr_buffers() {
...
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
kmem_cache = x86_get_pmu(cpu)->task_ctx_cache;
...
}
Because the failed CPU's cpuc->pmu is NULL, x86_get_pmu() hits its strict
WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpuc->pmu) assertion. If panic_on_warn=1 is set, could this
upgrade a graceful PMU initialization failure into a local panic?
Since intel_pmu_cpu_dead() now safely guards against the invalid cast with
cpuc->pmu != pmu, is this assignment necessary?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does failing check_hw_exists() leave the
CPU vulnerable to a #GP fault during a spurious NMI?
If a CPU is brought online but its PMU MSRs are disabled by a hypervisor,
initialization for that CPU aborts here. However, perf_event_nmi_handler()
is registered globally if at least one CPU succeeds.
If an active perf event runs on a healthy CPU (so active_events > 0), and a
spurious or broadcast NMI strikes the broken CPU, it will execute:
intel_pmu_handle_irq()
__intel_pmu_disable_all(true)
wrmsrq(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
Could accessing this non-existent MSR on the failed CPU trigger an unchecked
#GP fault and kernel panic?
> return false;
> + }
>
> pr_info("%s PMU driver: ", pmu->name);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260717080342.1879573-1-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-17 9:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-17 8:03 [Patch v3 0/8] perf/x86: Miscellaneous PMU bug fixes and optimizations Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 1/8] perf/x86: Unregister PMI handler on PMU init failure Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 2/8] perf/x86: Free hybrid state " Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 3/8] perf/x86: Guard intel_pmu_cpu_dead() against invalid hybrid PMU casts Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 9:31 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 4/8] perf/x86/intel: Unwind cpuc state if PEBS buffer setup fails Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 5/8] perf/x86: Remove stale fixed counter helper and fix hybrid PMU access Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 6/8] perf/x86/intel: Fix intel_cap handling on hybrid PMUs Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 7/8] perf/x86: Optimize ACR handling in match_prev_assignment() Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 8:03 ` [Patch v3 8/8] perf/x86/intel: Prevent drain_pebs() reentry Dapeng Mi
2026-07-17 10:38 ` sashiko-bot
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