From: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
To: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86/pmu: Prevent any host user from enabling PEBS for profiling guest
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 09:38:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6c4bd247-1f81-4b43-9e21-012f831d26b8@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231129095055.88060-1-likexu@tencent.com>
On 2023-11-29 4:50 a.m., Like Xu wrote:
> From: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
>
> Stop using PEBS counters on host to profiling guest. Limit the range of
> enabled PEBS counters to only those counters enabled from the guest PEBS
> emulation perspective.
>
> If there is a perf-record agent on host that uses perf-tools events like
> "cpu-cycles:GP" (G for attr.exclude_host, P for max precise event counter)
> to capture guest performance events, then the guest will be hanged. This is
> because Intel DS-based PEBS buffer is addressed using the 64-bit linear
> address of the current {p/v}CPU context based on MSR_IA32_DS_AREA.
>
> Any perf user using PEBS counters to profile guest on host is, in perf/core
> implementation details, trying to set bits on cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask
> and arr[pebs_enable].guest, much like the guest PEBS emulation behaviour.
> But the subsequent PEBS memory write, regardless of whether guest PEBS is
> enabled, can overshoot guest entry and corrupt guest memory.
>
> Profiling guest via PEBS-DS buffer on host is not supported at this time.
> Fix this by filtering the real configured value of arr[pebs_enable].guest
> with the emulated state of guest enabled PEBS counters, under the condition
> of none cross-mapped PEBS counters.
So the counter will be silently disabled. The user never knows why
nothing is sampled.
Since we don't support the case, profiling guest via PEBS-DS buffer on
host. Maybe we should error out when creating the event. For example
(not tested),
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 3871267d3237..24b90c70737f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -3958,6 +3958,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event
*event)
if ((event->attr.config & INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK) ==
INTEL_FIXED_VLBR_EVENT)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Profiling guest via PEBS-DS buffer on host is not supported. */
+ if (event->attr.exclude_host)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!(event->attr.freq || (event->attr.wakeup_events &&
!event->attr.watermark))) {
event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD;
if (!(event->attr.sample_type &
Thanks,
Kan
>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Fixes: c59a1f106f5c ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS")
> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 8 +++++++-
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> index a08f794a0e79..17afd504c35b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> @@ -4103,13 +4103,19 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data)
> .guest = pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask,
> };
>
> + /* In any case, clear guest PEBS bits first. */
> + arr[global_ctrl].guest &= ~arr[pebs_enable].guest;
> +
> if (arr[pebs_enable].host) {
> /* Disable guest PEBS if host PEBS is enabled. */
> arr[pebs_enable].guest = 0;
> } else {
> /* Disable guest PEBS thoroughly for cross-mapped PEBS counters. */
> arr[pebs_enable].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
> - arr[global_ctrl].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
> +
> + /* Prevent any host user from enabling PEBS for profiling guest. */
> + arr[pebs_enable].guest &= (kvm_pmu->pebs_enable & kvm_pmu->global_ctrl);
> +
> /* Set hw GLOBAL_CTRL bits for PEBS counter when it runs for guest */
> arr[global_ctrl].guest |= arr[pebs_enable].guest;
> }
>
> base-commit: 6803fb00772cc50cd59a66bd8caaee5c84b13fcf
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-29 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-29 9:50 [PATCH] KVM: x86/pmu: Prevent any host user from enabling PEBS for profiling guest Like Xu
2023-11-29 14:38 ` Liang, Kan [this message]
2023-11-30 7:29 ` Like Xu
2023-11-30 15:49 ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-01 3:59 ` Like Xu
2023-12-01 14:38 ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-04 8:32 ` Like Xu
2023-12-04 15:19 ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-05 7:24 ` Like Xu
2023-12-05 15:19 ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-06 3:49 ` Like Xu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=6c4bd247-1f81-4b43-9e21-012f831d26b8@linux.intel.com \
--to=kan.liang@linux.intel.com \
--cc=like.xu.linux@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).