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From: "Mi, Dapeng" <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
To: sashiko@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] perf/x86/intel: Clear stale ACR mask before updating new mask
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 10:57:30 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7d3ba145-23e7-4cec-97ff-699c4ae679dd@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260413013558.0EFE3C19424@smtp.kernel.org>


On 4/13/2026 9:35 AM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
> - [High] Incomplete Fix: Early return bypasses the newly added stale mask cleanup for subsequent events.
> - [High] Missing bounds check on user-provided mask allows cross-event PMU interference (cross-wiring).
> --
>
> commit f516548e46c9feac44792cd958b5c0a840d60d43
> Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
>
> perf/x86/intel: Clear stale ACR mask before updating new mask
>
> This commit clears the ACR mask before applying a new one to prevent
> stale bits from persisting during event rescheduling. It ensures the
> hardware state does not get polluted by previous configurations.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> index 4768236c054bb..58c236ce47474 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> @@ -3344,6 +3344,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_acr_late_setup(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc)
>>  			event = cpuc->event_list[j];
>>  			if (event->group_leader != leader->group_leader)
>>  				break;
>> +
>> +			/* Clear stale ACR mask first. */
>> +			event->hw.config1 = 0;
>>  			for_each_set_bit(idx, (unsigned long *)&event->attr.config2, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
>>  				if (i + idx >= cpuc->n_events ||
>>  				    !is_acr_event_group(cpuc->event_list[i + idx]))
> Could this validation check allow unprivileged users to cross-wire the PMU?
>
> Since is_acr_event_group() only verifies that the target event belongs to any
> ACR group, rather than the same group_leader, does this allow a user-provided
> out-of-bounds bit in config2 to point to an independent, system-wide ACR event
> running on the same CPU?
>
> If so, it seems the hardware counter index of an unrelated privileged event
> could be blindly copied into the user's hw.config1.

It couldn't be. The above "if (event->group_leader !=
leader->group_leader)" has checked if the events are in a same ACR group.


>
>>  					return;
> Does this early return bypass the newly added stale mask cleanup for subsequent
> events?
>
> Because attr.config2 is user-controlled, a user could supply a malformed mask
> with an out-of-bounds bit to intentionally trigger this early return.
>
> Since it returns from intel_pmu_acr_late_setup() completely, wouldn't this skip
> the event->hw.config1 = 0 cleanup for all subsequent ACR events scheduled on the
> same CPU, leaving them with a polluted hardware state?

Yes, it's possible. It looks we have to do twice iteration for the
event_list.  The 1st iteration is to clear the stale hw.config1 and the 2nd
iteration is to validate and parse the ACR mask. Would fix it in next
version. Thanks.



>

  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-14  2:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-13  1:01 [PATCH 0/2] Fix 2 bugs for Intel auto counter reload (ACR) Dapeng Mi
2026-04-13  1:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] perf/x86/intel: Clear stale ACR mask before updating new mask Dapeng Mi
2026-04-13  1:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-04-14  2:57     ` Mi, Dapeng [this message]
2026-04-13  1:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] perf/x86/intel: Disable PMI for self-reloaded ACR events Dapeng Mi
2026-04-13  1:19 ` [PATCH 0/2] Fix 2 bugs for Intel auto counter reload (ACR) Mi, Dapeng

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