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Peter Anvin" , Andy Lutomirski , Ingo Molnar , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Namhyung Kim , Paolo Bonzini , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, kvm@vger.kernel.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, Kan Liang , Yongwei Ma , Mingwei Zhang , Xiong Zhang , Sandipan Das , Dapeng Mi Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" On Mon, Aug 18, 2025, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Fri, Aug 15, 2025 at 08:55:25AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 15, 2025, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 15, 2025, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c > > > > > index e1df3c3bfc0d..ad22b182762e 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/events/core.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c > > > > > @@ -6408,6 +6408,8 @@ void perf_load_guest_context(unsigned long data) > > > > > task_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx->task_ctx, NULL, EVENT_GUEST); > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > + arch_perf_load_guest_context(data); > > > > > > > > So I still don't understand why this ever needs to reach the generic > > > > code. x86 pmu driver and x86 kvm can surely sort this out inside of x86, > > > > no? > > > > > > It's definitely possible to handle this entirely within x86, I just don't love > > > switching the LVTPC without the protection of perf_ctx_lock and perf_ctx_disable(). > > > It's not a sticking point for me if you strongly prefer something like this: > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c > > > index 0e5048ae86fa..86b81c217b97 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c > > > @@ -1319,7 +1319,9 @@ void kvm_mediated_pmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > > > > lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); > > > > > > - perf_load_guest_context(kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTPC)); > > > + perf_load_guest_context(); > > > + > > > + perf_load_guest_lvtpc(kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTPC)); > > > > Hmm, an argument for providing a dedicated perf_load_guest_lvtpc() APIs is that > > it would allow KVM to handle LVTPC writes in KVM's VM-Exit fastpath, i.e. without > > having to do a full put+reload of the guest context. > > > > So if we're confident that switching the host LVTPC outside of > > perf_{load,put}_guest_context() is functionally safe, I'm a-ok with it. > > Let me see. So the hardware sets Masked when it raises the interrupt. > > The interrupt handler clears it from software -- depending on uarch in 3 > different places: > 1) right at the start of the PMI > 2) in the middle, right before enabling the PMU (writing global control) > 3) at the end of the PMI > > the various changelogs adding that code mention spurious PMIs and > malformed PEBS records. > > So the fun all happens when the guest is doing PMI and gets a VM-exit > while still Masked. > > At that point, we can come in and completely rewrite the PMU state, > reroute the PMI and enable things again. Then later, we 'restore' the > PMU state, re-set LVTPC masked to the guest interrupt and 'resume'. > > What could possibly go wrong :/ Kan, I'm assuming, but not knowing, that > writing all the PMU MSRs is somehow serializing state sufficient to not > cause the above mentioned fails? Specifically, clearing PEBS_ENABLE > should inhibit those malformed PEBS records or something? What if the > host also has PEBS and we don't actually clear the bit? > > The current order ensures we rewrite LVTPC when global control is unset; > I think we want to keep that. Yes, for sure. > While staring at this, I note that perf_load_guest_context() will clear > global ctrl, clear all the counter programming, and re-enable an empty > pmu. Now, an empty PMU should result in global control being zero -- > there is nothing run after all. > > But then kvm_mediated_pmu_load() writes an explicit 0 again. Perhaps > replace this with asserting it is 0 instead? Yeah, I like that idea, a lot. This? perf_load_guest_context(); /* * Sanity check that "loading" guest context disabled all counters, as * modifying the LVTPC while host perf is active will cause explosions, * as will loading event selectors and PMCs with guest values. * * VMX will enable/disable counters at VM-Enter/VM-Exit by atomically * loading PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL. SVM effectively performs the switch by * configuring all events to be GUEST_ONLY. */ WARN_ON_ONCE(rdmsrq(kvm_pmu_ops.PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)); perf_load_guest_lvtpc(kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTPC)); > Anyway, this means that moving the LVTPC writing into > kvm_mediated_pmu_load() as you suggest is identical. > perf_load_guest_context() results in global control being 0, we then > assert it is 0, and write LVTPC while it is still 0. > kvm_pmu_load_guest_pmcs() will then frob the MSRs. > > OK, so *IF* doing the VM-exit during PMI is sound, this is something > that needs a comment somewhere. I'm a bit lost here. Are you essentially asking if it's ok to take a VM-Exit while the guest is handling a PMI? If so, that _has_ to work, because there are myriad things that can/will trigger a VM-Exit at any point while the guest is active. > Then going back again, is the easy part, since on the host side, we can never > transition into KVM during a PMI.