From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Alexey Budankov Subject: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:15:26 +0300 Message-ID: References: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "Intel-gfx" To: Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com, rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov , james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org, Casey Schaufler , serge@hallyn.com, James Morris Cc: Song Liu , Andi Kleen , Kees Cook , linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn , Alexander Shishkin , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, Igor Lubashev , linux-kernel , Stephane Eranian , "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Namhyung Kim , Thomas Gleixner , bgregg@netflix.com, Jiri Olsa , bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index 34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void) static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return -EACCES; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return -EACCES; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return -EPERM; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT); -- 2.20.1