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From: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
To: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86/pmu: Prevent any host user from enabling PEBS for profiling guest
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:29:55 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fd847e77-0510-48db-ad0b-5946458e2fb3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6c4bd247-1f81-4b43-9e21-012f831d26b8@linux.intel.com>

On 29/11/2023 10:38 pm, Liang, Kan wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2023-11-29 4:50 a.m., Like Xu wrote:
>> From: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
>>
>> Stop using PEBS counters on host to profiling guest. Limit the range of
>> enabled PEBS counters to only those counters enabled from the guest PEBS
>> emulation perspective.
>>
>> If there is a perf-record agent on host that uses perf-tools events like
>> "cpu-cycles:GP" (G for attr.exclude_host, P for max precise event counter)
>> to capture guest performance events, then the guest will be hanged. This is
>> because Intel DS-based PEBS buffer is addressed using the 64-bit linear
>> address of the current {p/v}CPU context based on MSR_IA32_DS_AREA.
>>
>> Any perf user using PEBS counters to profile guest on host is, in perf/core
>> implementation details, trying to set bits on cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask
>> and arr[pebs_enable].guest, much like the guest PEBS emulation behaviour.
>> But the subsequent PEBS memory write, regardless of whether guest PEBS is
>> enabled, can overshoot guest entry and corrupt guest memory.
>>
>> Profiling guest via PEBS-DS buffer on host is not supported at this time.
>> Fix this by filtering the real configured value of arr[pebs_enable].guest
>> with the emulated state of guest enabled PEBS counters, under the condition
>> of none cross-mapped PEBS counters.
> 
> So the counter will be silently disabled. The user never knows why
> nothing is sampled.
> Since we don't support the case, profiling guest via PEBS-DS buffer on
> host. Maybe we should error out when creating the event. For example
> (not tested),

Test failed.

> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> index 3871267d3237..24b90c70737f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> @@ -3958,6 +3958,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event
> *event)
>   		if ((event->attr.config & INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK) ==
> INTEL_FIXED_VLBR_EVENT)
>   			return -EINVAL;
> 
> +		/* Profiling guest via PEBS-DS buffer on host is not supported. */
> +		if (event->attr.exclude_host)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +

Guest PEBS emulation also sets this bit, a typical call stack looks like:

     intel_pmu_hw_config+0x441/0x4d0
     hsw_hw_config+0x12/0xa0
     x86_pmu_event_init+0x98/0x370
     perf_try_init_event+0x47/0x130
     perf_event_alloc+0x446/0xeb0
     perf_event_create_kernel_counter+0x38/0x190
     pmc_reprogram_counter.constprop.17+0xd9/0x230 [kvm]
     kvm_pmu_handle_event+0x1a6/0x310 [kvm]
     vcpu_enter_guest+0x1388/0x19b0 [kvm]
     vcpu_run+0x117/0x6c0 [kvm]
     kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x13d/0x4d0 [kvm]
     kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x301/0x6e0 [kvm]

Alternatively, this path is taken when using PEBS-via-PT to profile guests on host.

The status of the guest can only be queried in the NMI handler and the func
intel_guest_get_msrs() in the perf/core context, where it's easier and more
centrally to review this part of changes that affects vPMU for corner cases.

Maybe adding print info on the perf-tool side would help.

For perf-tool users, it will get 0 number of sample for "cpu-cycles:GP" events,
just like other uncounted perf-tool events.

>   		if (!(event->attr.freq || (event->attr.wakeup_events &&
> !event->attr.watermark))) {
>   		    event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD;
>   			if (!(event->attr.sample_type &
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Kan
> 
>>
>> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
>> Fixes: c59a1f106f5c ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS")
>> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 8 +++++++-
>>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> index a08f794a0e79..17afd504c35b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
>> @@ -4103,13 +4103,19 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data)
>>   		.guest = pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask,
>>   	};
>>   
>> +	/* In any case, clear guest PEBS bits first. */
>> +	arr[global_ctrl].guest &= ~arr[pebs_enable].guest;
>> +
>>   	if (arr[pebs_enable].host) {
>>   		/* Disable guest PEBS if host PEBS is enabled. */
>>   		arr[pebs_enable].guest = 0;
>>   	} else {
>>   		/* Disable guest PEBS thoroughly for cross-mapped PEBS counters. */
>>   		arr[pebs_enable].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
>> -		arr[global_ctrl].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask;
>> +
>> +		/* Prevent any host user from enabling PEBS for profiling guest. */
>> +		arr[pebs_enable].guest &= (kvm_pmu->pebs_enable & kvm_pmu->global_ctrl);
>> +
>>   		/* Set hw GLOBAL_CTRL bits for PEBS counter when it runs for guest */
>>   		arr[global_ctrl].guest |= arr[pebs_enable].guest;
>>   	}
>>
>> base-commit: 6803fb00772cc50cd59a66bd8caaee5c84b13fcf

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-30  7:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-29  9:50 [PATCH] KVM: x86/pmu: Prevent any host user from enabling PEBS for profiling guest Like Xu
2023-11-29 14:38 ` Liang, Kan
2023-11-30  7:29   ` Like Xu [this message]
2023-11-30 15:49     ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-01  3:59       ` Like Xu
2023-12-01 14:38         ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-04  8:32           ` Like Xu
2023-12-04 15:19             ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-05  7:24               ` Like Xu
2023-12-05 15:19                 ` Liang, Kan
2023-12-06  3:49                   ` Like Xu

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