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Sat, 10 Oct 2026 05:34:13 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <0e47c22afbce2f94673bcc77d640cd9da410c2f2.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 13/17] tpm: Add verification of kernel signing key provenance From: James Bottomley To: Matthew Garrett , mjg59@srcf.ucam.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, rafael@kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2026 11:34:10 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20261008132532.1155166-14-matthewg@nvidia.com> References: <20261008132532.1155166-1-matthewg@nvidia.com> <20261008132532.1155166-14-matthewg@nvidia.com> Autocrypt: addr=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com; keydata=mQENBE58FlABCADPM714lRLxGmba4JFjkocqpj1/6/Cx+IXezcS22azZetzCXDpm2MfNE lecY3qkFjfnoffQiw5rrOO0/oRSATOh8+2fmJ6el7naRbDuh+i8lVESfdlkoqX57H5R8h/UTIp6gn 1mpNlxjQv6QSZbl551zQ1nmkSVRbA5TbEp4br5GZeJ58esmYDCBwxuFTsSsdzbOBNthLcudWpJZHU RfMc0ew24By1nldL9F37AktNcCipKpC2U0NtGlJjYPNSVXrCd1izxKmO7te7BLP+7B4DNj1VRnaf8 X9+VIApCi/l4Kdx+ZR3aLTqSuNsIMmXUJ3T8JRl+ag7kby/KBp+0OpotABEBAAG0N0phbWVzIEJvd HRvbWxleSA8SmFtZXMuQm90dG9tbGV5QEhhbnNlblBhcnRuZXJzaGlwLmNvbT6JAVgEEwEIAEICGw MGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAhkBFiEE1WBuc8i0YnG+rZrfgUrkfCFIVNYFAml2ZBI FCS3GUMIACgkQgUrkfCFIVNZKjQf/deRzlXZClKxTC/Ee2yEPqqS7mm/INUA49KdQQ5oIhSxkUBy0 9J4qjMIo5F8ZFkFTqikBqeL35LKu7O7rn8WETfX8Bxvos3HUsl3jHo34DES4MUFIpoQPgtiLRGwLb K0cVCAArR2u2qj4ABmTRrs1I1kvdjEw6gatOuXtEe/j5O2fvfzTq9GBr0Q3n2IAsFXi4hLlx6VPE8 tyWUZ8BWJKtih3JAeUiXFvASL3McV0rV9RnU0VbjEQEhSE7PMYhWpnDC9AyBb0lXJllQRvC3NSkUB 8KVQgNNxRPss0WE/nBoZ4dFA42jTyzTz8lNylxZoAWV7WJb3QxVg4oCodRVrxxrQhSmFtZXMgQm90 dG9tbGV5IDxqZWpiQGtlcm5lbC5vcmc+iQFVBBMBCAA/AhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJCgsEFgIDAQIeA QIXgBYhBNVgbnPItGJxvq2a34FK5HwhSFTWBQJgS5mYBQkbNYS9AAoJEIFK5HwhSFTWBpwIAL5Bk3 5FB34U6iHmDzzgdCbxLTs43T/YQyJpcGIvopBvnI/fDY8oSG6Df64/O6B+1R+A8TDp6ZG5ysUWnCC 6GuIaEHemBYkitMPglR6+sGCMQY7O0mlsPvdssvKK1KI9Bno4VU6ogaF2qVzefSqg1Djmf/DcsxWP rI/jdJ8FB5AYR2rjIdDFc+zRdAJuavo1/anyY2wgpFh/3R8IOYAEfWV9nGgYkf9+tA4EIn1sxE0I3 L5oW2N3mbyRrkzuBwO8ztMCwqEPk7moWzhokcZqMXiAIahaZdkashJC+s2X2RZSGCy+g+pvY5NN4B BVG5XwLgVBqbHMTcxE0fbmPqz+q6O0LEphbWVzIEJvdHRvbWxleSA8amVqYkBoYW5zZW5wYXJ0bmV yc2hpcC5jb20+iQFXBBMBCABBFiEE1WBuc8i0YnG+rZrfgUrkfCFIVNYFAmODZ5ACGwMFCRs1hL0F CwkIBwICIgIGFQoJCAsCBBYCAwECHgcCF4AACgkQgUrkfCFIVNZu0Af/TzvL2/NdgAcw9uN3x60H8 jc4QUq14VpxcFEFEMpcj1morkX/G93V+56HBBaXZj+yK8PhxIA/SIz+sU7C/0YvKuvzakP8ZX/7WJ e32SOUtjfr/VTaqjIBzNj6OxLvZpmNbBw7s6DwhhNpHOWqJ/1ml+PtDRDV71IB58yVqQjp1xlNKVl ZppcJ5908EJzsFnRIVjiQiDSKoppqB2BCibBbrWcln7CiWMyOC/cco6SIn6twH+f7+aivJ3xGcOE2 a9gBKF5rNi9TBoX9oyPmshv/TDmnohsVrH7AYXlGYfZTk15SWEiROh1QX8/uD9wl/gcIv5EDUpT/F L2jzOsA5663bw== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable User-Agent: Evolution 3.56.2 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 On Thu, 2026-10-08 at 06:20 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > Add tpm2_kernel_key_verify(), which checks the provenance produced by > tpm2_kernel_key_create() and returns the public key it shows the > kernel > created. It checks that: >=20 > * The session audit attestation is signed by this TPM's kernel AK >=20 > * Replaying the logged cpHash and rpHash pairs from a zero digest > reproduces the attested session digest >=20 > * Each logged rpHash matches the recorded response parameters, and > the commands were PCR_Read, NV_Read, and CreateLoaded in that order >=20 > * PCR 5 was read, and held the value it holds now I get that PCR 5 measures boot configuration and isn't supposed to change from boot to boot, but what about across things like firmware upgrades ... do you have any idea how brittle it actually is? If it is brittle, one way out of this might be only to care about the last log entries, so make sure the log hashes to PCR5 then find your EFI_ACTION and the exit boot services mark in the right order rather than caring about exact value match. Regards, James