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From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>, Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 17:04:52 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150827090452.GB27415@linux-rxt1.site> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150820204044.GG2567@codeblueprint.co.uk>

On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 09:40:44PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Aug, at 02:16:26PM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch adds codes in EFI stub for generating and storing the
> > HMAC key in EFI boot service variable for signing hibernate image.
> > 
> > Per rcf2104, the length of HMAC-SHA1 hash result is 20 bytes, and
> > it recommended the length of key the same with hash rsult, means
> > also 20 bytes. Using longer key would not significantly increase
> > the function strength. Due to the nvram space is limited in some
> > UEFI machines, so using the minimal recommended length 20 bytes
> > key that will stored in boot service variable.
> 
> I'm having a hard time understanding the middle part of this
> paragraph, specifically the part of the key and the hash result.
> There's a typo in the subject too s/siging/signing/and "Generating"
> should be "Generate".
>

In description, I want to explain why the length of key is 20 bytes.
I will try to explain more clear, if it still confuses reviewer then
I will remove the description.
 
> > The HMAC key stored in EFI boot service variable, GUID is
> > HIBERNATIONKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21.
>  
> I'd really like to see some of the explanation from your cover letter
> included in the commit message for this patch, and in particular why
> signing hibernate images is a good thing.
> 
> Recording that for posterity in the commit message is going to be
> helpful when someone looks at this patch in 2 years time and wonders
> why RNG support was added to the EFI stub and why they might want to
> sign hibernate images.
> 

Thanks for suggestion, I will move some description from cover letter
to here and add comment for history and RNG support.

> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> > Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h   |  9 ++++++
> >  include/linux/suspend.h          |  3 ++
> >  3 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > index 0ffb6db..463aa9b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> >  #include <asm/efi.h>
> >  #include <asm/setup.h>
> >  #include <asm/desc.h>
> > +#include <asm/suspend.h>
> >  
> >  #include "../string.h"
> >  #include "eboot.h"
> > @@ -1383,6 +1384,63 @@ free_mem_map:
> >  	return status;
> >  }
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
> > +#define HIBERNATION_KEY \
> > +	((efi_char16_t [15]) { 'H', 'I', 'B', 'E', 'R', 'N', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 })
> > +#define HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE	(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \
> > +					EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)
> > +
> > +static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned long key_size;
> > +	unsigned long attributes;
> > +	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> > +	efi_status_t status;
> > +
> > +	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> > +	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> > +				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> > +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
> > +		return;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> > +
> > +	status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> > +				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, &attributes,
> > +				&key_size, keys->hibernation_key);
> 
> Tiny nit, but could you put a new line here please? This is a large
> chunk of code.
>

OK, I will add new line here.
 
> > +	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS && attributes != HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE) {
> > +		efi_printk(sys_table, "A hibernation key is not boot service variable\n");
> > +		memset(keys->hibernation_key, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > +		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> > +					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, attributes, 0,
> > +					NULL);
> > +		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +			efi_printk(sys_table, "Cleaned existing hibernation key\n");
> > +			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> 
> Hmm.. it's not clear to me that we should be deleting this EFI
> variable if the attributes are bogus. It would be safer to just bail.
> 

The purpose of checking attribute of hibernation key variable is 
in case someone created a key variable on runtime environment _before_
this kernel create boot service variable. That causes EFI stub may load
a key that from non-secure environment.

That's why delete non-boot service variable and create new one here.

> > +
> > +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get existing hibernation key\n");
> > +
> > +		efi_get_random_key(sys_table, params, keys->hibernation_key,
> > +				   HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > +
> > +		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> > +					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID,
> > +					HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE,
> > +					HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE,
> > +					keys->hibernation_key);
> > +		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> > +			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");
> 
> You're leaking 'keys' here.
>

Oh, you are right, I will free keys here.
 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> > index 2fab6c2..ab463c4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> > @@ -3,3 +3,12 @@
> >  #else
> >  # include <asm/suspend_64.h>
> >  #endif
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
> > +#include <linux/suspend.h>
> > +
> > +struct hibernation_keys {
> > +	unsigned long hkey_status;
> > +	u8 hibernation_key[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > +};
> > +#endif
> 
> Have you given any thought to how things are going to work if we
> change the hash function in the future, or provide a choice? That
> information doesn't appear anywhere in the above struct.
> 

Do you mean the hash function of signing hibernation image changed, so the
hibernation key also need to re-generate for new length?

I will add a field in struct to forward the length of hibernation key variable.
In the future kernel can check the length to handle the change.

> -- 
> Matt Fleming, Intel Open Source Technology Center

Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee

  reply	other threads:[~2015-08-27  9:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-11  6:16 [PATCH v2 00/16] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] PM / hibernate: define HMAC algorithm and digest size of hibernation Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI services pointer table Lee, Chun-Yi
     [not found]   ` <1439273796-25359-3-git-send-email-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-19 16:35     ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/boot: Public getting random boot function Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 14:12   ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]     ` <20150820141221.GC2567-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-27  4:06       ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number generator protocol Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 14:47   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  4:51     ` joeyli
     [not found]   ` <1439273796-25359-6-git-send-email-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-20 20:26     ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]       ` <20150820202620.GF2567-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-27  6:17         ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 20:40   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  9:04     ` joeyli [this message]
     [not found]       ` <20150827090452.GB27415-empE8CJ7fzk2xCFIczX1Fw@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 12:15         ` Matt Fleming
2015-09-13  2:47           ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] efi: Make efi_status_to_err() public Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 15:07   ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]     ` <20150820150706.GE2567-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-27  9:06       ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data Lee, Chun-Yi
     [not found]   ` <1439273796-25359-9-git-send-email-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-15 17:07     ` Pavel Machek
2015-08-16  5:28       ` joeyli
2015-08-16 21:23       ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-17  6:54         ` Nigel Cunningham
2015-08-21 12:40   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  9:28     ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and erase footprints Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-13  2:45   ` Chen, Yu C
2015-08-13  3:25     ` joeyli
2015-08-13 14:33   ` joeyli
     [not found]   ` <1439273796-25359-10-git-send-email-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-21 13:27     ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27 10:21       ` joeyli
2015-09-09 12:24         ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]           ` <20150909122408.GE4973-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-13  2:58             ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] PM / hibernate: Generate and verify signature of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] PM / hibernate: Avoid including hibernation key to hibernate image Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] PM / hibernate: Forward signature verifying result and key to image kernel Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] PM / hibernate: Add configuration to enforce signature verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] PM / hibernate: Allow user trigger hibernation key re-generating Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] PM / hibernate: Bypass verification logic on legacy BIOS Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] PM / hibernate: Document signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi

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