From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3][RFC] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 13:55:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180625115500.GC17001@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180622021410.GA30305@sandybridge-desktop>
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On Fri 2018-06-22 10:14:10, Yu Chen wrote:
> Hi,
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 09:14:43PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > On Thu 2018-06-21 14:08:40, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 10:53 AM, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
> > > > Hi!
> > > >
> > > >> As security becomes more and more important, we add the in-kernel
> > > >> encryption support for hibernation.
> > > > ...
> > > >> There was a discussion on the mailing list on whether this key should
> > > >> be derived in kernel or in user space. And it turns out to be generating
> > > >> the key by user space is more acceptable[1]. So this patch set is divided
> > > >> into two parts:
> > > >> 1. The hibernation snapshot encryption in kernel space,
> > > >> 2. the key derivation implementation in user space.
> > > >
> > > > uswsusp was created so that this kind of stuff could be kept in
> > > > userspace. You get graphical progress bar (etc) too. As you already
> > > > have userspace component for key derivation, I see no advantages to
> > > > uswsusp.
> > > >
> > > > If you have some, please explain.
> > >
> > > Not having to transfer plain text kernel memory to user space is one
> > > IMO.
> >
> > Well, AFAICT in this case userland has the key and encrypted data are
> > on disk. That does not seem to be improvement.
> >
> uswsusp needs to read the snapshot from kernel first, while
> do encryption in kernel directly would reduce the IO. Besides,
> the kernel memory content is protect from been read from
> user space from first place, although finally they are
> encrypted on the disk.
If you believe you solution is faster, please benchmark it. I don't
believe it will be.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-25 11:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-20 9:39 [PATCH 0/3][RFC] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Chen Yu
2018-06-20 9:39 ` [PATCH 1/3][RFC] PM / Hibernate: Add helper functions for " Chen Yu
2018-06-20 9:40 ` [PATCH 2/3][RFC] PM / Hibernate: Encrypt the snapshot pages before submitted to the block device Chen Yu
2018-06-28 13:07 ` joeyli
2018-06-28 13:50 ` Yu Chen
2018-06-28 14:28 ` joeyli
2018-06-28 14:52 ` Yu Chen
2018-06-29 12:59 ` joeyli
2018-07-06 15:28 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-12 10:10 ` joeyli
2018-07-13 7:34 ` Yu Chen
2018-07-18 15:48 ` joeyli
2018-07-19 9:16 ` Yu Chen
2018-06-20 9:40 ` [PATCH 3/3][RFC] tools: create power/crypto utility Chen Yu
2018-06-20 17:41 ` Eric Biggers
2018-06-22 2:39 ` Yu Chen
2018-06-22 2:59 ` Eric Biggers
2018-06-21 9:01 ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-21 12:10 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-06-21 19:04 ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-25 7:06 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-06-25 11:54 ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-25 21:56 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-06-25 22:16 ` Pavel Machek
[not found] ` <1530009024.20417.5.camel@suse.com>
2018-06-26 11:12 ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-21 8:53 ` [PATCH 0/3][RFC] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Pavel Machek
2018-06-21 12:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-06-21 19:14 ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-22 2:14 ` Yu Chen
2018-06-25 11:55 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2018-06-25 7:16 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-06-25 11:59 ` Pavel Machek
2018-06-25 22:14 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-07-05 16:16 ` joeyli
2018-07-06 13:42 ` Yu Chen
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