From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Pavel Machek Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5 v2][RFC] Encryption and authentication for hibernate snapshot image Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 19:10:27 +0100 Message-ID: <20190106181026.GA15256@amd> References: <20190103143227.9138-1-jlee@suse.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="zhXaljGHf11kAtnf" Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190103143227.9138-1-jlee@suse.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: "Lee, Chun-Yi" Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, "Lee, Chun-Yi" , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Chen Yu , Oliver Neukum , Ryan Chen , David Howells , Giovanni Gherdovich , Randy Dunlap , Jann Horn , Andy Lutomirski List-Id: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org --zhXaljGHf11kAtnf Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi! > This patchset is the implementation of encryption and authentication > for hibernate snapshot image. The image will be encrypted by AES and > authenticated by HMAC. Ok, so you encrypt.=20 > The hibernate function can be used to snapshot memory pages to an image, > then kernel restores the image to memory space in a appropriate time. > There have secrets in snapshot image and cracker may modifies it for > hacking system. Encryption and authentication of snapshot image can prote= ct > the system. >=20 > Hibernate function requests the master key through key retention service. > The snapshot master key can be a trusted key or a user defined key. The > name of snapshot master key is fixed to "swsusp-kmk". User should loads > swsusp-kmk to kernel by keyctl tool before the hibernation resume. > e.g. The swsusp-kmk must be loaded before systemd-hibernate-resume But if userspace has a key, encryption is useless against root. > The TPM trusted key type is preferred to be the master key. But user > defined key can also be used for testing or when the platform doesn't > have TPM. User must be aware that the security of user key relies on > user space. If the root account be compromised, then the user key will > easy to be grabbed. In the TPM case, does userland have access to the key?=20 Please explain your security goals. Pavel > Lee, Chun-Yi (5): > PM / hibernate: Create snapshot keys handler > PM / hibernate: Generate and verify signature for snapshot image > PM / hibernate: Encrypt snapshot image > PM / hibernate: Erase the snapshot master key in snapshot pages > PM / hibernate: An option to request that snapshot image must be > authenticated >=20 > Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + > include/linux/kernel.h | 3 +- > kernel/panic.c | 1 + > kernel/power/Kconfig | 25 + > kernel/power/Makefile | 1 + > kernel/power/hibernate.c | 59 ++- > kernel/power/power.h | 59 +++ > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 576 ++++++++++++++++++= +++++- > kernel/power/snapshot_key.c | 312 +++++++++++++ > kernel/power/swap.c | 6 + > kernel/power/user.c | 12 + > 11 files changed, 1042 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 kernel/power/snapshot_key.c >=20 --=20 (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blo= g.html --zhXaljGHf11kAtnf Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEARECAAYFAlwyRJIACgkQMOfwapXb+vKbGwCgqdFS+SAxvg8NHhZw8KSTwtEn xgMAn1tZyKl+ZiX2ewpAPAipm+wK6brO =lr4D -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --zhXaljGHf11kAtnf--