From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
Daniil Lunev <dlunev@google.com>,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
rjw@rjwysocki.net, Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 14:29:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220510122927.GA19328@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE=gft4nE6nYx9gRZuSL1v=8CjGsdtmx+GxPjmdD_hwJs5j-tw@mail.gmail.com>
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Hi!
> > > One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory
> > > is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling
> > > encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel
> > > in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future
> > > optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted
> > > page data before the user key is available. This would remove the
> > > double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages
> > > loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer
> > > decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still
> > > knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in.
> >
> > Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big...
> >
>
> As you know, with the way the snapshot mechanism works, a hibernation
> image can be at most 50% of RAM. If the system was using more than
There used to be 50% of RAM limit, but it was removed.
Best regards,
Pavel
--
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-10 12:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-04 23:20 [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 01/10] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 03/10] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 04/10] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data Evan Green
2022-08-02 23:00 ` Eric Biggers
2022-08-03 20:48 ` Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 05/10] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 06/10] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-08-29 21:45 ` TPM: hibernate with IMA PCR 10 Ken Goldman
2022-08-29 21:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-08-31 2:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-07 20:47 ` Evan Green
2022-09-07 23:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-08 5:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-11 2:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-20 4:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 20:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-23 13:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-27 16:03 ` Evan Green
2022-09-28 9:42 ` Jonathan McDowell
2022-05-04 23:20 ` [PATCH 07/10] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:21 ` [PATCH 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-05-06 16:08 ` Pavel Machek
2022-05-09 16:44 ` Evan Green
2022-05-10 12:29 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2022-05-10 16:02 ` Evan Green
2022-08-02 22:48 ` Eric Biggers
2022-08-03 20:48 ` Evan Green
2022-05-04 23:21 ` [PATCH 09/10] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-08-02 22:51 ` Eric Biggers
2022-05-04 23:21 ` [PATCH 10/10] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-05-06 16:08 ` [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Pavel Machek
2022-05-09 16:43 ` Evan Green
2022-05-17 16:06 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-05-17 17:34 ` Evan Green
2022-06-16 15:42 ` Evan Green
2022-08-01 22:32 ` Evan Green
2022-08-02 18:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-08-04 0:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-08-04 21:55 ` Evan Green
2022-08-06 18:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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