From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, gwendal@chromium.org,
dianders@chromium.org, apronin@chromium.org,
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
rjw@rjwysocki.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
dlunev@google.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
jarkko@kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image
Date: Sun, 13 Nov 2022 15:33:02 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3F+rj59Q5uzGI5i@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221111151451.v5.8.Ibd067e73916b9fae268a5824c2dd037416426af8@changeid>
On Fri, Nov 11, 2022 at 03:16:33PM -0800, Evan Green wrote:
> We'll also go through the motions of having PCR23 set to a known value at
> the time of key creation and unsealing. Currently there's nothing that
> enforces the contents of PCR23 as a condition to unseal the key blob,
> that will come in a later change.
This patch doesn't really make sense without the later patch
"PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy".
Maybe they should be merged into one patch?
> +/* sha256("To sleep, perchance to dream") */
> +static struct tpm_digest known_digest = { .alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA256,
> + .digest = {0x92, 0x78, 0x3d, 0x79, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x31, 0xb0, 0x55, 0xf9,
> + 0x1e, 0x0d, 0xce, 0x83, 0xde, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0x8c,
> + 0xf1, 0x22, 0x38, 0x6c, 0x33, 0xb1, 0x14, 0xb7, 0xec, 0x05,
> + 0x5f, 0x49}};
This can be const.
> +static int snapshot_create_kernel_key(struct snapshot_data *data)
> +{
> + /* Create a key sealed by the SRK. */
> + char *keyinfo = "new\t32\tkeyhandle=0x81000000";
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> + struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL;
> + struct key *key = NULL;
> + struct tpm_chip *chip;
> + int ret, i;
> +
> + chip = tpm_default_chip();
> + if (!chip)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (!(tpm_is_tpm2(chip))) {
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out_dev;
> + }
tpm_is_tpm2() can return an error value.
> + digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(struct tpm_digest),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!digests) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
> + digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
> + if (digests[i].alg_id == known_digest.alg_id)
> + memcpy(&digests[i], &known_digest, sizeof(known_digest));
> + }
> +
> + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(chip, 23, digests);
> + if (ret != 0)
> + goto out;
So, PCR 23 will not actually be extended properly if there is not a SHA-256
bank? Wouldn't it make more sense to return an error in that case?
> +static int snapshot_load_kernel_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> + struct uswsusp_key_blob *blob)
> +{
> +
> + char *keytemplate = "load\t%s\tkeyhandle=0x81000000";
Make this const.
> + blobstring = kmalloc(blob->blob_len * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!blobstring) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + bin2hex(blobstring, blob->blob, blob->blob_len);
> + keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, blobstring);
There's no need for bin2hex(). Just use the %*phN format specifier instead:
const char *keytemplate = "load\t%*phN\tkeyhandle=0x81000000";
keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, blob->blob_len, blob->blob);
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-13 23:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-11 23:16 [PATCH v5 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-11-13 20:31 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-27 16:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-27 16:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/11] tpm: Export and rename tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-11-13 20:46 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-14 17:11 ` James Bottomley
2022-11-27 16:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-27 16:41 ` James Bottomley
2022-11-30 20:22 ` Dr. Greg
2022-11-30 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-12-02 1:10 ` Dr. Greg
2023-01-03 20:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-03 21:04 ` William Roberts
2023-01-03 21:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-14 14:55 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-14 15:11 ` William Roberts
2023-01-15 3:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-15 14:41 ` William Roberts
2023-01-17 21:26 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-21 3:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-23 17:48 ` William Roberts
2023-01-24 11:51 ` Dr. Greg
2023-01-24 12:38 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-24 15:05 ` William Roberts
2023-01-26 17:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:32 ` William Roberts
2023-01-26 21:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 22:01 ` William Roberts
2023-02-07 23:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:20 ` William Roberts
2023-01-10 16:07 ` William Roberts
2022-11-27 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-13 21:20 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-14 3:32 ` James Bottomley
2022-11-14 16:32 ` Evan Green
2022-11-14 16:56 ` James Bottomley
2022-11-14 17:43 ` Evan Green
2022-11-14 18:00 ` James Bottomley
2022-12-02 21:03 ` James Bottomley
2022-12-05 18:43 ` Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:01 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:13 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/11] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:55 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:33 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/11] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:44 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/11] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:47 ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 11/11] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:51 ` Eric Biggers
2022-12-07 23:54 ` [PATCH v5 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
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