From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D35F1C25B0D for ; Sat, 6 Aug 2022 18:21:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233838AbiHFSVz (ORCPT ); Sat, 6 Aug 2022 14:21:55 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50006 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241657AbiHFSVk (ORCPT ); Sat, 6 Aug 2022 14:21:40 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A74D1E25; Sat, 6 Aug 2022 11:21:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 42BC461221; Sat, 6 Aug 2022 18:21:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 271BAC433C1; Sat, 6 Aug 2022 18:21:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1659810064; bh=orcjVHFk4lFBov1ujUSmqLHsLoO2iIvfGgGHJHlIh7A=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=FWMhuXFJSleNWQKkiPFl4VU6fLgJgg6NLKSQrAlEY/EFTQ9ut+LINlEq4+P8A76ir IvyBzut+gNS7PLgDqedD3Lom2EzymAV2djRK1XpPyawrVNmOacohakfCykPAhI8xbb Y8SnjOMZWNinwDaIqEUVGkxQlmlIciOCeYQ/r4VeVn/N/FXRdtUd3W1fJGX7qUfjvG eSMWVoal7Q1bqcQbqRZCy3pbAPd90fAtGG81LEqp8ofNdOI3Y9onRrpPZEvacpHvDJ Hl38QHCxXBh3JLj/eY20OJYs7ADgNsiFMtAyfyJW2Ne2V3Pii9H1HZAHJJLRXJACXZ dDFGHS6h1Yfdw== Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2022 21:21:01 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Evan Green Cc: Matthew Garrett , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Pavel Machek , LKML , Daniil Lunev , zohar@linux.ibm.com, "James E.J. Bottomley" , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Gwendal Grignou , Linux PM , David Howells , Hao Wu , James Morris , Jason Gunthorpe , Len Brown , Peter Huewe , "Serge E. Hallyn" , axelj , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Message-ID: References: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> <20220506160807.GA1060@bug> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 04, 2022 at 02:55:35PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > On Wed, Aug 3, 2022 at 5:59 PM Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Tue, Aug 02, 2022 at 11:36:43AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 3:33 PM Evan Green wrote: > > > > > > > One more bump here, as we'd really love to get encrypted hibernation > > > > to a form upstream would accept if at all possible. We were > > > > considering landing this in our Chrome OS tree for now, then coming > > > > back in a couple months with a "we've been baking this ourselves and > > > > it's going so great, oooh yeah". I'm not sure if upstream would find > > > > that compelling or not. But in any case, some guidance towards making > > > > this more upstream friendly would be well appreciated. > > > > > > > > One thing I realized in attempting to pick this myself is that the > > > > trusted key blob format has moved to ASN.1. So I should really move > > > > the creation ticket to the new ASN.1 format (if I can figure out the > > > > right OID for that piece), which would allow me to drop a lot of the > > > > ugly stuff in tpm2_unpack_blob(). Maybe if I get no other comments > > > > I'll work on that and resend. > > > > > > I've been revamping my TPM-backed verified hibernation implementation > > > based on this work, so I'd definitely be enthusiastic about it being > > > mergeable. > > > > BTW, is it tested with QEMU + swtpm? > > For myself, so far I've been testing on a recent Intel Chromebook. The > H1 (aka cr50) security chip on modern chromebooks implements a subset > [1] of TPM2.0, and is exposed through the standard TPM APIs in the > kernel. I can make sure to test on Qemu as well, is there anything in > particular I should look out for? I was just thinking what I could use for testing BR, Jarkko