From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/5] User namespace mount updates
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 15:15:09 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1443644116-41366-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
Hi Eric,
Here's a batch of updates for the unprivileged user namespace mount
patches based on your feedback. I think everything you mentioned should
be addressed here.
These are now based on your for-testing branch.
Updates include:
- Fix for incorrect use of flags argument in mount_mtd.
- Eliminate lookup_bdev_perm and instead add an access mode argument to
lookup_bdev.
- Use __inode_permission instead of inode_permission when checking for
rights towards a block device inode.
- Add a patch replacing in_user_ns with current_in_user_ns.
- Add a patch to handle Smack security labels consistently.
Thanks,
Seth
Andy Lutomirski (1):
fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
Seth Forshee (4):
fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting
selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns
Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 2 +-
drivers/md/dm-table.c | 2 +-
drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c | 6 +++++-
fs/block_dev.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
fs/exec.c | 2 +-
fs/namespace.c | 13 +++++++++++++
fs/quota/quota.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/mount.h | 1 +
include/linux/user_namespace.h | 6 ++----
kernel/user_namespace.c | 6 +++---
security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
14 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2015-09-30 20:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-30 20:15 Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 1/5] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 23:42 ` Mike Snitzer
2015-10-01 12:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-01 13:40 ` Mike Snitzer
2015-10-01 14:41 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-08 15:41 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-01 15:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-10-01 23:07 ` Jan Kara
2015-10-05 14:26 ` Seth Forshee
2015-10-01 15:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-10-01 15:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 2/5] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 4/5] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-09-30 20:15 ` [PATCH 5/5] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
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