From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user namespaces
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 14:01:52 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160425190152.GB28975@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1461339521-123191-4-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Quoting Seth Forshee (seth.forshee@canonical.com):
> Both of these filesystems already have use cases for mounting the
> same super block from multiple user namespaces. For sysfs this
> happens when using criu for snapshotting a container, where sysfs
> is mounted in the containers network ns but the hosts user ns.
> The cgroup filesystem shares the same super block for all mounts
> of the same hierarchy regardless of the namespace.
>
> As a result, the restriction on mounting a super block from a
> single user namespace creates regressions for existing uses of
> these filesystems. For these specific filesystems this
> restriction isn't really necessary since the backing store is
> objects in kernel memory and thus the ids assigned from inodes
> is not subject to translation relative to s_user_ns.
>
> Add a new filesystem flag, FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB, which when set
> causes sget_userns() to skip the check of s_user_ns. Set this
> flag for the sysfs and cgroup filesystems to fix the
> regressions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
thanks.
> ---
> fs/super.c | 3 ++-
> fs/sysfs/mount.c | 3 ++-
> include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
> kernel/cgroup.c | 4 ++--
> 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
> index 092a7828442e..ead156b44bf8 100644
> --- a/fs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/super.c
> @@ -472,7 +472,8 @@ retry:
> hlist_for_each_entry(old, &type->fs_supers, s_instances) {
> if (!test(old, data))
> continue;
> - if (user_ns != old->s_user_ns) {
> + if (!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB) &&
> + user_ns != old->s_user_ns) {
> spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
> if (s) {
> up_write(&s->s_umount);
> diff --git a/fs/sysfs/mount.c b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
> index f3db82071cfb..9555accd4322 100644
> --- a/fs/sysfs/mount.c
> +++ b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
> @@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static struct file_system_type sysfs_fs_type = {
> .name = "sysfs",
> .mount = sysfs_mount,
> .kill_sb = sysfs_kill_sb,
> - .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_VISIBLE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
> + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_VISIBLE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT |
> + FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB,
> };
>
> int __init sysfs_init(void)
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index be0f8023e28c..66a639ec1bc4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -1988,6 +1988,7 @@ struct file_system_type {
> #define FS_USERNS_MOUNT 8 /* Can be mounted by userns root */
> #define FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT 16 /* A userns mount does not imply MNT_NODEV */
> #define FS_USERNS_VISIBLE 32 /* FS must already be visible */
> +#define FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB 64 /* Allow sharing sb between userns-es */
> #define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE 32768 /* FS will handle d_move() during rename() internally. */
> struct dentry *(*mount) (struct file_system_type *, int,
> const char *, void *);
> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
> index 671dc05c0b0f..9c9aa27e531a 100644
> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
> @@ -2247,14 +2247,14 @@ static struct file_system_type cgroup_fs_type = {
> .name = "cgroup",
> .mount = cgroup_mount,
> .kill_sb = cgroup_kill_sb,
> - .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
> + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB,
> };
>
> static struct file_system_type cgroup2_fs_type = {
> .name = "cgroup2",
> .mount = cgroup_mount,
> .kill_sb = cgroup_kill_sb,
> - .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
> + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB,
> };
>
> static char *cgroup_path_ns_locked(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen,
> --
> 1.9.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-25 19:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-22 15:38 [PATCH v3 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
[not found] ` <1461339521-123191-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] fs: Remove check of s_user_ns for existing mounts in fs_fully_visible() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-25 19:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids Seth Forshee
2016-04-25 20:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-04-25 20:54 ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
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