From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, yukuai@fygo.io
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/8] lib/raid/xor: x86: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 04:51:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260626045151.3BE3F1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260626043731.319287-8-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Removing the X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check can cause an Invalid Opcode (#UD) kernel panic during XOR RAID operations if the CPU natively advertises AVX but not XSAVE.
--
commit 6fce8e80966a4c49b0b494779bd6206c6d6bed1f
Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
lib/raid/xor: x86: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check
This commit removes the X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check when selecting the AVX
XOR implementation, assuming X86_FEATURE_AVX implies X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE.
> diff --git a/lib/raid/xor/x86/xor_arch.h b/lib/raid/xor/x86/xor_arch.h
> index 99fe85a213c66..991abe3f4bbda 100644
> --- a/lib/raid/xor/x86/xor_arch.h
> +++ b/lib/raid/xor/x86/xor_arch.h
> @@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ extern struct xor_block_template xor_block_avx;
> */
> static __always_inline void __init arch_xor_init(void)
> {
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
> - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) {
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) {
[Severity: High]
Can this lead to an Invalid Opcode (#UD) kernel panic during XOR RAID
operations if a CPU advertises AVX but not XSAVE?
If a hypervisor exposes AVX but hides XSAVE (for example, using QEMU's
-cpu host,-xsave flag), get_cpu_cap() still sets X86_FEATURE_AVX in
boot_cpu_data.
Although check_cpufeature_deps() detects the missing dependency, it only
issues a pr_warn_once warning without actually clearing X86_FEATURE_AVX.
During boot, fpu__init_system_xstate() evaluates
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) as true and executes an early return.
This early return bypasses clear_cpu_caps_with_missing_xfeatures(), meaning
X86_FEATURE_AVX is never cleared by the kernel.
Since the X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check was removed here, arch_xor_init()
will forcibly select xor_block_avx based solely on X86_FEATURE_AVX.
When VEX-encoded AVX instructions are later executed, the CPU will throw an
Invalid Opcode (#UD) exception because CR4.OSXSAVE was never set to 1 by
the OS.
Is there another mechanism that guarantees X86_FEATURE_AVX is cleared in
this scenario, or should the X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check be retained to safely
ensure the OS has fully initialized and enabled XSAVE?
> xor_force(&xor_block_avx);
> } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM)) {
> xor_register(&xor_block_sse);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260626043731.319287-1-ebiggers@kernel.org?part=7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-26 4:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-26 4:37 [PATCH 0/8] x86: Remove cpu_has_xfeatures() and add AVX-512 xor_gen() Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86/fpu: Check for missing AVX and AVX-512 xstate bits Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 5:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-26 5:39 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 2/8] um: " Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 7:41 ` David Laight
2026-06-26 8:21 ` Anton Ivanov
2026-06-26 10:49 ` David Laight
2026-06-26 20:55 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 21:33 ` David Laight
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 3/8] crypto: x86 - Stop using cpu_has_xfeatures() Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 4/8] lib/crypto: x86: " Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 4:53 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 5/8] lib/crc: " Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/fpu: Remove cpu_has_xfeatures() Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 7/8] lib/raid/xor: x86: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE check Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 4:51 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-26 5:40 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-06-26 4:37 ` [PATCH 8/8] lib/raid/xor: x86: Add AVX-512 optimized xor_gen() Eric Biggers
2026-06-26 5:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-06-26 5:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
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