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From: David Brown <david.brown@hesbynett.no>
To: Matt Garman <matthew.garman@gmail.com>
Cc: Piergiorgio Sartor <piergiorgio.sartor@nexgo.de>,
	Mdadm <linux-raid@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Storage system
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 2014 17:11:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52F505B3.2050902@hesbynett.no> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJvUf-BTjmxonub0eWGNm1YNp4zYis5Mgti9FuRiQ8RbVY3cXQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 07/02/14 15:29, Matt Garman wrote:
> FWIW, I use a program called "shred" when I'm done with a disk.  It
> makes N (default = 3) passes of writing random data to the disk, and
> an optional final pass of zeroes.  It's time-consuming to complete,
> but takes only 30 seconds to get going.  Even more convenient if you
> have one of those USB hard drive docks, so you can take the drive out
> of your system.
> 
> Based on what I've read, that should be sufficient to keep anyone
> without a Dept of Defense budget from recovering you data.  The DOD
> probably already has your data anyway, so that's a non-issue.  :)
> 

Even with the full resources of NSA, there is no way to read useful data
from a disk that has had a single pass of writing zeros.  Multi-pass
disk erasure is a case of some companies getting very rich from a myth
based on a single academic paper with theories about how /some/ data
/might/ be recoverable from overwritten disks.  It was never more than
an idea at the time, and it applies even less to modern disks.

In an experiment, researchers wrote some bits to a sample of hard drive
material, overwrote them once, then tried to read the old data.  I can't
find the reference (I really wish I could), so my figures may be a bit
off - but they are in the right ballpark.  I believe it was about 32
bits they wrote.  They managed to recover 7 bits that they were
confident were correct - after spending months with equipment such as
electron microscopes.

The most convincing argument, however, is the economic one - if it were
possible to recover erased data (that has been overwritten once) with
any reliability, then disk recovery firms would be offering such a
service.  These folks can get your photos back after disks have been
"destroyed" in fires - but they cannot get data back if it has been erased.


The only thing you can't erase are re-mapped sectors - but hopefully
those will be rare!

With SSD's it's a bit different - re-mapping and garbage collection
means that there is the possibility of some data being left on partially
filled blocks.

> 
> 
> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 2:07 AM, David Brown <david.brown@hesbynett.no> wrote:
>> On 06/02/14 19:09, Piergiorgio Sartor wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> this question is only partially related to Linux MD,
>>> but since the experts are here, I think it would not
>>> be a big problem to ask here.
>>>
>>> I'm considering a storage system.
>>> This is based on HDD "rust".
>>> It should have RAID-6, for protection agaist disk
>>> failure(s).
>>> It should have LUKS (or similar), in order to simplify
>>> HDD disposal (disk that are still somehow readable will
>>> not need to be wiped out before dumping them).
>>> It should have LVM, as flexible partition system.
>>>
>>
>>
>> It strikes me as a bad idea to use encryption of any sort "to save time
>> when dumping old disks".  Physically destroying hard disks is not /that/
>> hard.  Unless you are keeping plans for a nuclear missile, then a few
>> whacks with a hammer will be good enough.  Breaking the electronics
>> means it costs many thousands of dollars to get the data off the disk
>> again - you don't even need to open the drive and get out the platters
>> (opening the drive is time-consuming - destroying the platters after
>> opening is easy).  And with raid, little of the data on the disk is
>> intelligible unless you have the full stripe (minus parity) - just ask
>> anyone who has tried to recover from one too many disk failures.
>>
>> And of course, just dd'ing /dev/zero to the first few MB of the disk
>> will make it unreadable for most hackers - even if they have all the
>> disks in a set, and know how they were configured.  And you could donate
>> the old disks to windows users - then they are guaranteed unreadable!
>>
>> Disk encryption slows everything down, and adds lots of complications to
>> the system.  It is less of an issue with drives with built-in
>> encryption, but still a complete waste of time and money if all you want
>> is "safe" disposal of old disks.
>>
>> The /only/ thing disk encryption is useful for is if you fear the disks
>> will be physically stolen by someone who is after your data (or customs
>> guards in dodgy countries, which amounts to the same thing).  So if you
>> fear that your company will be the target of top-range thieves who will
>> steal your disks for the data, then encryption is a good idea.  Of
>> course, better locks and alarm systems would be a better investment.
>>
>>
>> Once you have eliminated the "E", then I believe HRL is the common
>> arrangement, although sometimes you also do physical partitioning of the
>> disks first, so that you can have different bits with different raid
>> types.  A multi-way raid1 partition first for /boot can make booting
>> easier, a set of raid1 pairs works well for swap (for emergency use
>> only), and then the rest of each disk makes up your raid6 array.
>>
>>
>> --
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> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-02-07 16:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-02-06 18:09 Storage system Piergiorgio Sartor
2014-02-06 19:24 ` Joe Landman
2014-02-07  8:07 ` David Brown
2014-02-07 14:29   ` Matt Garman
2014-02-07 15:14     ` Roman Mamedov
2014-02-07 15:45       ` Roberto Spadim
2014-02-07 16:11     ` David Brown [this message]
2014-02-07 16:25       ` Can Jeuleers
2014-02-07 16:36         ` David Brown
2014-02-08  0:14           ` Chris Murphy
2014-02-07 19:16       ` Robert L Mathews
2014-02-07 23:58     ` Chris Murphy

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