AW: AW: RAID1 and data safety?

AW: AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Schuett Thomas EXT]

I wrote:
>> 
>> Still, if there is different data on the two disks due to a previous 
>> power failure, the comparsion could really be the better choise, isn't it?
>> 
>

Neil wrote:
>What does a comparison of two blocks tell you?  That they are
>different, not which one is "right".
>
>A filesystem designed to handle these sort of problems wouldn't suffer
>from data inconsistencies due to power off.  It would "know" where it
>was up to and would either re-write or ignore any data that it doesn't
>know to certainly be safe.

But:
If you have a raid1 and a journaling fs, see the following:
If the system chrashes at the end of a write transaction,
then the end-of-transaction information may got written 
to hda already, but not to hdb. On the next boot, the 
journaling fs may see an overall unclean bit (*probably* a transaction
is pending), so it reads the transaction log. 

And here the fault happens:
By chance, it reads the transaction log from hda, then sees, that the
transaction was finished, and clears the overall unclean bit. 
This cleaning is a write, so it goes to *both* HDs.

Situation now: On hdb there is a pending transaction in the transaction 
log, but the overall unclean bit is cleared. This may not be realised,
until by chance a year later hda chrashes, and you finaly face the fact,
that there is a corrupt situation on the left HD.

Solution approach: if it would have read the transaction log from both HDs,
it would have returned a read fault. A good journaling fs probably stores
the end-of-transaction info in a different block, than the start-of-transaction 
info. Then it can say: If I cannot properly read the end-of-transaction info,
then I consider the transaction as not finished, so I do a rollback. 
(Of course this requires a readable start-of-transaction info, therefore it 
should be stored seperate from the end-of-transaction info.)

Does this sound reasonable?

Thomas

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Peter T. Breuer]

Schuett Thomas EXT <Thomas.Schuett.extern@mchh.siemens.de> wrote:
> And here the fault happens:
> By chance, it reads the transaction log from hda, then sees, that the
> transaction was finished, and clears the overall unclean bit. 
> This cleaning is a write, so it goes to *both* HDs.

Don't put the journal on the raid device, then - I'm not ever sure why
people do that!  (they probably have a reason that is good - to them).

Or put it on another raid partition/device on the same media, but one
set to error unless replication is perfect (there does seem to be a use
for that policy!).

Peter

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Neil Brown]

On Tuesday March 29, ptb@lab.it.uc3m.es wrote:
> 
> Don't put the journal on the raid device, then - I'm not ever sure why
> people do that!  (they probably have a reason that is good - to them).
> 

Not good advice.  DO put the journal on a raid device.  It is much
safer there.

NeilBrown

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Peter T. Breuer]

Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
> On Tuesday March 29, ptb@lab.it.uc3m.es wrote:
> > 
> > Don't put the journal on the raid device, then - I'm not ever sure why
> > people do that!  (they probably have a reason that is good - to them).
> 
> Not good advice.  DO put the journal on a raid device.  It is much
> safer there.

Two journals means two possible sources of unequal information - plus the
two datasets.  We have been through this before. You get the journal
you deserve.

Peter

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Lars Marowsky-Bree]

On 2005-03-29T13:26:32, "Peter T. Breuer" <ptb@lab.it.uc3m.es> wrote:

> > Not good advice.  DO put the journal on a raid device.  It is much
> > safer there.
> Two journals means two possible sources of unequal information - plus the
> two datasets.  We have been through this before. You get the journal
> you deserve.

The RAID never exposes this potential inconsistency to the higher levels
though.

Indeed, you get what you deserve.


-- 
High Availability & Clustering
SUSE Labs, Research and Development
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH - A Novell Business

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Doug Ledford]

On Tue, 2005-03-29 at 13:26 +0200, Peter T. Breuer wrote:
> Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
> > On Tuesday March 29, ptb@lab.it.uc3m.es wrote:
> > > 
> > > Don't put the journal on the raid device, then - I'm not ever sure why
> > > people do that!  (they probably have a reason that is good - to them).
> > 
> > Not good advice.  DO put the journal on a raid device.  It is much
> > safer there.
> 
> Two journals means two possible sources of unequal information - plus the
> two datasets.  We have been through this before. You get the journal
> you deserve.

No, you don't.  You've been through this before and it wasn't any more
correct than it is now.  Most of this seems to center on the fact that
you aren't aware of a few constraints that the linux md subsystem and
the various linux journaling filesystems were written under and how each
of those meets those constraints at an implementation level, so allow me
to elucidate that for you.

1) All linux filesystems are designed to work on actual, physical hard
drives.

2) The md subsystem is designed to provide fault tolerance for hard
drive failures via redundant storage of information (except raid0 and
linear, those are ignored throughout the rest of this email).

3) The md subsystem is designed to seamlessly operate underneath any
linux filesystem.  This implies that it must *act* like an actual,
physical hard drive in order to not violate assumptions made at the
filesystem level.

So here's how those constraints are satisfied in linux.

For constraint #1, specifically as it relates to journaling filesystems,
all journaling filesystem currently in use started their lives at a time
when the linux block layer did not provide any means of write barriers.
As a result, they used completion events as write barriers.  That is to
say, if you needed a write barrier between the end of journal
transaction write and the start of the actual data writes to the drive,
you simply waited for the drive to say that the actual end of journal
transaction data had been written prior to issuing any of the writes to
the actual filesystem.  You then waited for all filesystem writes to
complete before allowing that journal transaction to be overwritten.

Additionally, people have mentioned the concept of rollbacks relating to
journaling filesystems.  At least ext3, and likely all journaling
filesystems on linux, don't do rollbacks.  They do replays.  In order to
do a rollback, you would have to first read the data you are going to
update, save it somewhere, then start the update and if you crash
somewhere in the update you then read the saved data and put it back in
place of the partially completed update.  Obviously, this has
performance impact because it means that any update requires a
corresponding read/write cycle to save the old data.  What they actually
do is transactional updates where they write the update to the journal,
wait for all of the journal writes relevant to a specific transaction
group to complete, then start the writes to the actual filesystem.  If
you crash during the update to the filesystem, you replay any and all
whole journal transactions in the ext3 journal which simply re-issues
the writes so that any that didn't complete, get completed.  You never
start the writes until you know they are already committed to the
journal, and you never remove them from the journal until you know they
are all committed to the filesystem proper.  That way you are 100%
guaranteed to be able to complete whatever group of filesystem proper
writes were in process at the time of a crash, returning you to a
consistent state.  The main assumption that the filesystem relies upon
to make this true is that an issued write request(s) is not returned
until it is complete and on media (or in the drive buffer and the drive
is claiming that even in the event of a power failure it will still make
media).

OK, that's the filesystem issues.  For constraint #2, md satisfies this
by storing data in a way that any single drive failure can be
compensated for transparently (or more if using a more than 2 disk raid1
array or using raid6).  The primary thing here is that on a recoverable
failure scenario, the layers above md must A) not know the error
occurred and B) must get the right data when reading and C) must be able
to continue writing to the device and those writes must be preserved
across reboots and other recovery operations that might take place to
bring the array out of degraded mode.  This is where the event counters
come into play.  That's what md uses to be able to tell which drives in
an array are up to date versus those that aren't, which is what's needed
to satisfy C.

Now, what Peter has been saying can happen on a raid1 array (but which
can't) is creeping data corruption that's only noticed later because a
write to md array gets completed on one device but not the other and it
isn't until you read it later that this shows up.  Under normal failure
scenarios (aka, not the rather unlikely one posted to this list recently
that involves random drives disappearing and then reappearing at just
the right time), this isn't an issue.  From a very high level
perspective, there are only two type of raid1 restarts: ones where the
event counters of constituent devices match, and ones where they don't.
If you don't have a raid restart then we aren't really interested in
what's going on because without a crash, things are going to eventually
get written identical on all devices, it's just a matter of time, and
while waiting on that to happen the page cache returns the right data.
So, if the event counters don't match, then the freshest device is taken
and the non-fresh devices are kicked from the array, so you only get the
most recent data.  This is what you get if a raid devices is failed out
of the array prior to a system crash or raid restart.  If the array
counters match and the state matches on all devices, then we simply pick
a device as the "in sync" device and resync to all the other mirrors.
This mimics the behavior of a physical hard drive in the sense that if
you had multiple writes in flight, it isn't guaranteed that they all
completed, just that whatever we return is all consistent and that it
isn't possible to read the same block twice and get two different
values.  This is what happens when a system crashes with all devices
active.  For less common situations, such as a 3 disk raid1 array, you
can actually get a combination of the two above behaviors if you have
something like 1 disk fail, then a crash.  We'll pick one of the two up
to date disks as the master (we always simply take the first active-sync
disk in the rdev array, so which disk it actually is depends on the
disk's position in the rdev array), sync it over to the other active-
sync disk, and kick the failed disk entirely out of the array.  It is
entirely possible that prior to the crash, a write might have completed
on one of the disks, but not on the one selected as the master for the
resync operation.  This write will then be lost upon restart.  Again,
this is consistent with a physical hard drive since the ordering of
multiple outstanding writes is indeterminate.

Raid4/5/6 is similar in that any disk that doesn't have an up to date
superblock is kicked from the array.  However, we can't just pick a disk
to sync to all the others, but we still need to provide a guarantee that
two reads won't get different data where two different reads means a
read from a data block versus a read from a reconstructed from parity
data block, so we resync all the parity blocks from all the data blocks
so that should a degraded state happen in the future, stale parity won't
cause the data returned to change.  The one failing here relative to
mimicking a real hard drive is that it's possible that with a raid5
array with say a 64k chunk size and a 256k write, that you could end up
with the first 64k chunk making it to disk, then not the second, then
the third making it, etc.  Generally speaking this doesn't happen on
real disks because sequential writes are done sequentially to media.

So, now we get to the interactions between the md raid devices and the
filesystem level of the OS.  This is where ext3 or other journaling
filesystems actually solve that problem I just noted with lost writes on
raid1 arrays and with partial writes with stale data in the middle of
new data on raid4/5/6 arrays.  If you use a journaling filesystem, then
any in flight writes to the filesystem proper at the time of a crash are
replayed in their entirety to ensure that they all make it to disk.  Any
in flight writes to the journal will be thrown away and never go to the
filesystem proper.  This means that even if two disks are inconsistent
with each other, the resync operation makes them consistent and the
journal replay guarantees they are up to date with the last completed
journal group entry.  This is true even when the journal is on the same
raid device as the filesystem because the journal is written with a
write completion barrier and the md subsystem doesn't complete the
barrier write until it has hit the media on all constituent devices,
which ensures that regardless of which device is picked as a master for
resync purposes after an unclean shutdown that it is impossible for any
of the filesystem proper writes to have started without a complete
journal transaction to replay in the event of failure.

Now, if I recall correctly, Peter posted a patch that changed this
semantic in the raid1 code.  The raid1 code does not complete a write to
the upper layers of the kernel until it's been completed on all devices
and his patch made it such that as soon as it hit 1 device it returned
the write to the upper layers of the kernel.  Doing this would introduce
the very problem Peter has been thinking that the default raid1 stack
had all along.  Let's say you are using ext3 and are writing an end of
journal transaction marker.  That marker is sent to drive A and B.
Assume drive A is busy completing some reads at the moment, and drive B
isn't and completes the end of journal write quickly.  The patch Peter
posted (or at least talked about, can't remember which) would then
return a completion event to the ext3 journal code.  The ext3 code would
then assume the journal was all complete and start issuing the writes
related to that journal transaction en-masse.  These writes will then go
to drives A and B.  Since drive A was busy with some reads, it gets
these writes prior to completing the end of transaction write it already
had in its queue.  Being a nice, smart SCSI disk with tagged queuing
enabled, it then proceeds to complete the whole queue of writes in
whatever order is most efficient for it.  It completes two of the writes
that were issued by the ext3 filesystem after the ext3 filesystem
thought the journal entry was complete, and then the machine has a power
supply failure and nothing else gets written.  As it turns out, drive A
is the first drive in the rdev array, so on reboot, it's selected as the
master for resync.  Now, that means that all the data, journal and
everything else, is going to be copied from drive A to drive B.  And
guess what.  We never completed that end of journal write on drive A, so
when the ext3 filesystem is mounted, that journal transaction is going
to be considered incomplete and *not* get replayed.  But we've also
written a couple of the updates from that transaction to disk A already.
Well, there you go, data corruption.  So, Peter, if you are still toying
with that patch, it's a *BAAAAAD* idea.

That's what using a journaling filesystem on top of an md device gets
you in terms of what problems the journaling solves for the md device.
In turn, a weakness of any journaling filesystem is that it is
inherently vulnerable to hard disk failures.  A drive failure takes out
the filesystem and your machine becomes unusable.  Obviously, this very
problem is what md solves for filesystems.  Whether talking about the
journal or the rest of the filesystem, if you let a hard drive error
percolate up to the filesystem, then you've failed in the goal of
software raid.  I remember talk once about how putting the journal on
the raid device was bad because it would cause the media in that area of
the drive to wear out faster.  The proper response to that is: "So.  I
don't care.  If that section of media wears out faster, fine by me,
because I'm smart and put both my journal and my filesystem on a
software raid device that allows me to replace the worn out device with
a fresh one without ever loosing any data or suffering a crash."  The
goal of the md layer is not to prevent drive wear out, the goal is to
make us tolerant of drive failures so we don't care when they happen, we
simply replace the bad drive and go on.  Since drive failures happen on
a fairly regular basis without md, if the price of not suffering
problems as a result of those failures is that we slightly increase the
failure rate due to excessive writing in the journal area, then fine by
me.

In addition, if you use raid5 arrays like I do, then putting the journal
on the raid array is a huge win because of the outrageously high
sequential throughput of a raid5 array.  Journals are preallocated at
filesystem creation time and occupy a more or less sequential area on
the disks.  Journals are also more or less a ring buffer.  You can tune
the journal size to a reasonable multiple of a full stripe size on the
raid5 array (say something like 1 to 10 MB per disk, so in a 5 disk
raid5 array, I'd use between a 4 and 40MB journal, depending on whether
I thought I would be doing a lot of large writes of sufficient enough
size to utilize a large journal), turn on journaling of not just meta-
data but all data, and then benefit from the fact that the journal
writes take place as more or less sequential writes as seen by things
like tiobench benchmark runs, and because the typical filesystem writes
are usually much more random in nature, the journaling overhead can be
reduced to no more than, say, 25% performance loss while getting the
benefit of both meta-data and regular data journaled.  It's certainly
*far* faster than sticking the journal on some other device unless it's
another very fast raid array.

Anyway, I think the situation can be summed up as this:

See Peter try to admin lots of machines.
See Peter imagine problems that don't exist.
See Peter disable features that would make his life easier as Peter
	takes steps to circumvent his imaginary problems.
See Peter stay at work over New Years holiday fixing problems that
	were likely a result of his own efforts to avoid problems.
Don't be a Peter, listen to Neil.


-- 
Doug Ledford <dledford@xsintricity.com>

Re: AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Molle Bestefich]

> Does this sound reasonable?

Does to me.  Great example!
Thanks for painting the pretty picture :-).

Seeing as you're clearly the superior thinker, I'll address your brain
instead of wasting wattage on my own.

Let's say that MD had the feature to read from both disks in a mirror
and perform a comparison on read.
Let's say that I had that feature turned on for 2 mirror arrays (4 disks).
I want to get a bit of performance back though, so I stripe the two
mirrored arrays.

Do you see any problem in this scenario?
Are we back to "corruption could happen then" or are we still OK?

Re: AW: AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Neil Brown]

On Tuesday March 29, Thomas.Schuett.extern@mchh.siemens.de wrote:
> But:
> If you have a raid1 and a journaling fs, see the following:
> If the system chrashes at the end of a write transaction,
> then the end-of-transaction information may got written 
> to hda already, but not to hdb. On the next boot, the 
> journaling fs may see an overall unclean bit (*probably* a transaction
> is pending), so it reads the transaction log. 
> 
> And here the fault happens:
> By chance, it reads the transaction log from hda, then sees, that the
> transaction was finished, and clears the overall unclean bit. 
> This cleaning is a write, so it goes to *both* HDs.
> 
> Situation now: On hdb there is a pending transaction in the transaction 
> log, but the overall unclean bit is cleared. This may not be realised,
> until by chance a year later hda chrashes, and you finaly face the fact,
> that there is a corrupt situation on the left HD.

Wrong.  There is nothing of the sort on hdb.  
Due to the system crash the data on hdb is completely ignored.  Data
from hda is copied over onto it.  Until that copy has completed,
nothing is read from hdb.

You could possibly come up with a scenario where the above happens but
while the copy from hda->hdb is happening, hda dies completely so
reads have to start happening from hdb.  
md could possibly handle this situation better (ensure a copy has
happened for any block before a read succeeds of that block), but I
don't think it is at all likely to be a re-life problem.

NeilBrown

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Peter T. Breuer]

Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
> Due to the system crash the data on hdb is completely ignored.  Data

Neil - can you explain the algorithm that stamps the superblocks with
an event count, once and for all? (until further amendment :-).

It goes without saying that sb's are not stamped at every write, and the
event count is not incremented at every write, so when and when?

Thanks

Peter

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Luca Berra]

On Tue, Mar 29, 2005 at 01:29:22PM +0200, Peter T. Breuer wrote:
>Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
>> Due to the system crash the data on hdb is completely ignored.  Data
>
>Neil - can you explain the algorithm that stamps the superblocks with
>an event count, once and for all? (until further amendment :-).

IIRC it is updated at every event (start, stop, add, remove, fail etc...)

>It goes without saying that sb's are not stamped at every write, and the
>event count is not incremented at every write, so when and when?

the event count is not incremented at every write, but the dirty flag
is, and it is cleared lazily after some idle time.
in older code it was set at array start and cleared only at stop.

so in case of a disk failure the other disks get updated about the
failure.

in case of a restart (crash) the array will be dirty and a coin tossed
to chose which mirror to use as an authoritative source (the coin is
biased, but it doesn't matter). At this point any possible parallel
reality is squashed out of existance.

L.

-- 
Luca Berra -- bluca@comedia.it
        Communication Media & Services S.r.l.
 /"\
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Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Peter T. Breuer]

Luca Berra <bluca@comedia.it> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2005 at 01:29:22PM +0200, Peter T. Breuer wrote:
> >Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
> >> Due to the system crash the data on hdb is completely ignored.  Data
> >
> >Neil - can you explain the algorithm that stamps the superblocks with
> >an event count, once and for all? (until further amendment :-).
> 
> IIRC it is updated at every event (start, stop, add, remove, fail etc...)

Hmm .. I see it updated sometimes twice and sometimes once between a
setfaulty and a hotadd (no writes between). There may be a race.

It's a bit of a problem because when I start a bitmap (which is when a
disk is faulted from the array), I copy the event count at that time to
the bitmap.  When the disk is re-inserted, I look at the event count on
its sb, and see that it may sometimes be one, sometimes two behind the
count on the bitmap.

And then sometimes the array event count jumps by ten or so.

Here's an example:

  md0: repairing old mirror component 300015 (disk 306 >= bitmap 294)

I had done exactly one write on the degraded array. And maybe a
setfaulty and a hotadd. The test cycle before that (exactly the same)
I got:

  md0: repairing old mirror component 300015 (disk 298 >= bitmap 294)

and at the very first separation (first test cycle) I saw

  md0: warning - new disk 300015 nearly too old for repair (disk 292 < bitmap 294)

(Yeah, these are my printk's - so what).

So it's all consistent with the idea that the event count is
incremented more frequently than you say.

Anyway, what you are saying is that if a crash occurs on the node with the
array, then the event counts on BOTH mirrors will be the same.  Thus
there is no way of knowing which is the more uptodate.

> >It goes without saying that sb's are not stamped at every write, and the
> >event count is not incremented at every write, so when and when?
> 
> the event count is not incremented at every write, but the dirty flag
> is, and it is cleared lazily after some idle time.
> in older code it was set at array start and cleared only at stop.

Hmmm. You mean this

   int                             sb_dirty;

in the mddev?  I don't think that's written out .. well, it may be, if
the whole sb is written, but that's very big. What exactly are you
referencing with "the dirty flag" above?

> so in case of a disk failure the other disks get updated about the
> failure.

Well, yes, but in the case of an array node crash ...

> in case of a restart (crash) the array will be dirty and a coin tossed
> to chose which mirror to use as an authoritative source (the coin is
> biased, but it doesn't matter). At this point any possible parallel
> reality is squashed out of existance.

It is my opinion that one ought always to roll back anything in the
journal (any journal) on a restart. On the grounds that you can't know
for sure if it went to the other mirror.

Would you like me to make a patch to make sure that writes go to all
mirrors or else error back t the user?  The only question in my mind is
how to turn such a policy on or off per array. Any suggestion? I'm not
familiar with most of mdadm's neer capabilities. I'd use the sysctl
interface, but it's not set up to be "per array". It should be.

Peter

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Mario Holbe]

Peter T. Breuer <ptb@lab.it.uc3m.es> wrote:
> Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
>> Due to the system crash the data on hdb is completely ignored.  Data
> Neil - can you explain the algorithm that stamps the superblocks with
> an event count, once and for all? (until further amendment :-).

This has nothing to do with the event count but with the state bits.
And the state is set to active/dirty on start and set to clean on
stop/ro. It's just like a filesystem's state but on block device
layer.


regards
   Mario
-- 
I thought the only thing the internet was good for was porn.  -- Futurama

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Doug Ledford]

On Tue, 2005-03-29 at 13:29 +0200, Peter T. Breuer wrote:
> Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> wrote:
> > Due to the system crash the data on hdb is completely ignored.  Data
> 
> Neil - can you explain the algorithm that stamps the superblocks with
> an event count, once and for all? (until further amendment :-).

I think the best explanation is this:  any change in array state that
would necessitate kicking a drive out of the array if it didn't also
make this change in state with the rest of the drives in the array
results in an increment to the event counter and a flush of the
superblocks.  For example, a transition of a raid array from ro to rw
mode results in an event update and a flush of superblocks.  If the
system then goes down and one drive has the superblock update and
another doesn't, then you know that one was behind the other and to kick
it.

> It goes without saying that sb's are not stamped at every write, and the
> event count is not incremented at every write, so when and when?

Transition from ro -> rw or from rw -> ro, transition from clean to
dirty or dirty to clean, any change in the distribution of disks in the
superblock (aka, change in number of working disks, active disks, spare
disks, failed disks, etc.), or any ordering updates of disk devices in
the rdisk array (for example, when a spare is done being rebuilt to
replace a failed device, it gets moved from it's current position in the
array to the position it was just rebuilt to replace as part of the
final transition from being rebuilt to being an active, live component
in the array).

-- 
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
http://people.redhat.com/dledford

Re: RAID1 and data safety?

[Peter T. Breuer]

I forgot to say "thanks"! Thanks for the breakdown.

Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> wrote:
(of event count increment)
> I think the best explanation is this:  any change in array state that

OK ..

> would necessitate kicking a drive out of the array if it didn't also
> make this change in state with the rest of the drives in the array

Hmmm.  

> results in an increment to the event counter and a flush of the
> superblocks.


> Transition from ro -> rw or from rw -> ro, transition from clean to
> dirty or dirty to clean, any change in the distribution of disks in the
> superblock (aka, change in number of working disks, active disks, spare
> disks, failed disks, etc.), or any ordering updates of disk devices in
> the rdisk array (for example, when a spare is done being rebuilt to
> replace a failed device, it gets moved from it's current position in the
> array to the position it was just rebuilt to replace as part of the
> final transition from being rebuilt to being an active, live component
> in the array).

I still see about 8-10 changes in the event count between faulting a
disk out and bringing it back into the array for hot-repair, even if
nothing is written meantime. I suppose I could investigate!

Of concern to me (only) is that I observe that a faulted disk seems to
have an event count that is 1-2 counts behind that stamped on the bitmap
left behind on the array as it starts up in response to the fault.  The
number behind varies.  Something races.

Peter

AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Schuett Thomas EXT]

[Please excuse, my mailtool breaks threads ...]
Reply to mail from 2005-04-05

Hello Doug,

many thanks for this highly detailed and structured posting.

A few questions are left: Is it common today, that a (eide) HD does
not state a write as finished (aka send completion events, if I got this 
right), before it was written to *media*?

I am happy to hear about this "write barriers", even as I am astonished, that 
it doesn't bring down the whole system performance (at least for raid1).


> This is where the event counters
> come into play.  That's what md uses to be able to tell which drives in
> an array are up to date versus those that aren't, which is what's needed
> to satisfy C.

So event counters are the 2nd type of information, that gets written with write 
barriers. One is the journal data from the (j)fs (and actually the real data 
too, to make it gain sence, otherwise the end-of-transaction-write is like a 
semaphor with only one of the two parties using it), and the other is the event 
counter.

> Now, if I recall correctly, Peter posted a patch that changed this
> semantic in the raid1 code.  The raid1 code does not complete a write to
> the upper layers of the kernel until it's been completed on all devices
> and his patch made it such that as soon as it hit 1 device it returned
> the write to the upper layers of the kernel.

I am glad to hear, that the behaviour is such, that the barrier stops, until 
*all* media got written. That was one of the things that really made me 
worrying. I hope, the patch is backed out and didn't went into any distros.

> had in its queue.  Being a nice, smart SCSI disk with tagged queuing
> enabled, it then proceeds to complete the whole queue of writes in
> whatever order is most efficient for it.

But just to make sure: Your previous statement "...when the linux block layer 
did not provide any means of write barriers. As a result, they used completion 
events as write barriers." indicates, that even "nice, smart SCSI disk with 
tagged queuing enabled" will act as demanded, because the special way of write 
with appended "completion events testing" will make sure they do?

---

You mentioned data journaling, and it sounded like it is reliable working. 
Which one of the existing journaling fs did you have in your mind?

---

Afaik a read only reads from *one* HD (in raid1). So how to be sure, 
that *both* HDs are still perfectly o.k.? Am I am fine to do a 
   cat /dev/hda2 > /dev/null ; cat /dev/hdb2 > /dev/null
even *during* the md is active and getting used r/w?

best regards,
  Thomas

Re: AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Doug Ledford]

On Thu, 2005-04-07 at 17:35 +0200, Schuett Thomas EXT wrote:
> [Please excuse, my mailtool breaks threads ...]
> Reply to mail from 2005-04-05
> 
> Hello Doug,
> 
> many thanks for this highly detailed and structured posting.

You're welcome.

> A few questions are left: Is it common today, that a (eide) HD does
> not state a write as finished (aka send completion events, if I got this 
> right), before it was written to *media*?

Depends on the state of the Write Cache bit in the drive's configuration
page.  If this bit is enabled, the drive is allowed to cache writes in
the on board RAM and complete the command.  Should the drive have a
power failure event before the data is written to drive, then it might
get lost.  If the bit is not set, then the drive is suppossed to
actually have the data on media before returning (or at the very
absolute least, it should be in a small enough queue of pending writes
that should the power get lost, it can still write the last bits out
during spin down).

> I am happy to hear about this "write barriers", even as I am astonished, that 
> it doesn't bring down the whole system performance (at least for raid1).

It doesn't bring down system performance because the journaling
filesystem isn't single task so to speak.  What this means is that when
you have a large number of writes queued up to be flushed, the
journaling fs can create a journal transaction for just some of the
writes, then issue an end of journal transaction, wait for that to
complete, then it can proceed to release all those writes to the
filesystem proper.  At the same time that the filesystem proper writes
are getting under way, it can issue another stream of writes to start
the next journal transaction.  As soon as all the journal writes are
complete, it can issue an end of journal transaction, wait for it to
complete, then issue all those writes to the filesystem proper.  So you
see, it's not that writes to the filesystem and the journal are
exclusive of each other so that one waits entirely on the other, it's
that writes from a single journal transaction are exclusive to writes to
the filesystem for *that particular transaction*.  By keeping ongoing
journal transactions in process, the journaling filesystem is able to
also stream data to the filesystem proper without much degradation, it's
just that the filesystem proper writes are delayed somewhat from the
corresponding journal transaction writes.  Make sense?

> 
> > This is where the event counters
> > come into play.  That's what md uses to be able to tell which drives in
> > an array are up to date versus those that aren't, which is what's needed
> > to satisfy C.
> 
> So event counters are the 2nd type of information, that gets written with write 
> barriers. One is the journal data from the (j)fs (and actually the real data 
> too, to make it gain sence, otherwise the end-of-transaction-write is like a 
> semaphor with only one of the two parties using it), and the other is the event 
> counter.

Not really.  The event counter is *much* courser grained than journal
entries.  A raid array may be in use for years and never have the event
counter get above 20 or so if it stays up most of the time and doesn't
suffer disk add/remove events.  It's really only intended to mark events
like drive failures so that if you have a drive fail on shutdown, then
on reboot we know that it failed because we did an immediate superblock
event counter update on all drives except the failed one when the
failure happened.

> > Now, if I recall correctly, Peter posted a patch that changed this
> > semantic in the raid1 code.  The raid1 code does not complete a write to
> > the upper layers of the kernel until it's been completed on all devices
> > and his patch made it such that as soon as it hit 1 device it returned
> > the write to the upper layers of the kernel.
> 
> I am glad to hear, that the behaviour is such, that the barrier stops, until 
> *all* media got written. That was one of the things that really made me 
> worrying. I hope, the patch is backed out and didn't went into any distros.

No it never went anywhere.  It was just a "Hey guys, I played with this
optimization, here's the patch" type posting and no one picked it up for
inclusion in any upstream or distro kernels.

> > had in its queue.  Being a nice, smart SCSI disk with tagged queuing
> > enabled, it then proceeds to complete the whole queue of writes in
> > whatever order is most efficient for it.
> 
> But just to make sure: Your previous statement "...when the linux block layer 
> did not provide any means of write barriers. As a result, they used completion 
> events as write barriers." indicates, that even "nice, smart SCSI disk with 
> tagged queuing enabled" will act as demanded, because the special way of write 
> with appended "completion events testing" will make sure they do?

Yes.  We know that drives are allowed to reorder writes, so anytime we
want a barrier for a given write (say you want all journal transactions
complete before writing the end of journal entry), then you basically
wait for all your journal transactions to complete before sending the
end of journal transaction.  You don't have to wait for *all* writes to
the drive to complete, just the journal writes.  This is why performance
isn't killed by journaling.  The filesystem proper writes for previous
journal transactions can be taking place while you are doing this
waiting.

> ---
> 
> You mentioned data journaling, and it sounded like it is reliable working. 
> Which one of the existing journaling fs did you have in your mind?

I use ext3 personally.  But that's as much because it's the default
filesystem and I know Stephen Tweedie will fix it if it's broken ;-)

> ---
> 
> Afaik a read only reads from *one* HD (in raid1). So how to be sure, 
> that *both* HDs are still perfectly o.k.? Am I am fine to do a 
>    cat /dev/hda2 > /dev/null ; cat /dev/hdb2 > /dev/null
> even *during* the md is active and getting used r/w?

It's ok to do this.  However, reads happen from both hard drives in a
raid1 array in a sort of round robin fashion.  You don't really know
which reads are going to go where, but each drive will get read from.
Doing what you suggest will get you a full read check on each drive and
do so safely.  Of course, if it's supported on your system, you could
also just enable the SMART daemon and have it tell the drives to do
continuous background media checks to detect sectors that are either
already bad or getting ready to go bad (corrected error conditions).

-- 
Doug Ledford <dledford@xsintricity.com>
http://www.xsintricity.com/dledford
http://www.livejournal.com/users/deerslayer
AIM: DeerObliterator

AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Schuett Thomas EXT]

>Neil Brown wrote:
>>> Is there any way to tell MD to [...] and
>>> read-from-all-disks on a RAID1 array?
>
>Not sure why a checksum of X data blocks should be cheaper
>performance-wise than a comparison between X data blocks, but I can
>see the point in that you only have to load the data once and check
>the checksum.  Not quite the same security, but almost.

Still, if there is different data on the two disks due to a previous 
power failure, the comparsion could really be the better choise, isn't it?

Re: AW: RAID1 and data safety?

[Neil Brown]

On Tuesday March 22, Thomas.Schuett.extern@mchh.siemens.de wrote:
> >Neil Brown wrote:
> >>> Is there any way to tell MD to [...] and
> >>> read-from-all-disks on a RAID1 array?
> >
> >Not sure why a checksum of X data blocks should be cheaper
> >performance-wise than a comparison between X data blocks, but I can
> >see the point in that you only have to load the data once and check
> >the checksum.  Not quite the same security, but almost.
> 
> Still, if there is different data on the two disks due to a previous 
> power failure, the comparsion could really be the better choise, isn't it?
> 

What does a comparison of two blocks tell you?  That they are
different, not which one is "right".

A filesystem designed to handle these sort of problems wouldn't suffer
from data inconsistencies due to power off.  It would "know" where it
was up to and would either re-write or ignore any data that it doesn't
know to certainly be safe.

NeilBrown