From: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud-RlY5vtjFyJ3QT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: oss-security-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Red Hat Security Response Team
<secalert-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Ben Hutchings <benh-8fiUuRrzOP0dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
linux-rdma-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [oss-security] CVE Request: Linux: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface'
Date: Mon, 09 May 2016 21:48:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1462823339.4268.54.camel@opteya.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160507042232.GA5286-yvBWh1Eg28aNj9Bq2fkWzw@public.gmane.org>
Hi,
Le samedi 07 mai 2016 à 06:22 +0200, Salvatore Bonaccorso a écrit :
>
> Jann Horn reported an issue in the infiniband stack. It has been
> fixed
> in v4.6-rc6 with commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/linus/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
>
> >
> > IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
> > The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
> > bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
> > trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
> > is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
> > specified kernel memory instead.
> >
> > For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
> > the write API.
> >
> > For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
> > to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
> > (likely a structured ioctl() interface).
> >
> > The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
> > hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
As a workaround, I would suggest that systems which do not require
(userspace) RDMA/Infiniband to blacklist/remove the following modules:
rdma_ucm
ib_uverbs
ib_ucm
ib_umad
For example, adds the following in /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist.conf
blacklist rdma_ucm
blacklist ib_uverbs
blacklist ib_ucm
blacklist ib_umad
Those building their own kernel might want to disable, if not already,
CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_ACCESS,
CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MAD,
CONFIG_INFINIBAND_ADDR_TRANS
(Unfortunately the last one will also disable those features:
iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER)
iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target support
RDS over Infiniband and iWARP
9P RDMA Transport (Experimental)
RPC-over-RDMA transport
(which actually disable NFSoRDMA))
Regards.
--
Yann Droneaud
OPTEYA
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-09 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20160507042232.GA5286@eldamar.local>
[not found] ` <20160507042232.GA5286-yvBWh1Eg28aNj9Bq2fkWzw@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-07 18:19 ` [oss-security] CVE Request: Linux: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface' Yann Droneaud
[not found] ` <1462645186.4268.27.camel-RlY5vtjFyJ3QT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-08 8:00 ` Christoph Hellwig
2016-05-09 18:02 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <20160509180208.GB6372-J1fxOzX/cBvk1uMJSBkQmQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-09 19:10 ` Yann Droneaud
[not found] ` <1462821041.4268.43.camel-RlY5vtjFyJ3QT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-09 19:39 ` Jann Horn
2016-05-09 19:48 ` Yann Droneaud [this message]
[not found] ` <1462823339.4268.54.camel-RlY5vtjFyJ3QT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-12 0:12 ` ira.weiny
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