From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Doug Ledford Subject: Re: [PATCH] RDMA/netlink: OOPs in rdma_nl_rcv_msg() from misinterpreted flag Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 13:39:44 -0400 Message-ID: <1508780384.3325.13.camel@redhat.com> References: <20171019213859.26124.37851.stgit@phlsvslse11.ph.intel.com> <20171020073724.GY2106@mtr-leonro.local> <14063C7AD467DE4B82DEDB5C278E8663875E0841@FMSMSX108.amr.corp.intel.com> <20171023081117.GE2106@mtr-leonro.local> <20171023171211.GM2106@mtr-leonro.local> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20171023171211.GM2106-U/DQcQFIOTAAJjI8aNfphQ@public.gmane.org> Sender: linux-rdma-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Leon Romanovsky Cc: "Ruhl, Michael J" , "Torvalds, Linus" , "linux-rdma-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" List-Id: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2017-10-23 at 20:12 +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 10:49:24AM -0400, Doug Ledford wrote: > > On 10/23/2017 4:11 AM, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > Doug, > > It has very little related to security here. The RDMA_NL_LS netlink > operations require CAP_NET_ADMIN capability set and it is checked > before > calling any callback. I disagree. In this particular case, it wasn't a nefarious user, it was a simple misconfiguration that cause the kernel to oops. So even if you have CAP_NET_ADMIN, you still don't want a user space issue to oops the kernel. If you simply don't allow it to happen, then whether the CAP_NET_ADMIN program has been compromised by a black hat user is irrelevant. That seems the right way to be to me. -- Doug Ledford GPG KeyID: B826A3330E572FDD Key fingerprint = AE6B 1BDA 122B 23B4 265B 1274 B826 A333 0E57 2FDD -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-rdma" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html