From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 20/25] IB/core: Add mitigation for Spectre V1
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:36:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190806213624.20194-20-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190806213624.20194-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 61f259821dd3306e49b7d42a3f90fb5a4ff3351b ]
Some processors may mispredict an array bounds check and
speculatively access memory that they should not. With
a user supplied array index we like to play things safe
by masking the value with the array size before it is
used as an index.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190731043957.GA1600@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c
index 6511cb21f6e20..4a137bf584b04 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/semaphore.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -856,11 +857,14 @@ static int ib_umad_unreg_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, u32 __user *arg)
if (get_user(id, arg))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS)
+ return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
- if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS || !__get_agent(file, id)) {
+ id = array_index_nospec(id, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS);
+ if (!__get_agent(file, id)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
--
2.20.1
next parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-06 21:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190806213624.20194-1-sashal@kernel.org>
2019-08-06 21:36 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2019-08-06 21:36 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 21/25] IB/mad: Fix use-after-free in ib mad completion handling Sasha Levin
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