From: pomzm67@gmail.com
To: security@kernel.org
Cc: selvin.xavier@broadcom.com, kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com,
jgg@ziepe.ca, leon@kernel.org, eddie.wai@broadcom.com,
somnath.kotur@broadcom.com, sriharsha.basavapatna@broadcom.com,
devesh.sharma@broadcom.com, dledford@redhat.com,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
Subject: [PATCH] RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace
Date: Sat, 9 May 2026 10:40:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260509084011.11971-1-pomzm67@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026050945-oversight-carefully-93e0@gregkh>
From: Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext() allocates uctx->shpg via
__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL). The buddy allocator does not zero pages
without __GFP_ZERO, so the page contains stale kernel data from
whatever object most recently freed it.
The page is then mapped into userspace via vm_insert_page() under
BNXT_RE_MMAP_SH_PAGE in bnxt_re_mmap(). The driver only ever writes
4 bytes (a u32 AVID) at offset BNXT_RE_AVID_OFFT (0x10) inside
bnxt_re_create_ah(); the remaining 4092 bytes of the page are exposed
to userspace unsanitised, leaking kernel memory contents.
Any user with access to /dev/infiniband/uverbsX on a host with a
bnxt_re device (typically rdma group membership) can read this data
via a single mmap() at pgoff 0 after IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT.
Other shared pages in the same file already use get_zeroed_page()
correctly:
drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
srq->uctx_srq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
cq->uctx_cq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
uctx->shpg is the only outlier. Bring it in line with the existing
convention by switching to get_zeroed_page().
Fixes: 1ac5a4047975 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Add bnxt_re RoCE driver")
Signed-off-by: Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
---
drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
index 7ed294516b7e..365ec2767d25 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
@@ -4638,7 +4638,7 @@ int bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext(struct ib_ucontext *ctx, struct ib_udata *udata)
uctx->rdev = rdev;
- uctx->shpg = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ uctx->shpg = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uctx->shpg) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
--
2.47.3
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-09 8:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-08 13:45 [security] RDMA/bnxt_re: kernel infoleak via uninitialised shpg shared page exposed to userspace Henrik Holmberg
2026-05-08 13:51 ` Greg KH
2026-05-08 14:23 ` Henrik Holmberg
2026-05-08 20:24 ` Henrik Holmberg
2026-05-09 4:25 ` Greg KH
2026-05-09 8:40 ` pomzm67 [this message]
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