From: Hyunsol Mun <muumthf@gmail.com>
To: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>,
Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>,
Dai Ngo <Dai.Ngo@oracle.com>, Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org,
bobtobabz@gmail.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] svcrdma: silently discard undersized messages
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 12:46:29 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261022034629.430954-1-muumthf@gmail.com> (raw)
RFC 8166 requires an RPC-over-RDMA message shorter than the 28-byte
minimum header to be silently discarded because its XID cannot be
trusted.
svc_rdma_xdr_decode_req() instead returns -EINVAL when the fixed header
cannot be decoded. svc_rdma_recvfrom() turns that into an RDMA_ERROR,
whose encoder copies the first two words from rc_recv_buf without
checking rc_byte_len. A zero- to seven-byte SEND can therefore return
up to eight bytes that were not supplied by the peer.
Check the complete minimum header length before parsing and use the
decoder's existing silent-drop return for undersized input. This keeps
the error encoder from reading beyond the received message and follows
the protocol requirement.
On an unpatched nfsd-testing kernel at 764ffa45f3f2, a two-VM Soft-iWARP
test sent 128 complete 28-byte bad-version headers over connection A.
After closing that connection, it sent 128 zero-byte SENDs over
connection B. All 128 zero-byte requests received replies, and 56 of
those replies contained the exact XID and version markers left by
connection A. The test process ran as uid/gid 65534 with no effective
capabilities and NoNewPrivs set.
With this patch applied, all eight complete 28-byte bad-version headers
elicited replies. A zero-byte SEND and a 27-byte SEND each elicited no
reply during a five-second observation interval. A normal NFSv4.1/RDMA
mount, write, readback, and unmount completed successfully. The server
remained running without an oops or panic. Both x86-64 kernels built
with GCC 12.2 and CONFIG_WERROR=y without warnings.
The vulnerability research and validation were conducted by members of
the Tobabz team as part of the Best of the Best 15th program.
Fixes: f3ea53fb3bc3 ("svcrdma: Use correct XID in error replies")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Hyunsol Mun <muumthf@gmail.com>
---
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c
index ed5a83e9edd2..f2fbba4b30d4 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c
@@ -714,6 +714,9 @@ static int svc_rdma_xdr_decode_req(struct xdr_buf *rq_arg,
__be32 *p, *rdma_argp;
unsigned int hdr_len;
+ if (unlikely(rq_arg->len < RPCRDMA_HDRLEN_MIN))
+ goto out_short;
+
rdma_argp = rq_arg->head[0].iov_base;
xdr_init_decode(&rctxt->rc_stream, rq_arg, rdma_argp, NULL);
@@ -758,7 +761,7 @@ static int svc_rdma_xdr_decode_req(struct xdr_buf *rq_arg,
out_short:
trace_svcrdma_decode_short_err(rctxt, rq_arg->len);
- return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
out_version:
trace_svcrdma_decode_badvers_err(rctxt, rdma_argp);
base-commit: 764ffa45f3f2189cd86ec6d46d248fc0440507b6
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-22 3:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-22 3:46 Hyunsol Mun [this message]
2026-10-22 3:54 ` [PATCH] svcrdma: silently discard undersized messages sashiko-bot
2026-10-22 12:47 ` Chuck Lever
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