Re: [PATCH] RDMA/uverbs: Consider capability of the process that opens the file

[sergeh@kernel.org]

On Mon, Apr 07, 2025 at 11:16:35AM +0000, Parav Pandit wrote:
> > From: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > Sent: Sunday, April 6, 2025 7:45 PM
> > 
> > On Fri, Apr 04, 2025 at 12:13:47PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Fri, Apr 04, 2025 at 02:53:30PM +0000, Parav Pandit wrote:
> > > > To summarize,
> > > >
> > > > 1. A process can open an RDMA resource (such as a raw QP, raw flow
> > > > entry, or similar 'raw' resource) through the fd using ioctl(), if it has the
> > appropriate capability, which in this case is CAP_NET_RAW.
> > > > This is similar to a process that opens a raw socket.
> > > >
> > > > 2. Given that RDMA uses ioctl() for resource creation, there isn't a
> > > > security concern surrounding the read()/write() system calls.
> > > >
> > > > 3. If process A, which does not have CAP_NET_RAW, passes the opened
> > > > fd to another privileged process B, which has CAP_NET_RAW, process B
> > can open the raw RDMA resource.
> > > > This is still within the kernel-defined security boundary, similar to a raw
> > socket.
> > > >
> > > > 4. If process A, which has the CAP_NET_RAW capability, passes the file
> > descriptor to Process B, which does not have CAP_NET_RAW, Process B will
> > not be able to open the raw RDMA resource.
> > > >
> > > > Do we agree on this Eric?
> > >
> > > This is our model, I consider it uAPI, so I don't belive we can change
> > > it without an extreme reason..
> > >
> > > > 5. the process's capability check should be done in the right user
> > namespace.
> > > > (instead of current in default user ns).
> > > > The right user namespace is the one which created the net namespace.
> > > > This is because rdma networking resources are governed by the net
> > namespace.
> > >
> > > This all makes my head hurt. The right user namespace is the one that
> > > is currently active for the invoking process, I couldn't understand
> > > why we have net namespaces refer to user namespaces :\
> > 
> > A user at any time can create a new user namespace, without creating a new
> > network namespace, and have privilege in that user namespace, over
> > resources owned by the user namespace.
> >
>  
> > So if a user can create a new user namespace, then say "hey I have
> > CAP_NET_ADMIN over current_user_ns, so give me access to the RDMA
> > resources belonging to my current_net_ns", that's a problem.
> > 
> > So that's why the check should be ns_capable(device->net->user-ns,
> > CAP_NET_ADMIN) and not ns_capable(current_user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN).
> >
> Given the check is of the process (and hence user and net ns) and not of the rdma device itself,
> Shouldn't we just check,
> 
> ns_capable(current->nsproxy->user_ns, ...)
> 
> This ensures current network namespace's owning user ns is consulted.

No, it does not.  If I do

unshare -U

then current->nsproxy->user_ns is not my current network namespace's
owning user ns.

-serge