From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Ursula Braun Subject: Re: net/smc and the RDMA core Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 15:08:39 +0200 Message-ID: References: <20170501163311.GA22209@lst.de> <1493750358.2552.13.camel@sandisk.com> <1b79048f-4495-3840-e7a6-d4fa5a8dfb57@grimberg.me> <20170504084825.GA5399@lst.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20170504084825.GA5399@lst.de> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org To: "hch@lst.de" , Sagi Grimberg Cc: Bart Van Assche , "davem@davemloft.net" , "netdev@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org" List-Id: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org On 05/04/2017 10:48 AM, hch@lst.de wrote: > On Thu, May 04, 2017 at 11:43:50AM +0300, Sagi Grimberg wrote: >> I would also suggest that you stop exposing the DMA MR for remote >> access (at least by default) and use a proper reg_mr operations with a >> limited lifetime on a properly sized buffer. > > Yes, exposing the default DMA MR is a _major_ security risk. As soon > as SMC is enabled this will mean a remote system has full read/write > access to the local systems memory. > > There іs a reason why I removed the ib_get_dma_mr function and replaced > it with the IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY key that has _UNSAFE_ in the name > and a very long comment explaining why, and I'm really disappointed that > we got a driver merged that instead of asking on the relevant list on > why a change unexpertong a function it needed happened and instead > tried the hard way to keep a security vulnerarbility alive. > Thanks for pointing out these problems. We will address them.