From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFF1CC9EC7D for ; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:26:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:From:References:Cc:To: Subject:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=qV/ghX8Ta0Hxkj675ooVGhdYU4rODT4MtQX/AZ6ab/c=; b=sjfA6OwzKDlVki Z2XxNoZ7iOq4ATDJvzeU7C7nJbaLgw/oJ9CT4IayD+k9S41MjR3tjMZup/cnUJgNOPZ1I4ws2+6wk /QMGm9jcAkCaJGBas0GrZjmnLV8xpYAcAvNPDmNPuuFyMztZgO3m2/3Qbb5ACWKvStp0i1gqOs8g2 +W28/p+HW6dXk8iq9An7MJivlg1xZNyQphqE9rJCsxJL+Qhoo5e6syVzf9JcMvOf4npQVLIQDMu0A C4a6Xs2RoMhBCcUMbbOFNceCeu68w+AOz6pMhefZEqGXIdmSIeO96Wz4qokg78ad9XvVo5jKDR2mU h7XAXseGWRkM2vKeB8vQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1vfH0I-00000005KKO-1xrR; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:26:38 +0000 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1vfH0E-00000005KJm-313i; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:26:36 +0000 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D88E497; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 04:26:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from [10.57.95.123] (unknown [10.57.95.123]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E6C913F59E; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 04:26:27 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <09de87bc-d952-41e7-9657-852c2924aaa7@arm.com> Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:26:26 +0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches Content-Language: en-GB To: David Laight Cc: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Huacai Chen , Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , Kees Cook , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Arnd Bergmann , Mark Rutland , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Linton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org References: <20260102131156.3265118-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com> <20260102131156.3265118-4-ryan.roberts@arm.com> <20260104230136.7aaf8886@pumpkin> <20260107140533.2b3c46a1@pumpkin> From: Ryan Roberts In-Reply-To: <20260107140533.2b3c46a1@pumpkin> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20260112_042634_877523_31D57A4F X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 40.59 ) X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On 07/01/2026 14:05, David Laight wrote: > On Sun, 4 Jan 2026 23:01:36 +0000 > David Laight wrote: > >> On Fri, 2 Jan 2026 13:11:54 +0000 >> Ryan Roberts wrote: >> >>> Previously different architectures were using random sources of >>> differing strength and cost to decide the random kstack offset. A number >>> of architectures (loongarch, powerpc, s390, x86) were using their >>> timestamp counter, at whatever the frequency happened to be. Other >>> arches (arm64, riscv) were using entropy from the crng via >>> get_random_u16(). >>> >>> There have been concerns that in some cases the timestamp counters may >>> be too weak, because they can be easily guessed or influenced by user >>> space. And get_random_u16() has been shown to be too costly for the >>> level of protection kstack offset randomization provides. >>> >>> So let's use a common, architecture-agnostic source of entropy; a >>> per-cpu prng, seeded at boot-time from the crng. This has a few >>> benefits: >>> >>> - We can remove choose_random_kstack_offset(); That was only there to >>> try to make the timestamp counter value a bit harder to influence >>> from user space. >>> >>> - The architecture code is simplified. All it has to do now is call >>> add_random_kstack_offset() in the syscall path. >>> >>> - The strength of the randomness can be reasoned about independently >>> of the architecture. >>> >>> - Arches previously using get_random_u16() now have much faster >>> syscall paths, see below results. >>> >>> There have been some claims that a prng may be less strong than the >>> timestamp counter if not regularly reseeded. But the prng has a period >>> of about 2^113. So as long as the prng state remains secret, it should >>> not be possible to guess. If the prng state can be accessed, we have >>> bigger problems. >> >> If you have 128 bits of output from consecutive outputs I think you >> can trivially determine the full state using (almost) 'school boy' maths >> that could be done on pencil and paper. >> (Most of the work only has to be done once.) >> >> The underlying problem is that the TAUSWORTHE() transformation is 'linear' >> So that TAUSWORTHE(x ^ y) == TAUSWORTHE(x) ^ TAUSWORTHE(y). >> (This is true of a LFSR/CRC and TOUSWORTH() is doing some subset of CRCs.) >> This means that each output bit is the 'xor' of some of the input bits. >> The four new 'state' values are just xor of the the bits of the old ones. >> The final xor of the four states gives a 32bit value with each bit just >> an xor of some of the 128 state bits. >> Get four consecutive 32 bit values and you can solve the 128 simultaneous >> equations (by trivial substitution) and get the initial state. >> The solution gives you the 128 128bit constants for: >> u128 state = 0; >> u128 val = 'value returned from 4 calls'; >> for (int i = 0; i < 128; i++) >> state |= parity(const128[i] ^ val) << i; >> You don't need all 32bits, just accumulate 128 bits. >> So if you can get the 5bit stack offset from 26 system calls you know the >> value that will be used for all the subsequent calls. > > Some of the state bits don't get used, so you only need 123 bits. > The stack offset is 6 bits - so you need the values from 19 calls. > >> Simply changing the final line to use + not ^ makes the output non-linear >> and solving the equations a lot harder. >> >> I might sit down tomorrow and see if I can actually code it... > > Finally done: > > #include > #include > #include > > typedef unsigned int u32; > typedef unsigned long long u64; > typedef unsigned __int128 u128; > > struct rnd_state { u32 s1; u32 s2; u32 s3; u32 s4; }; > u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state) > { > #define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b) > state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6U, 13U, 4294967294U, 18U); > state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2U, 27U, 4294967288U, 2U); > state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13U, 21U, 4294967280U, 7U); > state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3U, 12U, 4294967168U, 13U); > > return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4); > } > > #define X(n, hi, lo) [n] = (u128)0x##hi << 64 | 0x##lo > u128 map[128] = { > X( 1, 23acb122e4a76, e206c3f6fe435cb6), > ... > X(127, 00d3276d8a76a, e560d1975675be24) }; > > u128 parity_128(u128 v) > { > return __builtin_parityll(v) ^ __builtin_parityll(v >> 64); > } > > int main(int argc, char **argv) > { > struct rnd_state s = {}; > u128 s0, v, r = 0; > > read(open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY), &s, sizeof s); > // Remove low bits that get masked by the (s & c) term. > s.s1 &= ~1; s.s2 &= ~7; s.s3 &= ~15; s.s4 &= ~127; > s0 = (((u128)s.s4 << 32 | s.s3) << 32 | s.s2) << 32 | s.s1; > v = prandom_u32_state(&s); > v |= (u128)prandom_u32_state(&s) << 32; > v |= (u128)prandom_u32_state(&s) << 64; > v |= (u128)prandom_u32_state(&s) << 96; > > for (int n = 0; n < 128; n++) > r |= parity_128(v & map[n]) << n; > > printf("%016llx%016llx\n", (u64)(s0 >> 64), (u64)s0); > printf("values%s match\n", r == s0 ? "" : " do not"); > > return r != s0; > } > > I've trimmed the initialiser - it is very boring. > The code to create the initialiser is actually slightly smaller than it is. > Doable by hand provided you can do 128bit shift and xor without making > any mistakes. > > I've just done a quick search through the kernel sources and haven't found > many uses of prandom_u32_state() outside of test code. > There is sched_rng() which uses a per-cpu rng to throw a 1024 sized die. > bpf also has a per-cpu one for 'unprivileged user space'. > net/sched/sch_netem.c seems to use one - mostly for packet loss generation. > > Since the randomize_kstack code is now using a per-task rng (initialised > by clone?) that could be used instead of all the others provided they > are run when 'current' is valid. > > But the existing prandom_u32_state() needs a big health warning that > four outputs leak the entire state. > That is fixable by changing the last line to: > return state->s1 + state->s2 + state->s3 + state->s4; > That only affects the output value, the period is unchanged. Hi David, This all seems interesting, but I'm not clear that it is a blocker for this series. As I keep saying, we only use 6 bits for offset randmization so it is trival to brute force, regardless of how easy it is to recover the prng state. Perhaps we can decouple these 2 things and make them independent: - this series, which is motivated by speeding up syscalls on arm64; given 6 bits is not hard to brute force, spending a lot of cycles calculating those bits is unjustified. - Your observation that that the current prng could be improved to make recoving it's state harder. What do you think? Thanks, Ryan > > David > > _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv