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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Eric Chan <ericchancf@google.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
	Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
	Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 14:47:56 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1532becb-f2be-4458-5d34-77070f2c5e2d@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250113131459.2008123-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

On 1/13/25 07:14, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
> 
> memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
>   arch_memremap_wb()
>     ioremap_cache()
>       __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
> 
> In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
> if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
> 
> Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
> risky:
> 
>   - It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
>     guest.
> 
>   - Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
>     either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
>     VMM implementation).
> 
>     Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
>     memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
> 
> The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
> explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
> 
> Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
> default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified.
> 
> Fix the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is enabled.

This patch causes my bare-metal system to crash during boot when using
mem_encrypt=on:

[    2.392934] efi: memattr: Entry type should be RuntimeServiceCode/Data
[    2.393731] efi: memattr: ! 0x214c42f01f1162a-0xee70ac7bd1a9c629 [type=2028324321|attr=0x6590648fa4209879]
[    2.394733] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900b4669017
[    2.395729] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[    2.395729] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[    2.395729] PGD 8000100010067 P4D 8000100010067 PUD 0 
[    2.395729] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[    2.395729] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-sos-testing #1
[    2.395729] Hardware name: ...
[    2.395729] RIP: 0010:efi_memattr_apply_permissions+0xa6/0x330
[    2.395729] Code: 24 0f 48 8b 05 f3 30 a3 ff f6 c4 01 0f 85 66 02 00 00 31 db 4c 8d 6d 10 3b 5d 04 0f 83 4a 01 00 00 89 d8 0f af 45 08 4c 01 e8 <48> 8b 10 48 8b 70 08 4c 8b 40 18 48 89 54 24 10 48 8b 50 08 48 89
[    2.395729] RSP: 0000:ffffffffb3803e18 EFLAGS: 00010296
[    2.395729] RAX: ffffc900b4669017 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    2.395729] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb3803cd8 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[    2.395729] RBP: ffffc900000b5018 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: 0000000000000001
[    2.395729] R10: 00000000fffeffff R11: ffff894048a80000 R12: ffffffffb434f1c0
[    2.395729] R13: ffffc900000b5028 R14: ec5be84ccfb8b000 R15: ffffffffb3803e28
[    2.395729] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff894049000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.395729] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.395729] CR2: ffffc900b4669017 CR3: 0008006f43832001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    2.395729] PKRU: 55555554
[    2.395729] Call Trace:
[    2.395729]  <TASK>
[    2.395729]  ? __die+0x1f/0x60
[    2.395729]  ? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x150
[    2.395729]  ? exc_page_fault+0x15f/0x170
[    2.395729]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[    2.395729]  ? __pfx_efi_update_mem_attr+0x10/0x10
[    2.395729]  ? efi_memattr_apply_permissions+0xa6/0x330
[    2.395729]  ? efi_memattr_apply_permissions+0x254/0x330
[    2.395729]  __efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x166/0x250
[    2.395729]  efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x2d/0x50
[    2.395729]  start_kernel+0x5d7/0x670
[    2.395729]  x86_64_start_reservations+0x14/0x30
[    2.395729]  x86_64_start_kernel+0x79/0x80
[    2.395729]  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[    2.395729]  </TASK>
[    2.395729] Modules linked in:
[    2.395729] CR2: ffffc900b4669017
[    2.395729] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    2.395729] RIP: 0010:efi_memattr_apply_permissions+0xa6/0x330
[    2.395729] Code: 24 0f 48 8b 05 f3 30 a3 ff f6 c4 01 0f 85 66 02 00 00 31 db 4c 8d 6d 10 3b 5d 04 0f 83 4a 01 00 00 89 d8 0f af 45 08 4c 01 e8 <48> 8b 10 48 8b 70 08 4c 8b 40 18 48 89 54 24 10 48 8b 50 08 48 89
[    2.395729] RSP: 0000:ffffffffb3803e18 EFLAGS: 00010296
[    2.395729] RAX: ffffc900b4669017 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    2.395729] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb3803cd8 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[    2.395729] RBP: ffffc900000b5018 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: 0000000000000001
[    2.395729] R10: 00000000fffeffff R11: ffff894048a80000 R12: ffffffffb434f1c0
[    2.395729] R13: ffffc900000b5028 R14: ec5be84ccfb8b000 R15: ffffffffb3803e28
[    2.395729] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff894049000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.395729] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.395729] CR2: ffffc900b4669017 CR3: 0008006f43832001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    2.395729] PKRU: 55555554
[    2.395729] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[    2.395729] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 3 +++
>  arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c     | 8 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
> index ed580c7f9d0a..1a0dc2b2bf5b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
> @@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ extern void __iomem *ioremap_prot(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size, un
>  extern void __iomem *ioremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size);
>  #define ioremap_encrypted ioremap_encrypted
>  
> +void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags);
> +#define arch_memremap_wb arch_memremap_wb
> +
>  /**
>   * ioremap     -   map bus memory into CPU space
>   * @offset:    bus address of the memory
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 8d29163568a7..3c36f3f5e688 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -503,6 +503,14 @@ void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
>  
> +void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
> +{
> +	if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
> +		return (void __force *)ioremap_cache(phys_addr, size);
> +
> +	return (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(phys_addr, size);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Convert a physical pointer to a virtual kernel pointer for /dev/mem
>   * access

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       reply	other threads:[~2025-01-13 20:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20250113131459.2008123-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
     [not found] ` <20250113131459.2008123-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
2025-01-13 20:47   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-01-13 20:55     ` [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default Borislav Petkov
2025-01-14  7:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-14 14:33       ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-14 14:44         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-14 15:06           ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-14 16:54 Tom Lendacky
2025-01-15 10:23 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-15 10:34   ` Borislav Petkov

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