From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FFE9C4742C for ; Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:59:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F7BA20797 for ; Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:59:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="yN0KCCkX"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="hxEERjlx" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1F7BA20797 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References:Message-ID: Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=2+Gd4e5B9r92IkvgQcaQh/PlA3nIA6gHki4EW1GtzAk=; b=yN0KCCkXEiUITQkcCbXXvFb6o 6wqH6d7QOZACxqmIEShaFu0LUPNoJNl+Sba+uhOTJtgVBU2zWi9bO/BsC8HKLyULLVEpT2EnKCg0x 9prtODxbALVNsASxhdkuA7ozssXE+9JX1SfrIs7FnLGZV7AO4ZtIW2eqclFbEKU7N/nfvMbStdgBm vOm4R0nwNpsGzajTcuaOJTevwKHpyAPmYXU9WW3wvoo9FcYY19mmn5d8xukADcV4j0STcnfqwe86j 2dGuY69lYeZDwBMp1rIi29joOUeVIJ+csEf75bkqosZrCw/l8LBeAVVYYXlpx9VZOv8ed/+vWgCD0 iEooHceOQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kdZbS-0002a9-CG; Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:59:02 +0000 Received: from casper.infradead.org ([90.155.50.34]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kdZbM-0002XS-2Z; Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:58:56 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=kLz22mCweLR//KhTGZZOStZT7C8x0TEcQ4+GK8a3nck=; b=hxEERjlxxEGjzKsTREmAdvVMX3 IS8qSDrsGEqirPWQHguhpGtopsaES8pCsNt+5gHN8a/l860hbWdnv6UVaJOHhGDnFQnRtRL9NEZwl 2fcVThumtrCipwpdqKaCwPmlfcghO0WScHCRcAU1iMyaTWAGG/jBa37pH6nsqY35UG7jilrUB+aWP Cf/AoroggY7hCjRgzQQcjmCTa0hZmV6VXmztqO0wdT3NMa5zgbf/5yIxQaBty5jexorzuyz41NXfF d6LgpX1xryRRN/FkiBND/OVPDPCEATMfBEwLPQlSYWYq21IP2C/aDonZmnwPhyokSwlrknmvJAjZ8 ZU/3bYeQ==; Received: from willy by casper.infradead.org with local (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kdZbE-0003f3-8l; Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:58:48 +0000 Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:58:48 +0000 From: Matthew Wilcox To: Mike Rapoport Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201113135848.GF17076@casper.infradead.org> References: <20201110151444.20662-1-rppt@kernel.org> <20201110151444.20662-5-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201110151444.20662-5-rppt@kernel.org> X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Rick Edgecombe Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 05:14:39PM +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote: > +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) > +{ > + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; > + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); > + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; > + unsigned long addr; > + struct page *page; > + int ret = 0; > + > + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) > + return vmf_error(-EINVAL); > + > + page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset); Why did you decide to use find_get_entry() here? You don't handle swap or shadow entries. > + if (!page) { > + page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask); > + if (!page) > + return vmf_error(-EINVAL); Why is this EINVAL and not ENOMEM? > + ret = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask); > + if (unlikely(ret)) > + goto err_put_page; > + > + ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); > + if (ret) > + goto err_del_page_cache; > + > + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); > + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); > + > + __SetPageUptodate(page); > + > + ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED; > + } > + > + vmf->page = page; > + return ret; Does sparse not warn you about this abuse of vm_fault_t? Separate out 'ret' and 'err'. Andrew, please fold in this fix. I suspect Mike will want to fix the other things I mention above. diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 3dfdbd85ba00..09ca27f21661 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) return vmf_error(-EINVAL); - page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset); + page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); if (!page) { page = secretmem_alloc_page(ctx, vmf->gfp_mask); if (!page) _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv