Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/cfi,bpf: Fix BPF JIT call

Alexei Starovoitov
2023-12-05T01:18:58Z

On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 10:34 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>
>
> TL;DR, I think this is a pre-existing problem with kCFI + eBPF and not
> caused by my patches.

It's an old issue indeed.

To workaround I just did:
+__nocfi
static long bpf_for_each_array_elem(struct bpf_map *map,
bpf_callback_t callback_fn,
void *callback_ctx, u64 flags)

to proceed further.
test_progs passed few more tests, but then it hit:

[ 13.965472] CFI failure at tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0 (target:
0xffffffffa02050d6; expected type: 0x3a47ac32)
[ 13.966351] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 13.966752] CPU: 3 PID: 2142 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G
O 6.7.0-rc3-00705-g421defd1bea0-dirty #5246
[ 13.967552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 13.968421] RIP: 0010:tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0
[ 13.968751] Code: 70 40 ff 84 c0 74 49 48 8b 83 60 07 00 00 4c 8b
58 10 4d 85 db 74 1b 40 0f b6 f5 48 89 df 41 ba ce 53 b8 c5 45 03 53
f1 74 02 <0f> 0b 2e e8 c7 ee 31 00 0f b6 83 90 07 00 00 40 80 e5 1f 24
e0 40
[ 13.975460] Call Trace:
[ 13.975640] <IRQ>
[ 13.975791] ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0
[ 13.976062] ? die+0xa4/0xd0
[ 13.976273] ? do_trap+0xa5/0x180
[ 13.976513] ? tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0
[ 13.976800] ? do_error_trap+0xb6/0x100
[ 13.977076] ? tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0
[ 13.977360] ? tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0
[ 13.977644] ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
[ 13.977934] ? tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0
[ 13.978222] ? exc_invalid_op+0x38/0x60
[ 13.978497] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 13.978798] ? tcp_set_ca_state+0x51/0xd0
[ 13.979087] tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x45c/0x6c0
[ 13.979401] tcp_check_req+0x497/0x590
[ 13.979671] tcp_v6_rcv+0x728/0xce0
[ 13.979923] ? raw6_local_deliver+0x63/0x350
[ 13.980257] ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2f6/0x560
[ 13.980596] ? ip6_input_finish+0x59/0x140
[ 13.980887] ? NF_HOOK+0x29/0x1d0
[ 13.981136] ip6_input_finish+0xcb/0x140
[ 13.981415] ? __cfi_ip6_input_finish+0x10/0x10
[ 13.981738] NF_HOOK+0x177/0x1d0
[ 13.981970] ? rcu_is_watching+0x10/0x40
[ 13.982279] ? lock_release+0x35/0x2e0
[ 13.982547] ? lock_release+0x35/0x2e0
[ 13.982822] ? NF_HOOK+0x29/0x1d0
[ 13.983064] ? __cfi_ip6_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
[ 13.983409] NF_HOOK+0x177/0x1d0
[ 13.983664] ? ip6_rcv_core+0x50/0x6c0
[ 13.983956] ? process_backlog+0x132/0x290
[ 13.984264] ? process_backlog+0x132/0x290
[ 13.984557] __netif_receive_skb+0x5c/0x160
[ 13.984856] process_backlog+0x19e/0x290
[ 13.985140] __napi_poll+0x3f/0x1f0
[ 13.985402] net_rx_action+0x193/0x330
[ 13.985672] __do_softirq+0x14d/0x3ea
[ 13.985963] ? do_softirq+0x7f/0xb0
[ 13.986243] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x5b/0xd50
[ 13.986563] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x222/0x7a0
[ 13.986906] do_softirq+0x7f/0xb0

The stack trace doesn't have any bpf, but it's a bpf issue too.
Here tcp_set_ca_state() calls
icsk->icsk_ca_ops->set_state(sk, ca_state);
which calls bpf prog via bpf trampoline.

re: bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr().

since cfi_mode is __ro_after_init we don't need to waste
cfi_offset variable in prog->aux and in jit_context.

How about
+int get_cfi_offset(void)
+{
+ switch (cfi_mode) {
+ case CFI_FINEIBT:
+ return 16;
+ case CFI_KCFI:
+#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_PADDING
+ return 16;
+#else
+ return 5;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
struct bpf_binary_header *
bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
- unsigned long real_start = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func;
+ unsigned long real_start = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func -
get_cfi_offset();

and have __weak version of get_cfi_offset() in bpf/core.c
that returns 0 and non-weak in arch/x86 like above?

Similarly remove prog_offset from jit_context and undo:

ctx->prog_offset = emit_prologue(...)
to keep it as 'static void emit_prologue'

since cfi offset is fixed at early boot and the same for all progs.

Separately we need to deal with bpf_for_each_array_elem()
which doesn't look easy.
And fix tcp_set_ca_state() as well (which is even harder).

Just to see where places like these are I did:
+__nocfi
BPF_CALL_4(bpf_loop, u32, nr_loops, void *, callback_fn, void *, callback_ctx,
+__nocfi
static long bpf_for_each_hash_elem(struct bpf_map *map,
bpf_callback_t callback_fn,
+__nocfi
static enum hrtimer_restart bpf_timer_cb(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
+__nocfi
static int __bpf_rbtree_add(struct bpf_rb_root *root,
+__nocfi
BPF_CALL_4(bpf_user_ringbuf_drain, struct bpf_map *, map,
+__nocfi
void tcp_set_ca_state(struct sock *sk, const u8 ca_state)
+__nocfi
void tcp_init_congestion_control(struct sock *sk)
+__nocfi
void tcp_enter_loss(struct sock *sk)
+__nocfi
static void tcp_cong_avoid(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked)
+__nocfi
static inline void tcp_in_ack_event(struct sock *sk, u32 flags)

and more... Which is clearly not a direction to go.

Instead of annotating callers is there a way to say that
all bpf_callback_t calls are nocfi?

I feel the patches scratched the iceberg.