Re: [PATCH v3 27/29] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking

Charlie Jenkins
2024-05-10T20:30:57Z

On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 04:35:15PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> Adding documentation on landing pad aka indirect branch tracking on riscv
> and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
> ---
> Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..3007c81f0465
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +:Author: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
> +:Date: 12 January 2024
> +
> +====================================================
> +Tracking indirect control transfers on RISC-V Linux
> +====================================================
> +
> +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Linux
> +to enable indirect branch tracking for user mode applications on RISV-V
> +
> +1. Feature Overview
> +--------------------
> +
> +Memory corruption issues usually result in to crashes, however when in hands of
> +an adversary and if used creatively can result into variety security issues.
> +
> +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where adversary
> +can use corrupt function pointers and chain them together to perform jump oriented
> +programming (JOP) or call oriented programming (COP) and thus compromising control
> +flow integrity (CFI) of the program.
> +
> +Function pointers live in read-write memory and thus are susceptible to corruption
> +and allows an adversary to reach any program counter (PC) in address space. On
> +RISC-V zicfilp extension enforces a restriction on such indirect control transfers
> +
> + - indirect control transfers must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad`.
> + There are two exception to this rule
> + - rs1 = x1 or rs1 = x5, i.e. a return from a function and returns are

What is a return that is not a return from a function?

> + protected using shadow stack (see zicfiss.rst)
> +
> + - rs1 = x7. On RISC-V compiler usually does below to reach function
> + which is beyond the offset possible J-type instruction.
> +
> + "auipc x7, <imm>"
> + "jalr (x7)"
> +
> + Such form of indirect control transfer are still immutable and don't rely
> + on memory and thus rs1=x7 is exempted from tracking and considered software
> + guarded jumps.
> +
> +`lpad` instruction is pseudo of `auipc rd, <imm_20bit>` and is a HINT nop. `lpad`

I think this should say "x0" or instead of "rd", or mention that rd=x0.

> +instruction must be aligned on 4 byte boundary and compares 20 bit immediate with x7.
> +If `imm_20bit` == 0, CPU don't perform any comparision with x7. If `imm_20bit` != 0,
> +then `imm_20bit` must match x7 else CPU will raise `software check exception`
> +(cause=18)with `*tval = 2`.
> +
> +Compiler can generate a hash over function signatures and setup them (truncated
> +to 20bit) in x7 at callsites and function proglogs can have `lpad` with same

"prologues" instead of "proglogs"

> +function hash. This further reduces number of program counters a call site can
> +reach.
> +
> +2. ELF and psABI
> +-----------------
> +
> +Toolchain sets up `GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_FCFI` for property
> +`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file.
> +
> +3. Linux enabling
> +------------------
> +
> +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address space
> +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been compiled
> +with support of indirect branch. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable
> +indirect branch tracking for the program.
> +
> +4. prctl() enabling
> +--------------------
> +
> +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / `PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` /
> +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage indirect branch
> +tracking. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arches.
> +
> +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: If arg1 `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` and if CPU supports
> +`zicfilp` then kernel will enabled indirect branch tracking for the task.
> +Dynamic loader can issue this `prctl` once it has determined that all the objects
> +loaded in address space support indirect branch tracking. Additionally if there is
> +a `dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with `zicfilp`, dynamic loader can
> +issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` being clear)
> +
> +`PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking.
> +If enabled it'll return `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE`
> +
> +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Locks current status of indirect branch tracking on
> +the task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want
> +loading of objects without `zicfilp` support in it and thus would want to disallow
> +disabling of indirect branch tracking. In that case user space can use this prctl
> +to lock current settings.
> +
> +5. violations related to indirect branch tracking
> +--------------------------------------------------
> +
> +Pertaining to indirect branch tracking, CPU raises software check exception in
> +following conditions
> + - missing `lpad` after indirect call / jmp
> + - `lpad` not on 4 byte boundary
> + - `imm_20bit` embedded in `lpad` instruction doesn't match with `x7`
> +
> +In all 3 cases, `*tval = 2` is captured and software check exception is raised
> +(cause=18)
> +
> +Linux kernel will treat this as `SIGSEV`` with code = `SEGV_CPERR` and follow
> +normal course of signal delivery.
> --
> 2.43.2