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From: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
To: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	Xiao Wang <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>,
	paul.walmsley@sifive.com, palmer@dabbelt.com,
	aou@eecs.berkeley.edu
Cc: jerry.shih@sifive.com, nick.knight@sifive.com,
	ajones@ventanamicro.com, bjorn@rivosinc.com,
	andy.chiu@sifive.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com,
	haicheng.li@intel.com, akira.tsukamoto@gmail.com,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: uaccess: Allow the last potential unrolled copy
Date: Fri, 3 May 2024 15:30:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4a04a462-3eab-4382-83b2-ce6ed7104883@codethink.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <daa955d9-b554-4e0e-a08e-835c4cd5a366@ghiti.fr>

On 03/05/2024 14:02, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> On 03/05/2024 14:19, Ben Dooks wrote:
>> On 03/05/2024 13:16, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
>>> Hi Xiao,
>>>
>>> On 13/03/2024 11:33, Xiao Wang wrote:
>>>> When the dst buffer pointer points to the last accessible aligned 
>>>> addr, we
>>>> could still run another iteration of unrolled copy.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Xiao Wang <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>   arch/riscv/lib/uaccess.S | 2 +-
>>>>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/lib/uaccess.S b/arch/riscv/lib/uaccess.S
>>>> index 2e665f8f8fcc..1399d797d81b 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/lib/uaccess.S
>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/lib/uaccess.S
>>>> @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(fallback_scalar_usercopy)
>>>>       fixup REG_S   t4,  7*SZREG(a0), 10f
>>>>       addi    a0, a0, 8*SZREG
>>>>       addi    a1, a1, 8*SZREG
>>>> -    bltu    a0, t0, 2b
>>>> +    bleu    a0, t0, 2b
>>>>       addi    t0, t0, 8*SZREG /* revert to original value */
>>>>       j    .Lbyte_copy_tail
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree it is still safe to continue for another word_copy here.
>>>
>>> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
>>
>> Out of interest, has anyone checked if causing a schedule event during
>> this code breaks like the last time we had issues with the upstream
>> testing?
> 
> 
> I vaguely remember something, do you have a link to that discussion by 
> chance?
> 
> 
>>
>> I did propose saving the state of the user-access flag in the task
>> struct
> 
> 
> Makes sense, I just took a quick look and SR_SUM is cleared as soon as 
> we enter handle_exception() and it does not seem to be restored. Weird 
> it works, unless I missed something!
> 
> 
>> but we mostly solved it by making sleeping functions stay
>> away from the address calculation. This of course may have been done
>> already or need to be done if three's long areas where the user-access
>> flags can be disabled (generally only a few drivers did this, so we
>> may not have come across the problem)
>>
> I don't understand what you mean here, would you mind expanding a bit?
> 

I think this was all gone through in the original post where
we initially suggested saving SR_SUM and then moved as much out
of the critical SR_SUM area by changing how the macros worked

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20210318151010.100966-1-ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk/

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20210329095749.998940-1-ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk/
-- 
Ben Dooks				http://www.codethink.co.uk/
Senior Engineer				Codethink - Providing Genius

https://www.codethink.co.uk/privacy.html


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  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-03 14:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-13 10:33 [PATCH] riscv: uaccess: Allow the last potential unrolled copy Xiao Wang
2024-05-03 12:16 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-05-03 12:19   ` Ben Dooks
2024-05-03 13:02     ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-05-03 14:30       ` Ben Dooks [this message]
2024-05-06  7:53         ` Wang, Xiao W
2024-05-22 23:51 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv

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