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Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Mike Rapoport , Suren Baghdasaryan , Michal Hocko , Nick Desaulniers , Bill Wendling , Monk Chiang , Kito Cheng , Justin Stitt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, broonie@kernel.org, cleger@rivosinc.com, apatel@ventanamicro.com, ajones@ventanamicro.com, conor.dooley@microchip.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, samuel.holland@sifive.com, bjorn@rivosinc.com, fweimer@redhat.com, jeffreyalaw@gmail.com, heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com, andrew@sifive.com, ved@rivosinc.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] scs: generic scs code updated to leverage hw assisted shadow stack Message-ID: References: <20250724-riscv_kcfi-v1-0-04b8fa44c98c@rivosinc.com> <20250724-riscv_kcfi-v1-10-04b8fa44c98c@rivosinc.com> <20250725161327.GC1724026@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20250725161327.GC1724026@google.com> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20250725_094243_874611_770E6F3F X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 27.37 ) X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Fri, Jul 25, 2025 at 04:13:27PM +0000, Sami Tolvanen wrote: >On Thu, Jul 24, 2025 at 04:37:03PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote: >> If shadow stack have memory protections from underlying cpu, use those >> protections. arches can define PAGE_KERNEL_SHADOWSTACK to vmalloc such shadow >> stack pages. Hw assisted shadow stack pages grow downwards like regular >> stack. Clang based software shadow call stack grows low to high address. > >Is this the case for all the current hardware shadow stack >implementations? If not, we might want a separate config for the >shadow stack direction instead. Is there something like this for regular stack as well? I could copy same mechanism. > >> Thus this patch addresses some of those needs due to opposite direction >> of shadow stack. Furthermore, hw shadow stack can't be memset because memset >> uses normal stores. Lastly to store magic word at base of shadow stack, arch >> specific shadow stack store has to be performed. >> >> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta >> --- >> include/linux/scs.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> kernel/scs.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- >> 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h >> index 4ab5bdc898cf..6ceee07c2d1a 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/scs.h >> +++ b/include/linux/scs.h >> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ >> #include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> >> #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK >> >> @@ -37,22 +38,45 @@ static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) >> * Reset the shadow stack to the base address in case the task >> * is reused. >> */ >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> + task_scs_sp(tsk) = task_scs(tsk) + SCS_SIZE; >> +#else >> task_scs_sp(tsk) = task_scs(tsk); >> +#endif >> } >> >> static inline unsigned long *__scs_magic(void *s) >> { >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> + return (unsigned long *)(s); >> +#else >> return (unsigned long *)(s + SCS_SIZE) - 1; >> +#endif >> } >> >> static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) >> { >> unsigned long *magic = __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk)); >> - unsigned long sz = task_scs_sp(tsk) - task_scs(tsk); >> + unsigned long sz; >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> + sz = (task_scs(tsk) + SCS_SIZE) - task_scs_sp(tsk); >> +#else >> + sz = task_scs_sp(tsk) - task_scs(tsk); >> +#endif >> >> return sz >= SCS_SIZE - 1 || READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*magic) != SCS_END_MAGIC; >> } >> >> +static inline void __scs_store_magic(unsigned long *s, unsigned long magic_val) >> +{ >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> + arch_scs_store(s, magic_val); >> +#else >> + *__scs_magic(s) = magic_val; >> +#endif >> +} >> + > >I'm not a huge fan of all the ifdefs. We could clean this up by >allowing architectures to simply override some these functions, or at >least use if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG...)) instead. Will, any thoughts about >this? > >> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(dynamic_scs_enabled); >> >> static inline bool scs_is_dynamic(void) >> diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c >> index d7809affe740..5910c0a8eabd 100644 >> --- a/kernel/scs.c >> +++ b/kernel/scs.c >> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ >> #include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> >> #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS >> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(dynamic_scs_enabled); >> @@ -32,19 +33,31 @@ static void *__scs_alloc(int node) >> { >> int i; >> void *s; >> + pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL; >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> + prot = PAGE_KERNEL_SHADOWSTACK; >> +#endif > >I would rather define the shadow stack protection flags in the header >file and allow them to be overridden in asm/scs.h. > >> for (i = 0; i < NR_CACHED_SCS; i++) { >> s = this_cpu_xchg(scs_cache[i], NULL); >> if (s) { >> s = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(s, SCS_SIZE, >> KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); >> +/* >> + * If software shadow stack, its safe to memset. Else memset is not >> + * possible on hw protected shadow stack. memset constitutes stores and >> + * stores to shadow stack memory are disallowed and will fault. >> + */ >> +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> memset(s, 0, SCS_SIZE); >> +#endif > >This could also be moved to a static inline function that >architectures can override if they have hardware shadow stacks that >cannot be cleared at this point. > >> goto out; >> } >> } >> >> s = __vmalloc_node_range(SCS_SIZE, 1, VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END, >> - GFP_SCS, PAGE_KERNEL, 0, node, >> + GFP_SCS, prot, 0, node, >> __builtin_return_address(0)); >> >> out: >> @@ -59,7 +72,7 @@ void *scs_alloc(int node) >> if (!s) >> return NULL; >> >> - *__scs_magic(s) = SCS_END_MAGIC; >> + __scs_store_magic(__scs_magic(s), SCS_END_MAGIC); >> >> /* >> * Poison the allocation to catch unintentional accesses to >> @@ -87,6 +100,16 @@ void scs_free(void *s) >> return; >> >> kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(s, SCS_SIZE, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); >> + /* >> + * Hardware protected shadow stack is not writeable by regular stores >> + * Thus adding this back to free list will raise faults by vmalloc >> + * It needs to be writeable again. It's good sanity as well because >> + * then it can't be inadvertently accesses and if done, it will fault. >> + */ >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_SHADOW_STACK >> + set_memory_rw((unsigned long)s, (SCS_SIZE/PAGE_SIZE)); >> +#endif > >Another candidate for an arch-specific function to reduce the number >of ifdefs in the generic code. > >Sami _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv