[PATCH v8 00/10] KVM: selftests: Add SEV smoke test

[PATCH v8 00/10] KVM: selftests: Add SEV smoke test

[Sean Christopherson]

Add a basic SEV smoke test.  Unlike the intra-host migration tests, this
one actually runs a small chunk of code in the guest.

v8:
 - Undo the kvm.h uAPI breakage.
 - Take advantage of "struct vm_shape", introduced by the guest_memfd
   selftests, to simply tracking the SEV/SEV-ES subtypes.
 - Rename the test to "sev_smoke_test" instead of "sev_all_boot_test",
   as the "all" is rather nonsensical, and the test isn't booting anything
   in the traditional sense of the word.
 - Drop vm->protected and instead add an arch hook to query if the VM has
   protected memory.
 - Assert that the target memory region supports protected memory when
   allocating protected memory.
 - Allocate protected_phy_pages for memory regions if and only if the VM
   supports protected memory.
 - Rename kvm_host.h to kvm_util_arch.h, and move it to selftests/kvm where
   it belongs.
 - Fix up some SoB goofs.
 - Convert the intrahost SEV/SEV-ES migration tests to use common ioctl()
   wrappers.

V7
 * https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231218161146.3554657-1-pgonda@google.com
 * See https://github.com/sean-jc/linux/tree/x86/sev_selftests_for_peter.
 * I kept is_pt_protected because without it the page tables are never
 readable. Its used for the elf loading in kvm_vm_elf_load().

V6
 * Updated SEV VM create function based on Seanjc's feedback and new
   changes to VM creation functions.
 * Removed pte_me_mask based on feedback.
 * Fixed s_bit usage based on TDX
 * Fixed bugs and took Ackerly's code for enc_region setup code.

V5
 * Rebase onto seanjc@'s latest ucall pool series.
 * More review changes based on seanjc:
 ** use protected instead of encrypted outside of SEV specific files
 ** Swap memcrypt struct for kvm_vm_arch arch specific struct
 ** Make protected page table data agnostic of address bit stealing specifics
    of SEV
 ** Further clean up for SEV library to just vm_sev_create_one_vcpu()
 * Due to large changes moved more authorships from mroth@ to pgonda@. Gave
   originally-by tags to mroth@ as suggested by Seanjc for this.

V4
 * Rebase ontop of seanjc@'s latest Ucall Pool series:
   https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20220825232522.3997340-8-seanjc@google.com/
 * Fix up review comments from seanjc
 * Switch authorship on 2 patches because of significant changes, added
 * Michael as suggested-by or originally-by.

V3
 * Addressed more of andrew.jones@ in ucall patches.
 * Fix build in non-x86 archs.

V2
 * Dropped RFC tag
 * Correctly separated Sean's ucall patches into 2 as originally
   intended.
 * Addressed andrew.jones@ in ucall patches.
 * Fixed ucall pool usage to work for other archs

V1
 * https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220715192956.1873315-1-pgonda@google.com/

Ackerley Tng (1):
  KVM: selftests: Add a macro to iterate over a sparsebit range

Michael Roth (2):
  KVM: selftests: Make sparsebit structs const where appropriate
  KVM: selftests: Add support for protected vm_vaddr_* allocations

Peter Gonda (5):
  KVM: selftests: Add support for allocating/managing protected guest
    memory
  KVM: selftests: Explicitly ucall pool from shared memory
  KVM: selftests: Allow tagging protected memory in guest page tables
  KVM: selftests: Add library for creating and interacting with SEV
    guests
  KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV smoke test

Sean Christopherson (2):
  KVM: selftests: Extend VM creation's @shape to allow control of VM
    subtype
  KVM: selftests: Use the SEV library APIs in the intra-host migration
    test

 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   2 +
 .../kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h       |   7 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  50 ++++++-
 .../kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h         |   7 +
 .../kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h         |   7 +
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h |  56 +++++---
 .../kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h        |  23 ++++
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  |   8 ++
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        | 110 +++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    |  67 +++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c   |  48 +++----
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c  |   3 +-
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      |  32 ++++-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c  |  67 +++------
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c     |  58 ++++++++
 16 files changed, 570 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c


base-commit: 60eedcfceda9db46f1b333e5e1aa9359793f04fb
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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[PATCH v8 01/10] KVM: selftests: Extend VM creation's @shape to allow control of VM subtype

[Sean Christopherson]

Carve out space in the @shape passed to the various VM creation helpers to
allow using the shape to control the subtype of VM, e.g. to identify x86's
SEV VMs (which are "regular" VMs as far as KVM is concerned).

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 9 +++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c          | 1 +
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 070f250036fc..d9dc31af2f96 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ enum kvm_mem_region_type {
 struct kvm_vm {
 	int mode;
 	unsigned long type;
+	uint8_t subtype;
 	int kvm_fd;
 	int fd;
 	unsigned int pgtable_levels;
@@ -191,10 +192,14 @@ enum vm_guest_mode {
 };
 
 struct vm_shape {
-	enum vm_guest_mode mode;
-	unsigned int type;
+	uint32_t type;
+	uint8_t  mode;
+	uint8_t  subtype;
+	uint16_t padding;
 };
 
+kvm_static_assert(sizeof(struct vm_shape) == sizeof(uint64_t));
+
 #define VM_TYPE_DEFAULT			0
 
 #define VM_SHAPE(__mode)			\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index 4994afbdab40..a53caf81eb87 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct kvm_vm *____vm_create(struct vm_shape shape)
 
 	vm->mode = shape.mode;
 	vm->type = shape.type;
+	vm->subtype = shape.subtype;
 
 	vm->pa_bits = vm_guest_mode_params[vm->mode].pa_bits;
 	vm->va_bits = vm_guest_mode_params[vm->mode].va_bits;
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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[PATCH v8 02/10] KVM: selftests: Make sparsebit structs const where appropriate

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>

Make all sparsebit struct pointers "const" where appropriate.  This will
allow adding a bitmap to track protected/encrypted physical memory that
tests can access in a read-only fashion.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h | 36 +++++++-------
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c   | 48 +++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
index 12a9a4b9cead..fb5170d57fcb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
@@ -30,26 +30,26 @@ typedef uint64_t sparsebit_num_t;
 
 struct sparsebit *sparsebit_alloc(void);
 void sparsebit_free(struct sparsebit **sbitp);
-void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *dstp, struct sparsebit *src);
+void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *dstp, const struct sparsebit *src);
 
-bool sparsebit_is_set(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
-bool sparsebit_is_set_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+bool sparsebit_is_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
+bool sparsebit_is_set_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
 			  sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num);
-bool sparsebit_is_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
-bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+bool sparsebit_is_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
+bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
 			    sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num);
-sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_any_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_any_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_all_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_all_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_any_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_any_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_all_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_all_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
 				       sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
 					 sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num);
 
 void sparsebit_set(struct sparsebit *sbitp, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ void sparsebit_clear_num(struct sparsebit *sbitp,
 			 sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num);
 void sparsebit_clear_all(struct sparsebit *sbitp);
 
-void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *sbit,
+void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *sbit,
 		    unsigned int indent);
-void sparsebit_validate_internal(struct sparsebit *sbit);
+void sparsebit_validate_internal(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c
index 88cb6b84e6f3..cfed9d26cc71 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static sparsebit_num_t node_num_set(struct node *nodep)
 /* Returns a pointer to the node that describes the
  * lowest bit index.
  */
-static struct node *node_first(struct sparsebit *s)
+static struct node *node_first(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	struct node *nodep;
 
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static struct node *node_first(struct sparsebit *s)
  * lowest bit index > the index of the node pointed to by np.
  * Returns NULL if no node with a higher index exists.
  */
-static struct node *node_next(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
+static struct node *node_next(const struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
 {
 	struct node *nodep = np;
 
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct node *node_next(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
  * highest index < the index of the node pointed to by np.
  * Returns NULL if no node with a lower index exists.
  */
-static struct node *node_prev(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
+static struct node *node_prev(const struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
 {
 	struct node *nodep = np;
 
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static struct node *node_prev(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
  * subtree and duplicates the bit settings to the newly allocated nodes.
  * Returns the newly allocated copy of subtree.
  */
-static struct node *node_copy_subtree(struct node *subtree)
+static struct node *node_copy_subtree(const struct node *subtree)
 {
 	struct node *root;
 
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static struct node *node_copy_subtree(struct node *subtree)
  * index is within the bits described by the mask bits or the number of
  * contiguous bits set after the mask.  Returns NULL if there is no such node.
  */
-static struct node *node_find(struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
+static struct node *node_find(const struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
 {
 	struct node *nodep;
 
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static struct node *node_add(struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
 }
 
 /* Returns whether all the bits in the sparsebit array are set.  */
-bool sparsebit_all_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_all_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	/*
 	 * If any nodes there must be at least one bit set.  Only case
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ static void node_reduce(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *nodep)
 /* Returns whether the bit at the index given by idx, within the
  * sparsebit array is set or not.
  */
-bool sparsebit_is_set(struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
+bool sparsebit_is_set(const struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
 {
 	struct node *nodep;
 
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static inline sparsebit_idx_t node_first_clear(struct node *nodep, int start)
  * used by test cases after they detect an unexpected condition, as a means
  * to capture diagnostic information.
  */
-static void sparsebit_dump_internal(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *s,
+static void sparsebit_dump_internal(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *s,
 	unsigned int indent)
 {
 	/* Dump the contents of s */
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ void sparsebit_free(struct sparsebit **sbitp)
  * sparsebit_alloc().  It can though already have bits set, which
  * if different from src will be cleared.
  */
-void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *d, struct sparsebit *s)
+void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *d, const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	/* First clear any bits already set in the destination */
 	sparsebit_clear_all(d);
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *d, struct sparsebit *s)
 }
 
 /* Returns whether num consecutive bits starting at idx are all set.  */
-bool sparsebit_is_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+bool sparsebit_is_set_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num)
 {
 	sparsebit_idx_t next_cleared;
@@ -1005,14 +1005,14 @@ bool sparsebit_is_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
 }
 
 /* Returns whether the bit at the index given by idx.  */
-bool sparsebit_is_clear(struct sparsebit *s,
+bool sparsebit_is_clear(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t idx)
 {
 	return !sparsebit_is_set(s, idx);
 }
 
 /* Returns whether num consecutive bits starting at idx are all cleared.  */
-bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num)
 {
 	sparsebit_idx_t next_set;
@@ -1041,13 +1041,13 @@ bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(struct sparsebit *s,
  * value.  Use sparsebit_any_set(), instead of sparsebit_num_set() > 0,
  * to determine if the sparsebit array has any bits set.
  */
-sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	return s->num_set;
 }
 
 /* Returns whether any bit is set in the sparsebit array.  */
-bool sparsebit_any_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_any_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Nodes only describe set bits.  If any nodes then there
@@ -1070,20 +1070,20 @@ bool sparsebit_any_set(struct sparsebit *s)
 }
 
 /* Returns whether all the bits in the sparsebit array are cleared.  */
-bool sparsebit_all_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_all_clear(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	return !sparsebit_any_set(s);
 }
 
 /* Returns whether all the bits in the sparsebit array are set.  */
-bool sparsebit_any_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_any_clear(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	return !sparsebit_all_set(s);
 }
 
 /* Returns the index of the first set bit.  Abort if no bits are set.
  */
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	struct node *nodep;
 
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(struct sparsebit *s)
 /* Returns the index of the first cleared bit.  Abort if
  * no bits are cleared.
  */
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	struct node *nodep1, *nodep2;
 
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
 /* Returns index of next bit set within s after the index given by prev.
  * Returns 0 if there are no bits after prev that are set.
  */
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t prev)
 {
 	sparsebit_idx_t lowest_possible = prev + 1;
@@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(struct sparsebit *s,
 /* Returns index of next bit cleared within s after the index given by prev.
  * Returns 0 if there are no bits after prev that are cleared.
  */
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t prev)
 {
 	sparsebit_idx_t lowest_possible = prev + 1;
@@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(struct sparsebit *s,
  * and returns the index of the first sequence of num consecutively set
  * bits.  Returns a value of 0 of no such sequence exists.
  */
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num)
 {
 	sparsebit_idx_t idx;
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
  * and returns the index of the first sequence of num consecutively cleared
  * bits.  Returns a value of 0 of no such sequence exists.
  */
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
 	sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num)
 {
 	sparsebit_idx_t idx;
@@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ static size_t display_range(FILE *stream, sparsebit_idx_t low,
  * contiguous bits.  This is done because '-' is used to specify command-line
  * options, and sometimes ranges are specified as command-line arguments.
  */
-void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *s,
+void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *s,
 	unsigned int indent)
 {
 	size_t current_line_len = 0;
@@ -1681,7 +1681,7 @@ void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *s,
  * s.  On error, diagnostic information is printed to stderr and
  * abort is called.
  */
-void sparsebit_validate_internal(struct sparsebit *s)
+void sparsebit_validate_internal(const struct sparsebit *s)
 {
 	bool error_detected = false;
 	struct node *nodep, *prev = NULL;
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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[PATCH v8 03/10] KVM: selftests: Add a macro to iterate over a sparsebit range

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>

Add sparsebit_for_each_set_range() to allow iterator over a range of set
bits in a range.  This will be used by x86 SEV guests to process protected
physical pages (each such page needs to be encrypted _after_ being "added"
to the VM).

Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
[sean: split to separate patch]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
index fb5170d57fcb..bc760761e1a3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
@@ -66,6 +66,26 @@ void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *sbit,
 		    unsigned int indent);
 void sparsebit_validate_internal(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
 
+/*
+ * Iterate over an inclusive ranges within sparsebit @s. In each iteration,
+ * @range_begin and @range_end will take the beginning and end of the set
+ * range, which are of type sparsebit_idx_t.
+ *
+ * For example, if the range [3, 7] (inclusive) is set, within the
+ * iteration,@range_begin will take the value 3 and @range_end will take
+ * the value 7.
+ *
+ * Ensure that there is at least one bit set before using this macro with
+ * sparsebit_any_set(), because sparsebit_first_set() will abort if none
+ * are set.
+ */
+#define sparsebit_for_each_set_range(s, range_begin, range_end)         \
+	for (range_begin = sparsebit_first_set(s),                      \
+	     range_end = sparsebit_next_clear(s, range_begin) - 1;	\
+	     range_begin && range_end;                                  \
+	     range_begin = sparsebit_next_set(s, range_end),            \
+	     range_end = sparsebit_next_clear(s, range_begin) - 1)
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
-- 
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[PATCH v8 04/10] KVM: selftests: Add support for allocating/managing protected guest memory

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>

Add support for differentiating between protected (a.k.a. private, a.k.a.
encrypted) memory and normal (a.k.a. shared) memory for VMs that support
protected guest memory, e.g. x86's SEV.  Provide and manage a common
bitmap for tracking whether a given physical page resides in protected
memory, as support for protected memory isn't x86 specific, i.e. adding a
arch hook would be a net negative now, and in the future.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Originally-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     | 25 +++++++++++++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 22 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index d9dc31af2f96..a82149305349 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ typedef uint64_t vm_vaddr_t; /* Virtual Machine (Guest) virtual address */
 struct userspace_mem_region {
 	struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 region;
 	struct sparsebit *unused_phy_pages;
+	struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages;
 	int fd;
 	off_t offset;
 	enum vm_mem_backing_src_type backing_src_type;
@@ -573,6 +574,13 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type,
 		uint64_t guest_paddr, uint32_t slot, uint64_t npages,
 		uint32_t flags, int guest_memfd_fd, uint64_t guest_memfd_offset);
 
+#ifndef vm_arch_has_protected_memory
+static inline bool vm_arch_has_protected_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 void vm_mem_region_set_flags(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot, uint32_t flags);
 void vm_mem_region_move(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot, uint64_t new_gpa);
 void vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot);
@@ -836,10 +844,23 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason);
 
 vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min,
 			     uint32_t memslot);
-vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
-			      vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot);
+vm_paddr_t __vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
+				vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot,
+				bool protected);
 vm_paddr_t vm_alloc_page_table(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
+static inline vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
+					    vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
+{
+	/*
+	 * By default, allocate memory as protected for VMs that support
+	 * protected memory, as the majority of memory for such VMs is
+	 * protected, i.e. using shared memory is effectively opt-in.
+	 */
+	return __vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, num, paddr_min, memslot,
+				    vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm));
+}
+
 /*
  * ____vm_create() does KVM_CREATE_VM and little else.  __vm_create() also
  * loads the test binary into guest memory and creates an IRQ chip (x86 only).
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index a53caf81eb87..ea677aa019ef 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -717,6 +717,7 @@ static void __vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm,
 	vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2, &region->region);
 
 	sparsebit_free(&region->unused_phy_pages);
+	sparsebit_free(&region->protected_phy_pages);
 	ret = munmap(region->mmap_start, region->mmap_size);
 	TEST_ASSERT(!ret, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("munmap()", ret));
 	if (region->fd >= 0) {
@@ -1098,6 +1099,8 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type,
 	}
 
 	region->unused_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc();
+	if (vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm))
+		region->protected_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc();
 	sparsebit_set_num(region->unused_phy_pages,
 		guest_paddr >> vm->page_shift, npages);
 	region->region.slot = slot;
@@ -1924,6 +1927,10 @@ void vm_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t indent)
 			region->host_mem);
 		fprintf(stream, "%*sunused_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, "");
 		sparsebit_dump(stream, region->unused_phy_pages, 0);
+		if (region->protected_phy_pages) {
+			fprintf(stream, "%*sprotected_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, "");
+			sparsebit_dump(stream, region->protected_phy_pages, 0);
+		}
 	}
 	fprintf(stream, "%*sMapped Virtual Pages:\n", indent, "");
 	sparsebit_dump(stream, vm->vpages_mapped, indent + 2);
@@ -2025,6 +2032,7 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason)
  *   num - number of pages
  *   paddr_min - Physical address minimum
  *   memslot - Memory region to allocate page from
+ *   protected - True if the pages will be used as protected/private memory
  *
  * Output Args: None
  *
@@ -2036,8 +2044,9 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason)
  * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if
  * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min.
  */
-vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
-			      vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
+vm_paddr_t __vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
+				vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot,
+				bool protected)
 {
 	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
 	sparsebit_idx_t pg, base;
@@ -2050,8 +2059,10 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
 		paddr_min, vm->page_size);
 
 	region = memslot2region(vm, memslot);
+	TEST_ASSERT(!protected || region->protected_phy_pages,
+		    "Region doesn't support protected memory");
+
 	base = pg = paddr_min >> vm->page_shift;
-
 	do {
 		for (; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
 			if (!sparsebit_is_set(region->unused_phy_pages, pg)) {
@@ -2070,8 +2081,11 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
 		abort();
 	}
 
-	for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg)
+	for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
 		sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
+		if (protected)
+			sparsebit_set(region->protected_phy_pages, pg);
+	}
 
 	return base * vm->page_size;
 }
-- 
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Re: [PATCH v8 04/10] KVM: selftests: Add support for allocating/managing protected guest memory

[Itaru Kitayama]

On Fri, Feb 02, 2024 at 04:09:10PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> 
> Add support for differentiating between protected (a.k.a. private, a.k.a.
> encrypted) memory and normal (a.k.a. shared) memory for VMs that support
> protected guest memory, e.g. x86's SEV.  Provide and manage a common
> bitmap for tracking whether a given physical page resides in protected
> memory, as support for protected memory isn't x86 specific, i.e. adding a
> arch hook would be a net negative now, and in the future.
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
> Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> Originally-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
>  .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     | 25 +++++++++++++++++--
>  tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 22 +++++++++++++---
>  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> index d9dc31af2f96..a82149305349 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ typedef uint64_t vm_vaddr_t; /* Virtual Machine (Guest) virtual address */
>  struct userspace_mem_region {
>  	struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 region;
>  	struct sparsebit *unused_phy_pages;
> +	struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages;
>  	int fd;
>  	off_t offset;
>  	enum vm_mem_backing_src_type backing_src_type;
> @@ -573,6 +574,13 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type,
>  		uint64_t guest_paddr, uint32_t slot, uint64_t npages,
>  		uint32_t flags, int guest_memfd_fd, uint64_t guest_memfd_offset);
>  
> +#ifndef vm_arch_has_protected_memory
> +static inline bool vm_arch_has_protected_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm)
> +{
> +	return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  void vm_mem_region_set_flags(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot, uint32_t flags);
>  void vm_mem_region_move(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot, uint64_t new_gpa);
>  void vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot);
> @@ -836,10 +844,23 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason);
>  
>  vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min,
>  			     uint32_t memslot);
> -vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
> -			      vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot);
> +vm_paddr_t __vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
> +				vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot,
> +				bool protected);
>  vm_paddr_t vm_alloc_page_table(struct kvm_vm *vm);
>  
> +static inline vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
> +					    vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * By default, allocate memory as protected for VMs that support
> +	 * protected memory, as the majority of memory for such VMs is
> +	 * protected, i.e. using shared memory is effectively opt-in.
> +	 */
> +	return __vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, num, paddr_min, memslot,
> +				    vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm));
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * ____vm_create() does KVM_CREATE_VM and little else.  __vm_create() also
>   * loads the test binary into guest memory and creates an IRQ chip (x86 only).
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> index a53caf81eb87..ea677aa019ef 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> @@ -717,6 +717,7 @@ static void __vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm,
>  	vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2, &region->region);
>  
>  	sparsebit_free(&region->unused_phy_pages);
> +	sparsebit_free(&region->protected_phy_pages);
>  	ret = munmap(region->mmap_start, region->mmap_size);
>  	TEST_ASSERT(!ret, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("munmap()", ret));
>  	if (region->fd >= 0) {
> @@ -1098,6 +1099,8 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type,
>  	}
>  
>  	region->unused_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc();
> +	if (vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm))
> +		region->protected_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc();
>  	sparsebit_set_num(region->unused_phy_pages,
>  		guest_paddr >> vm->page_shift, npages);
>  	region->region.slot = slot;
> @@ -1924,6 +1927,10 @@ void vm_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t indent)
>  			region->host_mem);
>  		fprintf(stream, "%*sunused_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, "");
>  		sparsebit_dump(stream, region->unused_phy_pages, 0);
> +		if (region->protected_phy_pages) {
> +			fprintf(stream, "%*sprotected_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, "");
> +			sparsebit_dump(stream, region->protected_phy_pages, 0);
> +		}
>  	}
>  	fprintf(stream, "%*sMapped Virtual Pages:\n", indent, "");
>  	sparsebit_dump(stream, vm->vpages_mapped, indent + 2);
> @@ -2025,6 +2032,7 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason)
>   *   num - number of pages
>   *   paddr_min - Physical address minimum
>   *   memslot - Memory region to allocate page from
> + *   protected - True if the pages will be used as protected/private memory
>   *
>   * Output Args: None
>   *
> @@ -2036,8 +2044,9 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason)
>   * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if
>   * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min.
>   */
> -vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
> -			      vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
> +vm_paddr_t __vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
> +				vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot,
> +				bool protected)
>  {
>  	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
>  	sparsebit_idx_t pg, base;
> @@ -2050,8 +2059,10 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
>  		paddr_min, vm->page_size);
>  
>  	region = memslot2region(vm, memslot);
> +	TEST_ASSERT(!protected || region->protected_phy_pages,
> +		    "Region doesn't support protected memory");
> +
>  	base = pg = paddr_min >> vm->page_shift;
> -
>  	do {
>  		for (; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
>  			if (!sparsebit_is_set(region->unused_phy_pages, pg)) {
> @@ -2070,8 +2081,11 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
>  		abort();
>  	}
>  
> -	for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg)
> +	for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
>  		sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
> +		if (protected)
> +			sparsebit_set(region->protected_phy_pages, pg);
> +	}
>  
>  	return base * vm->page_size;
>  }

Reviewed-by: Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@fujitsu.com>

> -- 
> 2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog
> 

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[PATCH v8 05/10] KVM: selftests: Add support for protected vm_vaddr_* allocations

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>

Test programs may wish to allocate shared vaddrs for things like
sharing memory with the guest. Since protected vms will have their
memory encrypted by default an interface is needed to explicitly
request shared pages.

Implement this by splitting the common code out from vm_vaddr_alloc()
and introducing a new vm_vaddr_alloc_shared().

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  3 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 26 +++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index a82149305349..cb3159af6db3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -590,6 +590,9 @@ vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_unused_gap(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_mi
 vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min);
 vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
 			    enum kvm_mem_region_type type);
+vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
+				 vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
+				 enum kvm_mem_region_type type);
 vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int nr_pages);
 vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc_page(struct kvm_vm *vm,
 				 enum kvm_mem_region_type type);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index ea677aa019ef..e7f4f84f2e68 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -1431,15 +1431,17 @@ vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_unused_gap(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
 	return pgidx_start * vm->page_size;
 }
 
-vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
-			    enum kvm_mem_region_type type)
+static vm_vaddr_t ____vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
+				     vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
+				     enum kvm_mem_region_type type,
+				     bool protected)
 {
 	uint64_t pages = (sz >> vm->page_shift) + ((sz % vm->page_size) != 0);
 
 	virt_pgd_alloc(vm);
-	vm_paddr_t paddr = vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, pages,
-					      KVM_UTIL_MIN_PFN * vm->page_size,
-					      vm->memslots[type]);
+	vm_paddr_t paddr = __vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, pages,
+						KVM_UTIL_MIN_PFN * vm->page_size,
+						vm->memslots[type], protected);
 
 	/*
 	 * Find an unused range of virtual page addresses of at least
@@ -1459,6 +1461,20 @@ vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
 	return vaddr_start;
 }
 
+vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
+			    enum kvm_mem_region_type type)
+{
+	return ____vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sz, vaddr_min, type,
+				  vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm));
+}
+
+vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
+				 vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
+				 enum kvm_mem_region_type type)
+{
+	return ____vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sz, vaddr_min, type, false);
+}
+
 /*
  * VM Virtual Address Allocate
  *
-- 
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Re: [PATCH v8 05/10] KVM: selftests: Add support for protected vm_vaddr_* allocations

[Itaru Kitayama]

On Fri, Feb 02, 2024 at 04:09:11PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> 
> Test programs may wish to allocate shared vaddrs for things like
> sharing memory with the guest. Since protected vms will have their
> memory encrypted by default an interface is needed to explicitly
> request shared pages.
> 
> Implement this by splitting the common code out from vm_vaddr_alloc()
> and introducing a new vm_vaddr_alloc_shared().
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
> Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
>  .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  3 +++
>  tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 26 +++++++++++++++----
>  2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> index a82149305349..cb3159af6db3 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> @@ -590,6 +590,9 @@ vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_unused_gap(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_mi
>  vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min);
>  vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
>  			    enum kvm_mem_region_type type);
> +vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
> +				 vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
> +				 enum kvm_mem_region_type type);
>  vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int nr_pages);
>  vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc_page(struct kvm_vm *vm,
>  				 enum kvm_mem_region_type type);
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> index ea677aa019ef..e7f4f84f2e68 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> @@ -1431,15 +1431,17 @@ vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_unused_gap(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
>  	return pgidx_start * vm->page_size;
>  }
>  
> -vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
> -			    enum kvm_mem_region_type type)
> +static vm_vaddr_t ____vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
> +				     vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
> +				     enum kvm_mem_region_type type,
> +				     bool protected)
>  {
>  	uint64_t pages = (sz >> vm->page_shift) + ((sz % vm->page_size) != 0);
>  
>  	virt_pgd_alloc(vm);
> -	vm_paddr_t paddr = vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, pages,
> -					      KVM_UTIL_MIN_PFN * vm->page_size,
> -					      vm->memslots[type]);
> +	vm_paddr_t paddr = __vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, pages,
> +						KVM_UTIL_MIN_PFN * vm->page_size,
> +						vm->memslots[type], protected);
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Find an unused range of virtual page addresses of at least
> @@ -1459,6 +1461,20 @@ vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
>  	return vaddr_start;
>  }
>  
> +vm_vaddr_t __vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
> +			    enum kvm_mem_region_type type)
> +{
> +	return ____vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sz, vaddr_min, type,
> +				  vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm));
> +}
> +
> +vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
> +				 vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min,
> +				 enum kvm_mem_region_type type)
> +{
> +	return ____vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sz, vaddr_min, type, false);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * VM Virtual Address Allocate
>   *
Reviewied-by: Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@fujitsu.com>

> -- 
> 2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog
> 

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[PATCH v8 06/10] KVM: selftests: Explicitly ucall pool from shared memory

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>

Allocate the common ucall pool using vm_vaddr_alloc_shared() so that the
ucall structures will be placed in shared (unencrypted) memory for VMs
with support for protected (encrypted) memory, e.g. x86's SEV.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c
index 816a3fa109bf..f5af65a41c29 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ void ucall_init(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t mmio_gpa)
 	vm_vaddr_t vaddr;
 	int i;
 
-	vaddr = __vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sizeof(*hdr), KVM_UTIL_MIN_VADDR, MEM_REGION_DATA);
+	vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, sizeof(*hdr), KVM_UTIL_MIN_VADDR,
+				      MEM_REGION_DATA);
 	hdr = (struct ucall_header *)addr_gva2hva(vm, vaddr);
 	memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(*hdr));
 
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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[PATCH v8 07/10] KVM: selftests: Allow tagging protected memory in guest page tables

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>

Add support for tagging and untagging guest physical address, e.g. to
allow x86's SEV and TDX guests to embed shared vs. private information in
the GPA.  SEV (encryption, a.k.a. C-bit) and TDX (shared, a.k.a. S-bit)
steal bits from the guest's physical address space that is consumed by the
CPU metadata, i.e. effectively aliases the "real" GPA.

Implement generic "tagging" so that the shared vs. private metadata can be
managed by x86 without bleeding too many details into common code.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Originally-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 .../kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h       |  7 +++++++
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     | 13 ++++++++++++
 .../kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h         |  7 +++++++
 .../kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h         |  7 +++++++
 .../kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h        | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      | 15 ++++++++++++-
 7 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..218f5cdf0d86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_ARM64_KVM_HOST_H
+#define _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_ARM64_KVM_HOST_H
+
+struct kvm_vm_arch {};
+
+#endif  // _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_ARM64_KVM_HOST_H
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index cb3159af6db3..4b266dc0c9bd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/kvm.h>
 
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 
+#include "kvm_util_arch.h"
 #include "sparsebit.h"
 
 /*
@@ -113,6 +115,9 @@ struct kvm_vm {
 	vm_vaddr_t idt;
 	vm_vaddr_t handlers;
 	uint32_t dirty_ring_size;
+	uint64_t gpa_tag_mask;
+
+	struct kvm_vm_arch arch;
 
 	/* Cache of information for binary stats interface */
 	int stats_fd;
@@ -605,6 +610,12 @@ void *addr_gva2hva(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gva);
 vm_paddr_t addr_hva2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, void *hva);
 void *addr_gpa2alias(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa);
 
+
+static inline vm_paddr_t vm_untag_gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa)
+{
+	return gpa & ~vm->gpa_tag_mask;
+}
+
 void vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int _vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
@@ -1114,4 +1125,6 @@ void kvm_selftest_arch_init(void);
 
 void kvm_arch_vm_post_create(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
+bool vm_is_gpa_protected(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr);
+
 #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_UTIL_BASE_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c8280d5659ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_RISCV_KVM_HOST_H
+#define _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_RISCV_KVM_HOST_H
+
+struct kvm_vm_arch {};
+
+#endif  // _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_RISCV_KVM_HOST_H
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4c4c1c1e4bf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_S390_KVM_HOST_H
+#define _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_S390_KVM_HOST_H
+
+struct kvm_vm_arch {};
+
+#endif  // _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_S390_KVM_HOST_H
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..17bb38236d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H
+#define _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+struct kvm_vm_arch {
+	uint64_t c_bit;
+	uint64_t s_bit;
+};
+
+static inline bool __vm_arch_has_protected_memory(struct kvm_vm_arch *arch)
+{
+	return arch->c_bit || arch->s_bit;
+}
+
+#define vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm) \
+	__vm_arch_has_protected_memory(&(vm)->arch)
+
+#endif  // _TOOLS_LINUX_ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index e7f4f84f2e68..19511137d1ae 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -1597,6 +1597,8 @@ void *addr_gpa2hva(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa)
 {
 	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
 
+	gpa = vm_untag_gpa(vm, gpa);
+
 	region = userspace_mem_region_find(vm, gpa, gpa);
 	if (!region) {
 		TEST_FAIL("No vm physical memory at 0x%lx", gpa);
@@ -2305,3 +2307,18 @@ void __attribute((constructor)) kvm_selftest_init(void)
 
 	kvm_selftest_arch_init();
 }
+
+bool vm_is_gpa_protected(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr)
+{
+	sparsebit_idx_t pg = 0;
+	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+
+	if (!vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm))
+		return false;
+
+	region = userspace_mem_region_find(vm, paddr, paddr);
+	TEST_ASSERT(region, "No vm physical memory at 0x%lx", paddr);
+
+	pg = paddr >> vm->page_shift;
+	return sparsebit_is_set(region->protected_phy_pages, pg);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
index 615d05247470..6c1d2c0ec584 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ static uint64_t *virt_create_upper_pte(struct kvm_vm *vm,
 {
 	uint64_t *pte = virt_get_pte(vm, parent_pte, vaddr, current_level);
 
+	paddr = vm_untag_gpa(vm, paddr);
+
 	if (!(*pte & PTE_PRESENT_MASK)) {
 		*pte = PTE_PRESENT_MASK | PTE_WRITABLE_MASK;
 		if (current_level == target_level)
@@ -200,6 +202,8 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr, int level)
 		    "Physical address beyond maximum supported,\n"
 		    "  paddr: 0x%lx vm->max_gfn: 0x%lx vm->page_size: 0x%x",
 		    paddr, vm->max_gfn, vm->page_size);
+	TEST_ASSERT(vm_untag_gpa(vm, paddr) == paddr,
+		    "Unexpected bits in paddr: %lx", paddr);
 
 	/*
 	 * Allocate upper level page tables, if not already present.  Return
@@ -222,6 +226,15 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr, int level)
 	TEST_ASSERT(!(*pte & PTE_PRESENT_MASK),
 		    "PTE already present for 4k page at vaddr: 0x%lx", vaddr);
 	*pte = PTE_PRESENT_MASK | PTE_WRITABLE_MASK | (paddr & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+
+	/*
+	 * Neither SEV nor TDX supports shared page tables, so only the final
+	 * leaf PTE needs manually set the C/S-bit.
+	 */
+	if (vm_is_gpa_protected(vm, paddr))
+		*pte |= vm->arch.c_bit;
+	else
+		*pte |= vm->arch.s_bit;
 }
 
 void virt_arch_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr)
@@ -496,7 +509,7 @@ vm_paddr_t addr_arch_gva2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gva)
 	 * No need for a hugepage mask on the PTE, x86-64 requires the "unused"
 	 * address bits to be zero.
 	 */
-	return PTE_GET_PA(*pte) | (gva & ~HUGEPAGE_MASK(level));
+	return vm_untag_gpa(vm, PTE_GET_PA(*pte)) | (gva & ~HUGEPAGE_MASK(level));
 }
 
 static void kvm_setup_gdt(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct kvm_dtable *dt)
-- 
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[PATCH v8 08/10] KVM: selftests: Add library for creating and interacting with SEV guests

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>

Add a library/APIs for creating and interfacing with SEV guests, all of
which need some amount of common functionality, e.g. an open file handle
for the SEV driver (/dev/sev), ioctl() wrappers to pass said file handle
to KVM, tracking of the C-bit, etc.

Add an x86-specific hook to initialize address properties, a.k.a. the
location of the C-bit.  An arch specific hook is rather gross, but x86
already has a dedicated #ifdef-protected kvm_get_cpu_address_width() hook,
i.e. the ugliest code already exists.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Originally-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   1 +
 .../kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h        |   2 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  |   8 ++
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        | 110 +++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      |  17 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 267 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index ce58098d80fd..169b6ee8f733 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/hyperv.c
 LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/memstress.c
 LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/pmu.c
 LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/processor.c
+LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
 LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/svm.c
 LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/ucall.c
 LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/vmx.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
index 17bb38236d97..205ed788aeb8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 struct kvm_vm_arch {
 	uint64_t c_bit;
 	uint64_t s_bit;
+	int sev_fd;
+	bool is_pt_protected;
 };
 
 static inline bool __vm_arch_has_protected_memory(struct kvm_vm_arch *arch)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
index 0f4792083d01..3bd03b088dda 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@
 extern bool host_cpu_is_intel;
 extern bool host_cpu_is_amd;
 
+enum vm_guest_x86_subtype {
+	VM_SUBTYPE_NONE = 0,
+	VM_SUBTYPE_SEV,
+	VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES,
+};
+
 /* Forced emulation prefix, used to invoke the emulator unconditionally. */
 #define KVM_FEP "ud2; .byte 'k', 'v', 'm';"
 
@@ -276,6 +282,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_cpu_property {
 #define X86_PROPERTY_MAX_EXT_LEAF		KVM_X86_CPU_PROPERTY(0x80000000, 0, EAX, 0, 31)
 #define X86_PROPERTY_MAX_PHY_ADDR		KVM_X86_CPU_PROPERTY(0x80000008, 0, EAX, 0, 7)
 #define X86_PROPERTY_MAX_VIRT_ADDR		KVM_X86_CPU_PROPERTY(0x80000008, 0, EAX, 8, 15)
+#define X86_PROPERTY_SEV_C_BIT			KVM_X86_CPU_PROPERTY(0x8000001F, 0, EBX, 0, 5)
 #define X86_PROPERTY_PHYS_ADDR_REDUCTION	KVM_X86_CPU_PROPERTY(0x8000001F, 0, EBX, 6, 11)
 
 #define X86_PROPERTY_MAX_CENTAUR_LEAF		KVM_X86_CPU_PROPERTY(0xC0000000, 0, EAX, 0, 31)
@@ -1093,6 +1100,7 @@ do {											\
 } while (0)
 
 void kvm_get_cpu_address_width(unsigned int *pa_bits, unsigned int *va_bits);
+void kvm_init_vm_address_properties(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 bool vm_is_unrestricted_guest(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
 struct ex_regs {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..262b16f574e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Helpers used for SEV guests
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
+#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
+
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+
+#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR 0
+#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR 17
+
+enum sev_guest_state {
+	SEV_GUEST_STATE_UNINITIALIZED = 0,
+	SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
+	SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET,
+	SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING,
+};
+
+#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG	(1UL << 0)
+#define SEV_POLICY_ES		(1UL << 2)
+
+bool is_kvm_sev_supported(void);
+
+void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
+void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+
+struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code,
+					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu);
+
+kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
+
+/*
+ * The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP uAPI is utter garbage and takes an "unsigned long"
+ * instead of a proper struct.  The size of the parameter is embedded in the
+ * ioctl number, i.e. is ABI and thus immutable.  Hack around the mess by
+ * creating an overlay to pass in an "unsigned long" without a cast (casting
+ * will make the compiler unhappy due to dereferencing an aliased pointer).
+ */
+#define __vm_sev_ioctl(vm, cmd, arg)					\
+({									\
+	int r;								\
+									\
+	union {								\
+		struct kvm_sev_cmd c;					\
+		unsigned long raw;					\
+	} sev_cmd = { .c = {						\
+		.id = (cmd),						\
+		.data = (uint64_t)(arg),				\
+		.sev_fd = (vm)->arch.sev_fd,				\
+	} };								\
+									\
+	r = __vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &sev_cmd.raw);	\
+	r ?: sev_cmd.c.error;						\
+})
+
+#define vm_sev_ioctl(vm, cmd, arg)					\
+({									\
+	int ret = __vm_sev_ioctl(vm, cmd, arg);				\
+									\
+	__TEST_ASSERT_VM_VCPU_IOCTL(!ret, #cmd,	ret, vm);		\
+})
+
+static inline void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
+}
+
+
+static inline void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_ES_INIT, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline void sev_register_encrypted_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm,
+						 struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+{
+	struct kvm_enc_region range = {
+		.addr = region->region.userspace_addr,
+		.size = region->region.memory_size,
+	};
+
+	vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
+}
+
+static inline void sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
+					  uint64_t size)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data update_data = {
+		.uaddr = (unsigned long)addr_gpa2hva(vm, gpa),
+		.len = size,
+	};
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update_data);
+}
+
+#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index 19511137d1ae..b2262b5fad9e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ struct kvm_vm *____vm_create(struct vm_shape shape)
 	case VM_MODE_PXXV48_4K:
 #ifdef __x86_64__
 		kvm_get_cpu_address_width(&vm->pa_bits, &vm->va_bits);
+		kvm_init_vm_address_properties(vm);
 		/*
 		 * Ignore KVM support for 5-level paging (vm->va_bits == 57),
 		 * it doesn't take effect unless a CR4.LA57 is set, which it
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
index 6c1d2c0ec584..aa92220bf5da 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include "test_util.h"
 #include "kvm_util.h"
 #include "processor.h"
+#include "sev.h"
 
 #ifndef NUM_INTERRUPTS
 #define NUM_INTERRUPTS 256
@@ -278,6 +279,9 @@ uint64_t *__vm_get_page_table_entry(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr,
 {
 	uint64_t *pml4e, *pdpe, *pde;
 
+	TEST_ASSERT(!vm->arch.is_pt_protected,
+		    "Walking page tables of protected guests is impossible");
+
 	TEST_ASSERT(*level >= PG_LEVEL_NONE && *level < PG_LEVEL_NUM,
 		    "Invalid PG_LEVEL_* '%d'", *level);
 
@@ -573,6 +577,11 @@ void kvm_arch_vm_post_create(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	vm_create_irqchip(vm);
 	sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_intel);
 	sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_amd);
+
+	if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV)
+		sev_vm_init(vm);
+	else if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES)
+		sev_es_vm_init(vm);
 }
 
 struct kvm_vcpu *vm_arch_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id,
@@ -1063,6 +1072,14 @@ void kvm_get_cpu_address_width(unsigned int *pa_bits, unsigned int *va_bits)
 	}
 }
 
+void kvm_init_vm_address_properties(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV) {
+		vm->arch.c_bit = BIT_ULL(this_cpu_property(X86_PROPERTY_SEV_C_BIT));
+		vm->gpa_tag_mask = vm->arch.c_bit;
+	}
+}
+
 static void set_idt_entry(struct kvm_vm *vm, int vector, unsigned long addr,
 			  int dpl, unsigned short selector)
 {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f37b1a7247ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include "sev.h"
+
+bool is_kvm_sev_supported(void)
+{
+	int sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
+	struct sev_user_data_status sev_status;
+
+	struct sev_issue_cmd arg = {
+		.cmd = SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+		.data = (unsigned long)&sev_status,
+	};
+
+	kvm_ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
+	close(sev_fd);
+
+	return sev_status.api_major > SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR ||
+	       (sev_status.api_major == SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR &&
+		sev_status.api_minor >= SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * sparsebit_next_clear() can return 0 if [x, 2**64-1] are all set, and the
+ * -1 would then cause an underflow back to 2**64 - 1. This is expected and
+ * correct.
+ *
+ * If the last range in the sparsebit is [x, y] and we try to iterate,
+ * sparsebit_next_set() will return 0, and sparsebit_next_clear() will try
+ * and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition
+ * expression would cause us to quit the loop.
+ */
+static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+{
+	const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
+	const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
+	const sparsebit_idx_t lowest_page_in_region = gpa_base >> vm->page_shift;
+	sparsebit_idx_t i, j;
+
+	if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages))
+		return;
+
+	sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
+
+	sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
+		const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
+		const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
+
+		sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+	}
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
+		.policy = policy,
+	};
+	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status status;
+	int ctr;
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.policy, policy);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
+
+	hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
+		encrypt_region(vm, region);
+
+	vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true;
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure launch_measure;
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status guest_status;
+
+	launch_measure.len = 256;
+	launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &launch_measure);
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &guest_status);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(guest_status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status status;
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+	TEST_ASSERT(status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE ||
+		    status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET,
+		    "Unexpected guest state: %d", status.state);
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
+}
+
+struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code,
+					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
+{
+	struct vm_shape shape = {
+		.type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT,
+		.mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT,
+		.subtype = VM_SUBTYPE_SEV,
+	};
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1];
+	uint8_t measurement[512];
+
+	vm = __vm_create_with_vcpus(shape, 1, 0, guest_code, cpus);
+	*cpu = cpus[0];
+
+	sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
+
+	/* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */
+	sev_vm_launch_measure(vm, measurement);
+
+	sev_vm_launch_finish(vm);
+
+	return vm;
+}
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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[PATCH v8 09/10] KVM: selftests: Use the SEV library APIs in the intra-host migration test

[Sean Christopherson]

Port the existing intra-host SEV(-ES) migration test to the recently added
SEV library, which handles much of the boilerplate needed to create and
configure SEV guests.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c  | 67 ++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c
index a49828adf294..d6f7428e42c6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
 #include "test_util.h"
 #include "kvm_util.h"
 #include "processor.h"
-#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "sev.h"
 #include "kselftest.h"
 
-#define SEV_POLICY_ES 0b100
-
 #define NR_MIGRATE_TEST_VCPUS 4
 #define NR_MIGRATE_TEST_VMS 3
 #define NR_LOCK_TESTING_THREADS 3
@@ -22,46 +20,24 @@
 
 bool have_sev_es;
 
-static int __sev_ioctl(int vm_fd, int cmd_id, void *data, __u32 *fw_error)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_cmd cmd = {
-		.id = cmd_id,
-		.data = (uint64_t)data,
-		.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit(),
-	};
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = ioctl(vm_fd, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &cmd);
-	*fw_error = cmd.error;
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static void sev_ioctl(int vm_fd, int cmd_id, void *data)
-{
-	int ret;
-	__u32 fw_error;
-
-	ret = __sev_ioctl(vm_fd, cmd_id, data, &fw_error);
-	TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0 && fw_error == SEV_RET_SUCCESS,
-		    "%d failed: return code: %d, errno: %d, fw error: %d",
-		    cmd_id, ret, errno, fw_error);
-}
-
 static struct kvm_vm *sev_vm_create(bool es)
 {
 	struct kvm_vm *vm;
-	struct kvm_sev_launch_start start = { 0 };
 	int i;
 
 	vm = vm_create_barebones();
-	sev_ioctl(vm->fd, es ? KVM_SEV_ES_INIT : KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
+	if (!es)
+		sev_vm_init(vm);
+	else
+		sev_es_vm_init(vm);
+
 	for (i = 0; i < NR_MIGRATE_TEST_VCPUS; ++i)
 		__vm_vcpu_add(vm, i);
+
+	sev_vm_launch(vm, es ? SEV_POLICY_ES : 0);
+
 	if (es)
-		start.policy |= SEV_POLICY_ES;
-	sev_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &start);
-	if (es)
-		sev_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
 	return vm;
 }
 
@@ -181,7 +157,7 @@ static void test_sev_migrate_parameters(void)
 	sev_vm = sev_vm_create(/* es= */ false);
 	sev_es_vm = sev_vm_create(/* es= */ true);
 	sev_es_vm_no_vmsa = vm_create_barebones();
-	sev_ioctl(sev_es_vm_no_vmsa->fd, KVM_SEV_ES_INIT, NULL);
+	sev_es_vm_init(sev_es_vm_no_vmsa);
 	__vm_vcpu_add(sev_es_vm_no_vmsa, 1);
 
 	ret = __sev_migrate_from(sev_vm, sev_es_vm);
@@ -230,13 +206,13 @@ static void sev_mirror_create(struct kvm_vm *dst, struct kvm_vm *src)
 	TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "Copying context failed, ret: %d, errno: %d", ret, errno);
 }
 
-static void verify_mirror_allowed_cmds(int vm_fd)
+static void verify_mirror_allowed_cmds(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_guest_status status;
+	int cmd_id;
 
-	for (int cmd_id = KVM_SEV_INIT; cmd_id < KVM_SEV_NR_MAX; ++cmd_id) {
+	for (cmd_id = KVM_SEV_INIT; cmd_id < KVM_SEV_NR_MAX; ++cmd_id) {
 		int ret;
-		__u32 fw_error;
 
 		/*
 		 * These commands are allowed for mirror VMs, all others are
@@ -256,14 +232,13 @@ static void verify_mirror_allowed_cmds(int vm_fd)
 		 * These commands should be disallowed before the data
 		 * parameter is examined so NULL is OK here.
 		 */
-		ret = __sev_ioctl(vm_fd, cmd_id, NULL, &fw_error);
-		TEST_ASSERT(
-			ret == -1 && errno == EINVAL,
-			"Should not be able call command: %d. ret: %d, errno: %d",
-			cmd_id, ret, errno);
+		ret = __vm_sev_ioctl(vm, cmd_id, NULL);
+		TEST_ASSERT(ret == -1 && errno == EINVAL,
+			    "Should not be able call command: %d. ret: %d, errno: %d",
+			    cmd_id, ret, errno);
 	}
 
-	sev_ioctl(vm_fd, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
 }
 
 static void test_sev_mirror(bool es)
@@ -281,9 +256,9 @@ static void test_sev_mirror(bool es)
 		__vm_vcpu_add(dst_vm, i);
 
 	if (es)
-		sev_ioctl(dst_vm->fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
+		vm_sev_ioctl(dst_vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
 
-	verify_mirror_allowed_cmds(dst_vm->fd);
+	verify_mirror_allowed_cmds(dst_vm);
 
 	kvm_vm_free(src_vm);
 	kvm_vm_free(dst_vm);
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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[PATCH v8 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV smoke test

[Sean Christopherson]

From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>

Add a basic smoke test for SEV guests to verify that KVM can launch an
SEV guest and run a few instructions without exploding.  To verify that
SEV is indeed enabled, assert that SEV is reported as enabled in
MSR_AMD64_SEV, a.k.a. SEV_STATUS, which cannot be intercepted by KVM
(architecturally enforced).

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
cc: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
[sean: rename to "sev_smoke_test"]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |  1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c     | 58 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index 169b6ee8f733..da20e6bb43ed 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_pmu_caps_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_shinfo_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_migrate_tests
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_smoke_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/amx_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/max_vcpuid_cap_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/triple_fault_event_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c1534efab2be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include "test_util.h"
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
+#include "sev.h"
+
+static void guest_sev_code(void)
+{
+	GUEST_ASSERT(this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV));
+	GUEST_ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
+
+	GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	struct ucall uc;
+
+	vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(policy, guest_code, &vcpu);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+		switch (get_ucall(vcpu, &uc)) {
+		case UCALL_SYNC:
+			continue;
+		case UCALL_DONE:
+			return;
+		case UCALL_ABORT:
+			REPORT_GUEST_ASSERT(uc);
+		default:
+			TEST_FAIL("Unexpected exit: %s",
+				  exit_reason_str(vcpu->run->exit_reason));
+		}
+	}
+
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	TEST_REQUIRE(is_kvm_sev_supported());
+
+	test_sev(guest_sev_code, SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+	test_sev(guest_sev_code, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.43.0.594.gd9cf4e227d-goog


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Re: [PATCH v8 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV smoke test

[Sean Christopherson]

On Fri, Feb 02, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> +{
> +	TEST_REQUIRE(is_kvm_sev_supported());

This also needs

	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV));

to handle the case where the platform supports SEV, i.e. /dev/sev exists, but
KVM doesn't support SEV, e.g. if TDP is disabled, if SEV was explicitly disabled
via module param, etc.

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Re: [PATCH v8 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV smoke test

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 06, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 02, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> > +{
> > +	TEST_REQUIRE(is_kvm_sev_supported());
> 
> This also needs
> 
> 	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV));
> 
> to handle the case where the platform supports SEV, i.e. /dev/sev exists, but
> KVM doesn't support SEV, e.g. if TDP is disabled, if SEV was explicitly disabled
> via module param, etc.

Thinking more about this, I think we should simply delete is_kvm_sev_supported().
(a) it obviously doesn't query _KVM_ support, and (b) if KVM says SEV is supported,
then it darn well actually be supported.

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Re: [PATCH v8 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV smoke test

[Sean Christopherson]

On Thu, Feb 22, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 06, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 02, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> > > +{
> > > +	TEST_REQUIRE(is_kvm_sev_supported());
> > 
> > This also needs
> > 
> > 	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV));
> > 
> > to handle the case where the platform supports SEV, i.e. /dev/sev exists, but
> > KVM doesn't support SEV, e.g. if TDP is disabled, if SEV was explicitly disabled
> > via module param, etc.
> 
> Thinking more about this, I think we should simply delete is_kvm_sev_supported().
> (a) it obviously doesn't query _KVM_ support, and (b) if KVM says SEV is supported,
> then it darn well actually be supported.

Ugh, and selftests also need to handle the scenario where SEV is enabled, but all
ASIDs are assigned to SEV-ES.  We could try to create a dummy VM and check for an
-EBUSY return, but that is ugly and could result in missing KVM bugs due to tests
being skipped instead of failing.

That's a future problem though, because I think we'll need new KVM functionality
to surface that information.

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Re: [PATCH v8 00/10] KVM: selftests: Add SEV smoke test

[Carlos Bilbao]

Hello,

On 2/2/24 18:09, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Add a basic SEV smoke test.  Unlike the intra-host migration tests, this
> one actually runs a small chunk of code in the guest.
> 
> v8:
>   - Undo the kvm.h uAPI breakage.
>   - Take advantage of "struct vm_shape", introduced by the guest_memfd
>     selftests, to simply tracking the SEV/SEV-ES subtypes.
>   - Rename the test to "sev_smoke_test" instead of "sev_all_boot_test",
>     as the "all" is rather nonsensical, and the test isn't booting anything
>     in the traditional sense of the word.
>   - Drop vm->protected and instead add an arch hook to query if the VM has
>     protected memory.
>   - Assert that the target memory region supports protected memory when
>     allocating protected memory.
>   - Allocate protected_phy_pages for memory regions if and only if the VM
>     supports protected memory.
>   - Rename kvm_host.h to kvm_util_arch.h, and move it to selftests/kvm where
>     it belongs.
>   - Fix up some SoB goofs.
>   - Convert the intrahost SEV/SEV-ES migration tests to use common ioctl()
>     wrappers.
> 
> V7
>   * https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231218161146.3554657-1-pgonda@google.com
>   * See https://github.com/sean-jc/linux/tree/x86/sev_selftests_for_peter.
>   * I kept is_pt_protected because without it the page tables are never
>   readable. Its used for the elf loading in kvm_vm_elf_load().
> 
> V6
>   * Updated SEV VM create function based on Seanjc's feedback and new
>     changes to VM creation functions.
>   * Removed pte_me_mask based on feedback.
>   * Fixed s_bit usage based on TDX
>   * Fixed bugs and took Ackerly's code for enc_region setup code.
> 
> V5
>   * Rebase onto seanjc@'s latest ucall pool series.
>   * More review changes based on seanjc:
>   ** use protected instead of encrypted outside of SEV specific files
>   ** Swap memcrypt struct for kvm_vm_arch arch specific struct
>   ** Make protected page table data agnostic of address bit stealing specifics
>      of SEV
>   ** Further clean up for SEV library to just vm_sev_create_one_vcpu()
>   * Due to large changes moved more authorships from mroth@ to pgonda@. Gave
>     originally-by tags to mroth@ as suggested by Seanjc for this.
> 
> V4
>   * Rebase ontop of seanjc@'s latest Ucall Pool series:
>     https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20220825232522.3997340-8-seanjc@google.com/
>   * Fix up review comments from seanjc
>   * Switch authorship on 2 patches because of significant changes, added
>   * Michael as suggested-by or originally-by.
> 
> V3
>   * Addressed more of andrew.jones@ in ucall patches.
>   * Fix build in non-x86 archs.
> 
> V2
>   * Dropped RFC tag
>   * Correctly separated Sean's ucall patches into 2 as originally
>     intended.
>   * Addressed andrew.jones@ in ucall patches.
>   * Fixed ucall pool usage to work for other archs
> 
> V1
>   * https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220715192956.1873315-1-pgonda@google.com/
> 
> Ackerley Tng (1):
>    KVM: selftests: Add a macro to iterate over a sparsebit range
> 
> Michael Roth (2):
>    KVM: selftests: Make sparsebit structs const where appropriate
>    KVM: selftests: Add support for protected vm_vaddr_* allocations
> 
> Peter Gonda (5):
>    KVM: selftests: Add support for allocating/managing protected guest
>      memory
>    KVM: selftests: Explicitly ucall pool from shared memory
>    KVM: selftests: Allow tagging protected memory in guest page tables
>    KVM: selftests: Add library for creating and interacting with SEV
>      guests
>    KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV smoke test
> 
> Sean Christopherson (2):
>    KVM: selftests: Extend VM creation's @shape to allow control of VM
>      subtype
>    KVM: selftests: Use the SEV library APIs in the intra-host migration
>      test
> 
>   tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   2 +
>   .../kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h       |   7 +
>   .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  50 ++++++-
>   .../kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h         |   7 +
>   .../kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h         |   7 +
>   .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h |  56 +++++---
>   .../kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h        |  23 ++++
>   .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  |   8 ++
>   .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        | 110 +++++++++++++++
>   tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    |  67 +++++++--
>   tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c   |  48 +++----
>   .../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c  |   3 +-
>   .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      |  32 ++++-
>   tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
>   .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c  |  67 +++------
>   .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c     |  58 ++++++++
>   16 files changed, 570 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/aarch64/kvm_util_arch.h
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/riscv/kvm_util_arch.h
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/s390x/kvm_util_arch.h
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/kvm_util_arch.h
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
> 
> 
> base-commit: 60eedcfceda9db46f1b333e5e1aa9359793f04fb

Tested-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>

Tested including TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)); in main() too.

Thanks,
Carlos

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