From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "David Stevens" <stevensd@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-rt-devel@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC 08/10] Set PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK in various places
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 23:43:37 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260827234338.3F1441F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260827232948.2520558-9-stevensd@google.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Safe Rust methods `set_flag_bits` and `clear_flag_bits` on `Task` allow data races when called on non-current tasks.
- [Medium] Unconditional clearing of `PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK` in Rust binder breaks flag preservation logic.
--
commit 6f8ac02f62f897200c71ad824d4019095dc4428c
Author: David Stevens <stevensd@google.com>
Set PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK in various places
Annotate various blocking locations with the PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK.
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs b/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs
> index bc0ef8927905c..be62f7fd43ca2 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs
> @@ -538,13 +538,21 @@ fn get_work_local(self: &Arc<Self>, wait: bool) -> Result<Option<DLArc<dyn Deliv
[ ... ]
> inner.looper_flags |= LOOPER_WAITING;
> +
> + current.set_flag_bits(bindings::PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK);
> +
> let signal_pending = self.work_condvar.wait_interruptible_freezable(&mut inner);
> +
> + current.clear_flag_bits(bindings::PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK);
[Severity: Medium]
Will unconditionally clearing the flag break flag preservation logic if stack
reclaim states are nested?
The C allow_stack_reclaim guard explicitly saves and restores the flag to
support nesting. If get_work_local() is called from a context where
PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK is already set, this will unexpectedly disable stack
reclamation for the outer scope upon exit.
> +
> inner.looper_flags &= !LOOPER_WAITING;
>
> if signal_pending {
> @@ -592,15 +600,21 @@ fn get_work(self: &Arc<Self>, wait: bool) -> Result<Option<DLArc<dyn DeliverToRe
[ ... ]
> + current.set_flag_bits(bindings::PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK);
> +
> inner.looper_flags |= LOOPER_WAITING | LOOPER_WAITING_PROC;
> let signal_pending = self.work_condvar.wait_interruptible_freezable(&mut inner);
> inner.looper_flags &= !(LOOPER_WAITING | LOOPER_WAITING_PROC);
>
> + current.clear_flag_bits(bindings::PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK);
[Severity: Medium]
Similar to get_work_local(), is it safe to unconditionally clear the flag here
in get_work() instead of restoring its previous state?
> +
> if signal_pending || inner.looper_need_return {
> // We need to return now. We need to pull the thread off the list of ready threads
> // (by dropping `reg`), then check the state again after it's off the list to
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/task.rs b/rust/kernel/task.rs
> index 38273f4eedb51..6168f058343a2 100644
> --- a/rust/kernel/task.rs
> +++ b/rust/kernel/task.rs
> @@ -344,6 +344,22 @@ pub fn group_leader(&self) -> &Task {
> // only be used while `current` is still valid, thus still running.
> unsafe { &*ptr.cast() }
> }
> +
> + /// Sets the given task flag bits on the current task.
> + #[inline]
> + pub fn set_flag_bits(&self, set: u32) {
> + // SAFETY: The `flags` field of `current` is not modified from other threads, so
> + // the non-atomic update isn't a race.
> + unsafe { (*self.as_ptr()).flags |= set }
> + }
[Severity: High]
Does this expose a soundness hole by allowing data races on the flags field
when called on a non-current task?
The safety comment assumes self is the current task, but the method signature
accepts any Task reference. Because Task implements Send + Sync, another thread
could obtain a reference to a non-current task (for example, via group_leader())
and safely call this method. This allows an unsafe non-atomic read-modify-write
and undefined behavior in safe Rust.
> +
> + /// Clears the given task flag bits on the current task.
> + #[inline]
> + pub fn clear_flag_bits(&self, clear: u32) {
> + // SAFETY: The `flags` field of `current` is not modified from other threads, so
> + // the non-atomic update isn't a race.
> + unsafe { (*self.as_ptr()).flags &= !clear }
> + }
> }
[Severity: High]
Does this method suffer from the same soundness hole as set_flag_bits() since it
is a safe method performing a non-atomic update without verifying self is the
current task?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260827232948.2520558-1-stevensd@google.com?part=8
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-27 23:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-27 23:29 [RFC 00/10] Reclaimable kernel stacks David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 01/10] Add !MEMCG memcg_list_lru_alloc implementation David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 02/10] mm/vmalloc: Skip vmallocinfo NUMA stats for VM_SPARSE David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 03/10] fork: refactor vmap stack alloc/free into helpers David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 04/10] mm: vmalloc: support creating aligned vm areas David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 05/10] fork: allocate reclaimable stacks with VM_SPARSE David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 06/10] Reclaim memory from blocked kernel stacks David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:53 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-28 11:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 12:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 12:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-29 0:18 ` David Stevens
2026-08-29 8:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-29 8:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 12:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 23:33 ` David Stevens
2026-08-28 13:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-08-28 13:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 14:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 15:58 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-08-28 15:10 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-08-28 19:08 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-08-28 19:13 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-08-28 19:17 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-08-28 20:50 ` David Stevens
2026-08-29 8:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-29 14:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2026-08-28 21:17 ` David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 07/10] Reclaim stacks via a shrinker David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 08/10] Set PF_RECLAIMABLE_STACK in various places David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:43 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-28 6:33 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 09/10] x86: Enable reclaimable stacks David Stevens
2026-08-27 23:29 ` [RFC 10/10] arm64: " David Stevens
2026-08-28 12:47 ` [RFC 00/10] Reclaimable kernel stacks Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 14:33 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-08-28 14:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-08-28 16:10 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-08-28 17:58 ` David Stevens
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