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From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
To: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, bigeasy@linutronix.de,
	linux-rt-users@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] arm64/fpsimd: Don't disable softirq when touching FPSIMD/SVE state
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:34:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190411163423.GJ3567@e103592.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <899713e0-2d32-04a0-b2f2-3493f7299033@arm.com>

On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 04:58:41PM +0100, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hi Dave,
> 
> On 4/5/19 4:07 PM, Dave Martin wrote:
> >On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 10:02:45AM +0100, Julien Grall wrote:
> >>>>+#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON
> >>>>+
> >>>>  /*
> >>>>   * may_use_simd - whether it is allowable at this time to issue SIMD
> >>>>   *                instructions or access the SIMD register file
> >>>>diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
> >>>>index 5ebe73b69961..b7e5dac26190 100644
> >>>>--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
> >>>>+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
> >>>>@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@
> >>>>   * To prevent this from racing with the manipulation of the task's FPSIMD state
> >>>>   * from task context and thereby corrupting the state, it is necessary to
> >>>>   * protect any manipulation of a task's fpsimd_state or TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE
> >>>>- * flag with local_bh_disable() unless softirqs are already masked.
> >>>>+ * flag with kernel_neon_{disable, enable}. This will still allow softirqs to
> >>>>+ * run but prevent them to use FPSIMD.
> >>>>   *
> >>>>   * For a certain task, the sequence may look something like this:
> >>>>   * - the task gets scheduled in; if both the task's fpsimd_cpu field
> >>>>@@ -142,6 +143,9 @@ extern void __percpu *efi_sve_state;
> >>>>  #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */
> >>>>+static void kernel_neon_disable(void);
> >>>>+static void kernel_neon_enable(void);
> >>>
> >>>I find these names a bit confusing: _disable() actualy enables FPSIMD/SVE
> >>>context access for the current context (i.e., makes it safe).
> >>>
> >>>Since these also disable/enable preemption, perhaps we can align them
> >>>with the existing get_cpu()/put_cpu(), something like:
> >>>
> >>>void get_cpu_fpsimd_context();
> >>>vold put_cpu_fpsimd_context();
> >>>
> >>>If you consider it's worth adding the checking helper I alluded to
> >>>above, it could then be called something like:
> >>>
> >>>bool have_cpu_fpsimd_context();
> >>
> >>I am not sure where you suggested a checking helper above. Do you refer to
> >>exposing kernel_neon_busy even for !CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON?
> >
> >Hmmm, looks like I got my reply out of order here.
> >
> >I meant the helper (if any) to check
> >!preemptible() && !__this_cpu_read(kernel_neon_busy).
> 
> I guess you are using && instead of || because some of the caller may not
> call get_cpu_fpsimd_context() before but still disable preemption, right?
> 
> Wouldn't it be better to have all the user calling get_cpu_fpsimd_context()
> and put_cpu_fpsimd_context()?
> 
> This has the advantage to uniformize how the way FPSIMD is protected and
> also...

My expectation is that all users would have called
get_cpu_fpsimd_context().

The reason for writing the check that way is that we can't meaningfully
inspect percpu variables unless we are non-preemptible already.  The &&
means we don't do the percpu read at all is the case where preemptible()
is true.

Or do you think my logic is wrong somewhere?  (It's possible...)

> >Looks like you inferred what I meant later on anyway.
> >
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>+
> >>>>  /*
> >>>>   * Call __sve_free() directly only if you know task can't be scheduled
> >>>>   * or preempted.
> >>>>@@ -213,11 +217,11 @@ static void sve_free(struct task_struct *task)
> >>>>   * thread_struct is known to be up to date, when preparing to enter
> >>>>   * userspace.
> >>>>   *
> >>>>- * Softirqs (and preemption) must be disabled.
> >>>>+ * Preemption must be disabled.
> >>>
> >>>[*] That's not enough: we need to be in kernel_neon_disable()...
> >>>_enable() (i.e., kernel_neon_busy needs to be true to prevent softirqs
> >>>messing with the FPSIMD state).
> >>
> >>How about not mentioning preemption at all and just say:
> >>
> >>"The fpsimd context should be acquired before hand".
> >>
> >>This would help if we ever decide to protect critical section differently.
> >
> >Yes, or even better, name the function used to do this (i.e.,
> >kernel_neon_disable() or get_cpu_fpsimd_context() or whatever it's
> >called).
> 
> ... would make the comments simpler because we would have only one possible
> case to care.

Agreed

---Dave

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-11 16:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-08 16:55 [RFC PATCH] arm64/fpsimd: Don't disable softirq when touching FPSIMD/SVE state Julien Grall
2019-02-12 17:13 ` Julia Cartwright
2019-02-18 14:07   ` Julien Grall
2019-02-13 14:30 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-02-13 15:36   ` Dave Martin
2019-02-13 15:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-02-13 15:42       ` Dave Martin
2019-02-13 16:52       ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-02-14 10:34         ` Dave Martin
2019-02-18 15:07           ` Julien Grall
2019-03-04 17:25             ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-03-14 18:07               ` Julien Grall
2019-03-15 10:06                 ` Dave Martin
2019-03-15 10:22                   ` Julien Grall
2019-02-13 16:50     ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-02-18 14:33   ` Julien Grall
2019-02-18 16:32 ` Julien Grall
2019-04-04 10:52 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-05  9:02   ` Julien Grall
2019-04-05 14:39     ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-04-05 15:17       ` Julien Grall
2019-04-05 15:42         ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-04-11 15:12           ` Julien Grall
2019-04-05 15:07     ` Dave Martin
2019-04-11 15:58       ` Julien Grall
2019-04-11 16:34         ` Dave Martin [this message]
2019-04-11 16:50           ` Julien Grall
2019-04-11 14:10   ` Julien Grall

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