From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 4/7] taskstats: Add per task steal time accounting From: Peter Zijlstra In-Reply-To: <4CE2B37F.8050808@redhat.com> References: <20101111170352.732381138@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20101111170815.024542355@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1289677083.2109.167.camel@laptop> <20101115155057.15f3be35@mschwide.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> <1289833883.2109.494.camel@laptop> <20101115184206.4463fd05@mschwide.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> <1289843441.2109.520.camel@laptop> <20101115185923.1c353d07@mschwide.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> <1289844524.2109.524.camel@laptop> <20101116095101.5d86d1e5@mschwide.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> <1289909768.2109.592.camel@laptop> <20101116163325.755a709f@mschwide.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> <1289922329.2109.627.camel@laptop> <4CE2B37F.8050808@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 17:43:26 +0100 Message-ID: <1289925806.2109.628.camel@laptop> Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Archive: List-Post: To: Avi Kivity Cc: Martin Schwidefsky , Michael Holzheu , Shailabh Nagar , Andrew Morton , Venkatesh Pallipadi , Suresh Siddha , Ingo Molnar , Oleg Nesterov , John stultz , Thomas Gleixner , Balbir Singh , Heiko Carstens , Roland McGrath , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, "jeremy.fitzhardinge" List-ID: On Tue, 2010-11-16 at 18:38 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote: > On 11/16/2010 05:45 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > > >>> In fact, kvm seems to already have these tracepoints: kvm_exit/kvm_entry > >>> and it has a separate excplicit hypercall tracepoint as well: > >>> kvm_hypercall. > >> But the kvm tracepoints are used when Linux is the hypervisor, no? For our > >> situation that would be a tracepoint in z/VM - or the equivalent. This is > >> out of scope of this patch. > > Ah crud, you might be right.. Avi could a kvm guest generate events on > > vcpu enter/exit? > > No. Hypercalls are voluntary and known, but most exits are involuntary > and unknown to the guest. Any memory access can generate a page fault, > and any host interrupt will exit the guest. Right, but we could not make the guest jump to a special stub on vcpu enter? I guess we could simply because we have the hypervisor under control.