From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
Sender: Ingo Molnar <mingo.kernel.org@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 08:56:19 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address
 limit before returning to user-mode
List-Archive: <https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/>
List-Post: <mailto:kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ren=E9?= Nyffenegger <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>, linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
List-ID: <linux-s390.vger.kernel.org>


* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

> > There's the option of using GCC plugins now that the infrastructure was 
> > upstreamed from grsecurity. It can be used as part of the regular build 
> > process and as long as the analysis is pretty simple it shouldn't hurt compile 
> > time much.
> 
> Well, and that the situation may arise due to memory corruption, not from 
> poorly-matched set_fs() calls, which static analysis won't help solve. We need 
> to catch this bad kernel state because it is a very bad state to run in.

If memory corruption corrupted the task state into having addr_limit set to 
KERNEL_DS then there's already a fair chance that it's game over: it could also 
have set *uid to 0, or changed a sensitive PF_ flag, or a number of other 
things...

Furthermore, think about it: there's literally an infinite amount of corrupted 
task states that could be a security problem and that could be checked after every 
system call. Do we want to check every one of them?

Thanks,

	Ingo