From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
Sender: Ingo Molnar <mingo.kernel.org@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 08:57:33 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address
 limit before returning to user-mode
List-Archive: <https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/>
List-Post: <mailto:kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ren=E9?= Nyffenegger <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>, linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
List-ID: <linux-s390.vger.kernel.org>


* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

> > git commit b5a882fcf146c87cb6b67c6df353e1c042b8773d
> > "s390: restore address space when returning to user space".
> 
> If I'm understanding this, it won't catch corruption of addr_limit
> during fast-path syscalls, though (i.e. addr_limit changed without a
> call to set_fs()). :(

Nor does it, or the patch you propose, protect against against something 
corrupting task->mm pointer, or the task->*uid values, or any of the myriads of 
security relevant values stored in the task structure!

Making sure API (set_fs()) usage is bug-free and protecting against the effects of 
general data corruption are two unrelated things that should not mixed.

Thanks,

	Ingo