Re: [PATCH v5 33/37] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user()

Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-20T11:47:40Z

On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 1:19 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2024-06-20 at 10:36 +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 19, 2024 at 5:45 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > put_user() uses inline assembly with precise constraints, so Clang
> > > is
> > > in principle capable of instrumenting it automatically.
> > > Unfortunately,
> > > one of the constraints contains a dereferenced user pointer, and
> > > Clang
> > > does not currently distinguish user and kernel pointers. Therefore
> > > KMSAN attempts to access shadow for user pointers, which is not a
> > > right
> > > thing to do.
> >
> > By the way, how does this problem manifest?
> > I was expecting KMSAN to generate dummy shadow accesses in this case,
> > and reading/writing 1-8 bytes from dummy shadow shouldn't be a
> > problem.
> >
> > (On the other hand, not inlining the get_user/put_user functions is
> > probably still faster than retrieving the dummy shadow, so I'm fine
> > either way)
>
> We have two problems here: not only clang can't distinguish user and
> kernel pointers, the KMSAN runtime - which is supposed to clean that
> up - can't do that either due to overlapping kernel and user address
> spaces on s390. So the instrumentation ultimately tries to access the
> real shadow.
>
> I forgot what the consequences of that were exactly, so I reverted the
> patch and now I get:
>
> Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address
> space
> Failing address: 000003fed25fa000 TEID: 000003fed25fa403
> Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
> AS:0000000005a70007 R3:00000000824d8007 S:0000000000000020
> Oops: 0010 ilc:2 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G B N 6.10.0-rc4-
> g8aadb00f495e #11
> Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux)
> Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 000003ffe288975a (memset+0x3a/0xa0)
> R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
> Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000000 000003fed25fa180 000003fed25fa180
> 000003ffe28897a6
> 0000000000000007 000003ffe0000000 0000000000000000
> 000002ee06e68190
> 000002ee06f19000 000003fed25fa180 000003ffd25fa180
> 000003ffd25fa180
> 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 000003ffe17262e0
> 0000037ee000f730
> Krnl Code: 000003ffe288974c: 41101100 la %r1,256(%r1)
> 000003ffe2889750: a737fffb brctg
> %r3,000003ffe2889746
> #000003ffe2889754: c03000000029 larl
> %r3,000003ffe28897a6
> >000003ffe288975a: 44403000 ex %r4,0(%r3)
> 000003ffe288975e: 07fe bcr 15,%r14
> 000003ffe2889760: a74f0001 cghi %r4,1
> 000003ffe2889764: b9040012 lgr %r1,%r2
> 000003ffe2889768: a784001c brc
> 8,000003ffe28897a0
> Call Trace:
> [<000003ffe288975a>] memset+0x3a/0xa0
> ([<000003ffe17262bc>] kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin+0x21c/0x3a0)
> [<000003ffe1725fb6>] kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory+0x26/0x30
> [<000003ffe1c1c646>] create_elf_tables+0x13c6/0x2620
> [<000003ffe1c0ebaa>] load_elf_binary+0x50da/0x68f0
> [<000003ffe18c41fc>] bprm_execve+0x201c/0x2f40
> [<000003ffe18bff9a>] kernel_execve+0x2cda/0x2d00
> [<000003ffe49b745a>] kernel_init+0x9ba/0x1630
> [<000003ffe000cd5c>] __ret_from_fork+0xbc/0x180
> [<000003ffe4a1907a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30
> Last Breaking-Event-Address:
> [<000003ffe2889742>] memset+0x22/0xa0
> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
>
> So is_bad_asm_addr() returned false for a userspace address.
> Why? Because it happened to collide with the kernel modules area:
> precisely the effect of overlapping.
>
> VMALLOC_START: 0x37ee0000000
> VMALLOC_END: 0x3a960000000
> MODULES_VADDR: 0x3ff60000000
> Address: 0x3ffd157a580
> MODULES_END: 0x3ffe0000000

I see, thanks for the clarification!

> Now the question is, why do we crash when accessing shadow for modules?
> I'll need to investigate, this does not look normal. But even if that
> worked, we clearly wouldn't want userspace accesses to pollute module
> shadow, so I think we need this patch in its current form.

Ok, it indeed makes sense.