From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 344797E110; Sat, 26 Apr 2025 18:03:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1745690609; cv=none; b=saujoxRmjQ9XHEK6REVMA0X1opnRxC467toBl7nEtbWzQDCYLW5n5CJnH9WjNs6l+uO9knjKqO8O9ouOfkuTd0zX0I8G9B45E3MPUSp/KJDfIXmP6rm+BhU0Tfxs5ALekZ+ZbleeZdx5qqDLrhLZFOOzxC/i3aYoPr81Kzj/YcY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1745690609; c=relaxed/simple; bh=thPYajZSkuIUqKSQ0PKrjdP700DcSK2zwAu2Gky2T80=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=UsC0QOWAIu4XUqFxjJcTrGlll4PmDrzRsoPly9KFq4dgg3F4fGPbpZu2tjW9FhNE6WPzsKSHuGSJbsZKHNkc+Zxib8kyWf2qPh2cPWGjh9L6tG/p+zJclW2e8wCH8TOuAruQceVJirwdhqqof7IAQ4XvFRFK9mfBU28hAzrtv6s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=nAIxHEC/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="nAIxHEC/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3C994C4CEE2; Sat, 26 Apr 2025 18:03:28 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1745690608; bh=thPYajZSkuIUqKSQ0PKrjdP700DcSK2zwAu2Gky2T80=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=nAIxHEC/RBFXC7YAAr3+tsr8rzEcee3Oga1vMPOVdLEclJGRGGYsap6d40ssYdREa 631y8iWvrWajenPInP5JKnMuJ2fzsFVn4xbQ/K+cHhgPVnyuchNRRoD0ozvKffZkS3 MqUsr8paPOUnFmn+B8HDI8yKlJGh1TXUf3fq6tuJ1SIjPZir6nq73386jFGlYKnBTI uo2ZHr9L3pkwpshwb0rthNh+eao6mVOKjQYtoSDUrpgKEgzJXu+h6VzFzy4Z/K4auE MgMeah9RtM9RNppv7fmQMq0y8aXytAvAE0U5aitXE09LbzHtDgGADWAkJrVYOWn55s dQXkKhP5hQ5yw== Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2025 11:03:26 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org, Jason@zx2c4.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] crypto: x86/sha256 - implement library instead of shash Message-ID: <20250426180326.GA1184@sol.localdomain> References: <20250426065041.1551914-12-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Sat, Apr 26, 2025 at 06:50:43PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > +void sha256_blocks_arch(u32 state[SHA256_STATE_WORDS], > > + const u8 *data, size_t nblocks) > > +{ > > + if (static_branch_likely(&have_sha256_x86) && crypto_simd_usable()) { > > + kernel_fpu_begin(); > > + static_call(sha256_blocks_x86)(state, data, nblocks); > > + kernel_fpu_end(); > > + } else { > > + sha256_blocks_generic(state, data, nblocks); > > + } > > Why did you restore the SIMD fallback path? Please provide a real > use-case for doing SHA2 in a hardirq or I'll just remove it again. The SHA-256 library functions currently work in any context, and this patch series preserves that behavior. Changing that would be a separate change. But also as I've explained before, for the library API the performance benefit of removing the crypto_simd_usable() doesn't seem to be worth the footgun that would be introduced. Your position is, effectively, that if someone calls one of the sha256*() functions from a hardirq, we should sometimes corrupt a random task's FPU registers. That's a really bad bug that is very difficult to root-cause. My position is that we should make it just work as expected. Yes, no one *should* be doing SHA-256 in a hardirq. But I don't think that means we should corrupt a random task's FPU registers if someone doesn't follow best practices, when we can easily make the API just work as expected. - Eric