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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Bharat Bhushan <bharat.bhushan@nxp.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>,
	Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@caviumnetworks.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH iommufd 1/9] irq: Add msi_device_has_secure_msi()
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2022 14:18:16 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <86a63wr787.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y5NB7o/7gtryVpoJ@nvidia.com>

On Fri, 09 Dec 2022 14:10:54 +0000,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 01:59:35PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > On Thu, 08 Dec 2022 20:26:28 +0000,
> > Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:
> > > 
> > > This will replace irq_domain_check_msi_remap() in following patches.
> > > 
> > > The new API makes it more clear what "msi_remap" actually means from a
> > > functional perspective instead of identifying an implementation specific
> > > HW feature.
> > > 
> > > Secure MSI means that an irq_domain on the path from the initiating device
> > 
> > irq_domain is a SW construct, and you are trying to validate something
> > that is HW property.
> 
> Sure, but the SW constructs model the HW functions, so yes this is
> trying to say that the irq_domain is modeling HW that does this.
> 
> > "Secure" is also a terribly overloaded term that means very different
> > things in non-x86 circles. 
> 
> Here it is being used as a software property - it is security safe to
> allow device operation outside the kernel.
> 
> > When I read this, I see an ARM system with
> > a device generating an MSI with the "secure" bit set as part of the
> > transaction and identifying the memory access as being part of the
> > "secure" domain.
> 
> Is that secure meaning "confidential" or some other ARM thing?

In ARM parlance, "secure" denotes the secure *physical address space*,
which is a totally disconnected PA space from the "normal" PA space.

If on top of that you have had an unhealthy helping of the
"confidential computing" kool-aid, you get another 2 extra physical
address spaces ("root" and "realm").

> 
> > > number that the initiating device is authorized to trigger. Secure MSI
> > > must block devices from triggering interrupts they are not authorized to
> > > trigger. Currently authorization means the MSI vector is one assigned to
> > > the device.
> > 
> > What you are describing here is a *device isolation* property, and I'd
> > rather we stay away from calling that "secure". If anything, I'd
> > rather call everything else "broken".
> 
> Sure, so
> 
> msi_device_isolated_interrupts() 
> 
> And related ?

Sure.

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-09 14:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-08 20:26 [PATCH iommufd 0/9] Remove IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 1/9] irq: Add msi_device_has_secure_msi() Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 13:59   ` Marc Zyngier
2022-12-09 14:10     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 14:18       ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 2/9] vfio/type1: Check that every device supports IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 21:48   ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-09  0:44     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 10:24       ` Robin Murphy
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 3/9] vfio/type1: Convert to msi_device_has_secure_msi() Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 4/9] iommufd: " Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09  6:01   ` Tian, Kevin
2022-12-09 14:47     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 16:44       ` Robin Murphy
2022-12-09 17:38         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-12 15:17           ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-12-12 15:47             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-12 16:25               ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 5/9] irq: Remove unused irq_domain_check_msi_remap() code Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 6/9] irq: Rename MSI_REMAP to SECURE_MSI Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 7/9] iommu/x86: Replace IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP with IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_SECURE_MSI Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 8/9] irq/s390: Add arch_is_secure_msi() for s390 Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 9/9] iommu: Remove IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 23:37 ` [PATCH iommufd 0/9] " Matthew Rosato
2022-12-09  0:42   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09  5:54 ` Tian, Kevin
2022-12-09 14:38   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 15:21     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 19:57 ` Thomas Gleixner

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