From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Bharat Bhushan <bharat.bhushan@nxp.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>,
Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>,
Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@caviumnetworks.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH iommufd 1/9] irq: Add msi_device_has_secure_msi()
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 10:10:54 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y5NB7o/7gtryVpoJ@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <86bkocr83c.wl-maz@kernel.org>
On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 01:59:35PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On Thu, 08 Dec 2022 20:26:28 +0000,
> Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:
> >
> > This will replace irq_domain_check_msi_remap() in following patches.
> >
> > The new API makes it more clear what "msi_remap" actually means from a
> > functional perspective instead of identifying an implementation specific
> > HW feature.
> >
> > Secure MSI means that an irq_domain on the path from the initiating device
>
> irq_domain is a SW construct, and you are trying to validate something
> that is HW property.
Sure, but the SW constructs model the HW functions, so yes this is
trying to say that the irq_domain is modeling HW that does this.
> "Secure" is also a terribly overloaded term that means very different
> things in non-x86 circles.
Here it is being used as a software property - it is security safe to
allow device operation outside the kernel.
> When I read this, I see an ARM system with
> a device generating an MSI with the "secure" bit set as part of the
> transaction and identifying the memory access as being part of the
> "secure" domain.
Is that secure meaning "confidential" or some other ARM thing?
> > number that the initiating device is authorized to trigger. Secure MSI
> > must block devices from triggering interrupts they are not authorized to
> > trigger. Currently authorization means the MSI vector is one assigned to
> > the device.
>
> What you are describing here is a *device isolation* property, and I'd
> rather we stay away from calling that "secure". If anything, I'd
> rather call everything else "broken".
Sure, so
msi_device_isolated_interrupts()
And related ?
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-09 14:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-08 20:26 [PATCH iommufd 0/9] Remove IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 1/9] irq: Add msi_device_has_secure_msi() Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 13:59 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-12-09 14:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2022-12-09 14:18 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 2/9] vfio/type1: Check that every device supports IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 21:48 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-09 0:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 10:24 ` Robin Murphy
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 3/9] vfio/type1: Convert to msi_device_has_secure_msi() Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 4/9] iommufd: " Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 6:01 ` Tian, Kevin
2022-12-09 14:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 16:44 ` Robin Murphy
2022-12-09 17:38 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-12 15:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-12-12 15:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-12 16:25 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 5/9] irq: Remove unused irq_domain_check_msi_remap() code Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 6/9] irq: Rename MSI_REMAP to SECURE_MSI Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 7/9] iommu/x86: Replace IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP with IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_SECURE_MSI Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 8/9] irq/s390: Add arch_is_secure_msi() for s390 Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 20:26 ` [PATCH iommufd 9/9] iommu: Remove IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 23:37 ` [PATCH iommufd 0/9] " Matthew Rosato
2022-12-09 0:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 5:54 ` Tian, Kevin
2022-12-09 14:38 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 15:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-09 19:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
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