From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 681D3379EC8; Fri, 19 Jun 2026 12:14:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781871265; cv=none; b=X6lh2x6iDfFtTH/PO/M0fSR3Mnng8hPQ487MsqfwFGOkRGT4u2n8NA5jwXnnkBY8cJ2r8iGQZ3zyRw7320a1VM0MpKGdRpIJeEn2ShR+aReL+bKdtKPvFQeotOebe6jSHVMI/AWrx3J35JtxNj633EvJojkWaXqVhHmM/GqT5Xw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781871265; c=relaxed/simple; bh=D18Y7QMf2ua3rnX5TS42ytW40kBRhvzW3ESkYKGnS+U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:Message-ID: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=r8PbCLFVci419vh6DvSNHywzu0TFEK1xUTESRs44i1Lk8j0aSTsye977j6/Qe/I5EUMT8s8Gm/WcNJ4A5Si/dugoj9MTVKw0hXaC1vLeyCFJVV1tfp79VmBwRg+/aQvyOut8Kyv3UX19+0Y2vEFWb5oDN/mYBdJsmJHeK+M1rIE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Rt0Naddy; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Rt0Naddy" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9D9471F000E9; Fri, 19 Jun 2026 12:14:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1781871263; bh=KrOJsDp07RvjHOd4cMkZps4YSuiVy126p7RvYOPP0A8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=Rt0NaddySWLItBMWeGU37cEP6ghBwAiCgFoVL/yDeYKFrgWjjOXw5fnpeRkuQFogY CLQbZdwDh+aShieCJXxvlci/ACzTq16EHZ6mSrAk3gTro6XT5InFDGLxT0cVRcEqfb FihgVAzw/GPJ10OXjcrRrP/594+fy9kNP/aeuNTCXdZBvKOKjXYtpHsmL/+1mwrFLv oVkEnkNi8gubNsQu/SLW3F9g7CDV8OKpc/DTxyw/Rmn+RCGXkd42YTjCTaq4zmSo9u 5ej1hm8jG9aoxWXPIhtGGBmT2MJcNjAicaMSdL3a0XPTJmSSxFB09c0n1Sp7+9yfRg /ADZdG2vuqkog== X-Mailer: emacs 30.2 (via feedmail 11-beta-1 I) From: Aneesh Kumar K.V To: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy , Catalin Marinas , iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Robin Murphy , Marek Szyprowski , Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Steven Price , Suzuki K Poulose , Jiri Pirko , Mostafa Saleh , Petr Tesarik , Dan Williams , Xu Yilun , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Alexander Gordeev , Gerald Schaefer , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/20] dma-mapping: Use DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED through direct, pool and swiotlb paths In-Reply-To: <20260618153705.GH231643@ziepe.ca> References: <20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20260609144746.GL2764304@ziepe.ca> <2ecfa1a8-6202-4319-9692-a6ffeb5a3dbf@amd.com> <20260618153705.GH231643@ziepe.ca> Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 13:14:13 +0100 Message-ID: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Jason Gunthorpe writes: > On Thu, Jun 18, 2026 at 09:37:22AM +0100, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: >> Alexey Kardashevskiy writes: >> >> > On 10/6/26 00:47, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: >> >> On Tue, Jun 09, 2026 at 02:43:08PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 02:09:39PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote: >> >>>> This series propagates DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED through the dma-direct, >> >>>> dma-pool, and swiotlb paths so that encrypted and decrypted DMA buffers >> >>>> are handled consistently. >> >>>> >> >>>> Today, the direct DMA path mostly relies on force_dma_unencrypted() for >> >>>> shared/decrypted buffer handling. This series consolidates the >> >>>> force_dma_unencrypted() checks in the top-level functions and ensures >> >>>> that the remaining DMA interfaces use DMA attributes to make the correct >> >>>> decisions. >> >>> >> >>> Please check Sashiko's reports, it has some good points: >> >>> >> >>> https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org >> >>> >> >>> I think the main one is the swiotlb_tbl_map_single() changes which break >> >>> AMD SME host support. There cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) is true >> >>> but force_dma_unencrypted() is false. Normally you'd not end up on this >> >>> path but you can have swiotlb=force. >> >> >> >> IMHO that's an AMD issue, not with the design of this series.. >> >> >> >> The series is right, a device that is !force_dma_decrypted() must be >> >> considerd to be a trusted device and we must never place any DMA >> >> mappings for a trusted device into shared memory. >> > >> > swiotlb=force forces swiotlb, not decryption. > > If force_dma_decrypted() == true then swiotlb must allocate from a > decrypted memory pool. It is right there in the name! > > The hypervisor environment should *never* set force_dma_decrypted() > because all devices can access all hypervisor memory, up to their IOVA > limits. > >> > So when I try "mem_encrypt=on iommu=pt swiotlb=force" with this >> > patchset, it fails to boot. But it boots with a hack like this: > > On the host side I expect this to cause swiotlb to allocate encrypted > memory and bounce to it. > >> u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); >> u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, >> dev->bus_dma_limit); >> + /* >> + * With memory encryption enabled, SWIOTLB is marked decrypted. >> + * If SWIOTLB bouncing is forced, treat the device as requiring >> + * decrypted DMA. >> + */ > > And this is more insane logic. The right fix is to allocate the > swiotlb bounce from the *encrypted* pools when running on the > hypervisor which requires undoing this abuse of force_dma_decrypted(). > Agreed. If the device can do encrypted DMA and requires bouncing, it should bounce through encrypted pools. We don't support encrypted pools now and that means, we mark the option ("mem_encrypt=on iommu=pt swiotlb=force") not supported for now? -aneesh