Re: [patch] [SCSI] qla4xxx: overflow in qla4xxx_set_chap_entry()

[Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>]

On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 03:08:12PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 11:52:37AM +0000, Vikas Chaudhary wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> > Date: Wednesday, 13 November 2013 1:18 pm
> > To: Vikas <vikas.chaudhary@qlogic.com>, Adheer Chandravanshi
> > <adheer.chandravanshi@qlogic.com>
> > Cc: Dept-Eng iSCSI Driver <Dept-iSCSIDriver@qlogic.com>, "James E.J.
> > Bottomley" <JBottomley@parallels.com>, scsi <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>,
> > "kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org" <kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org>
> > Subject: [patch] [SCSI] qla4xxx: overflow in qla4xxx_set_chap_entry()
> > 
> > >We should cap the size of memcpy() because it comes from the network
> > >and can't be trusted.
> > 
> > This patch is on assumption that data is coming from network,
> > but in this case data come from application (iscsiadm) with correct length.
> > 
> 
> No, that doesn't work.  We don't trust user space.

Btw, the is especially true with network namespaces...  These days
anyone who is ns_capable() could overflow the buffer after:
df008c91f835 ('net: Allow userns root to control llc, netfilter, netlink, packet, and xfrm')

regards,
dan carpenter