From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:03:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180106090322.GF4380@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151520104838.32271.7038801336240727574.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:10:48PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> Static analysis reports that 'handle' may be a user controlled value
> that is used as a data dependency to read 'sp' from the
> 'req->outstanding_cmds' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of
> kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
> stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'sp'. In this
> case 'sp' is directly dereferenced later in the function.
I'm pretty sure that 'handle' comes from the hardware, not from
userspace, from what I can tell here. If we want to start auditing
__iomem data sources, great! But that's a bigger task, and one I don't
think we are ready to tackle...
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-06 9:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-06 1:09 [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:03 ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-01-06 9:42 ` Greg KH
2018-01-11 22:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 7:27 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 15:25 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-06 2:22 ` [PATCH 00/18] " Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87y3lbpvzp.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-06 6:30 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:43 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 16:20 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:59 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:44 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 9:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 15:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 16:34 ` Daniel Borkmann
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180106090322.GF4380@kroah.com \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=alan@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
--cc=jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=martin.petersen@oracle.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).